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LST Discharging British Wounded,
watercolor on paper, by Mitchell Jamieson,
ca. 1944, shows a landing craft unloading
wounded British Royal Marines at a
southern English port during the first
days of the Normandy invasion in June
1944. In “The British and the Limitations of Maritime Maneuver,” Geoffrey
Till reviews Britain’s experience with
the concept of maritime maneuver
associated with Sir Julian Corbett, to
which many strategists are turning as a
means of achieving their ends in an era
of intensifying great-power competition
across the oceans, examining the costs,
challenges, and limitations that must be
resolved if maritime maneuver is to fulfill
its strategic promise.
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FROM THE EDITORS
It long has been the fashion to contrast an “American way of war” with a “British
way of war,” the difference corresponding roughly to a reliance on attrition or
maneuver. In “The British and the Limitations of Maritime Maneuver,” Geoffrey Till provides a succinct overview of Britain’s long-standing preference for
maneuver in warfare, with particular reference to the key role of the Royal Navy
in enabling that preference. At the same time, he emphasizes the barriers to
executing maneuverist warfare successfully, owing to the intrinsic difficulties of
amphibious operations as well as the enemy’s failure to cooperate, and thus the
inescapability of attrition as a default mode. In a new era of great-power competition, the United States faces adversaries who show every indication of eschewing
attritional methods while threatening to employ novel capabilities such as cyber
that particularly lend themselves to a maneuverist mind-set. The implications of
all this for American naval strategy today deserve to be pondered. Geoffrey Till
holds the Dudley W. Knox Chair for Naval History and Strategy at the Naval War
College (the College).
In “Water under the Bridge? The Revival of New Zealand–United States Maritime Cooperation,” Steven Paget comprehensively reviews the U.S.–New Zealand
defense relationship as both nations strive to overcome the estrangement that
followed New Zealand’s expulsion from the ANZUS alliance in 1985 as a result
of Wellington’s opposition to visits from nuclear-armed or -propelled American
naval vessels. While it continues to maintain some distance from American
foreign policy, particularly relating to China, it is evident that New Zealand
fully embraces a close defense relationship with the United States and a policy
of maritime cooperation, especially in dealing with the small island states of the
South Pacific, where internal political instability increasingly is intertwined with
aggressive political-economic meddling by the Chinese. Steven Paget is affiliated
with the University of Portsmouth (U.K.).
For the most part, the stability of civil-military relations in the United States
has been taken for granted in recent years. Very recent developments suggest this
no longer should be the case. In “‘An Object Lesson to the Country’: The 1915
Atlantic Fleet Summer Exercise and the U.S. Navy on the Eve of World War I,”
Ryan Peeks reconstructs the inside story of the political impetus behind the fleet’s
summer exercise that year. The larger story is the antagonism between senior
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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USN officers—including the most senior among them, Admiral Bradley Fiske—
and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels. (It should be added, though, that
Fiske’s intrigues were abetted covertly by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin
D. Roosevelt.) The exercise simulated a German naval expedition against the
East Coast of the United States; it was rigged to result in a resounding German
victory, primarily to help the Navy pressure the administration and Congress to
make up for its deficit (to some extent self-inflicted) in battle cruisers, but more
generally to prepare public opinion for higher defense budgets in the changed
international circumstances of the time. Ryan Peeks is a historian at the Joint
History and Research Office.
The Second World War continues to be a rich source of lessons in maritime
naval operations. Milan Vego, in “Redeployment of the German Brest Group
through the English Channel, 11–13 February 1942 (Operation CERBERUS),”
provides a detailed reconstruction of a largely forgotten encounter between the
German fleet and Britain’s Royal Navy in the early stages of the war. He shows
that, despite the Germans’ relative inexperience in naval warfare, they demonstrated a high degree of operational virtuosity in the daring redeployment of
the Brest Group through the English Channel with minimal losses, in spite of
Britain’s many advantages in this theater. Milan Vego is the Admiral R. K. Turner
Professor of Operational Art at the College.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

on the Naval War College’s Newport campus is the venerable Luce Hall, built in 1892 as the
first purpose-built home of the College. It stands majestically along the shores of
Narragansett Bay, and its visage might imply that the institution is an independent and stand-alone entity. In fact, the College is one node in a rather intricate
network of military and civilian institutions of higher learning. As such, we are
guided by the standards and expectations of two national or regional accrediting standards or bodies: the Officer Professional Military Education Policy
(OPMEP), administered by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS),
and the New England Commission of Higher Education (NECHE). We will look
briefly at each of these to demonstrate how the standards they have established
help to shape the manner in which we provide professional military education
and graduate-level education to our students.
THE MOST ICONIC BUILDING

Accreditation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Throughout their existence, the military services have each operated schools and
educational institutions designed to focus on the specific war-fighting environments in which they operate: land combat for the Army; maritime operations
for the Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard; and aerial combat for the Air Force,
following its establishment as an independent service in 1947. It long has been
recognized that any military operation of significant size will need to receive
support from and to coordinate with multiple services, the particulars depending on the nature of the action contemplated. The term joint operations is used
when forces from more than one service operate together, as they did during
World War II and later conflicts. The National War College was founded in 1946
as the first senior service school designed specifically to teach joint operations by
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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providing joint professional military education (JPME). The Goldwater-Nichols
Act of 1986 reorganized significant portions of the Department of Defense, and
it encouraged joint education in the service-specific schools by requiring formal
joint education for officers competing for flag- and general-officer rank. The
primary CJCS instruction (CJCSI) providing guidance on how JPME will be
administered across the military services is the OPMEP. It identifies required
multiservice percentages in both faculty and student populations, joint-learning
areas and special areas of emphasis, and other factors designed to ensure that
the entire officer corps receives a broad education that goes beyond any single
service’s perspective. I want to share with you some of the noteworthy changes
detailed in the most recent revision to this critical document.
In May 2020, the Directorate for Joint Force Development (Joint Staff J7)
issued CJCSI 1800.01F, also known as OPMEP-Foxtrot (OPMEP-F), which introduces a significant shift in how professional military education at all levels
must assess whether students are in fact learning what their professors, academic
departments, and colleges intend for them to learn. Rather than simply requiring coverage of specified material, as in previous versions of the instruction,
OPMEP-F will bring our command-and-staff and war-college assessment practices in line with those that have been in place across higher education for many
years. Specifically, our programs now will have to demonstrate that students in
our intermediate and senior courses have mastered the defined program learning outcomes (PLOs). Students will continue to take exams, write papers, and
participate in war games and group exercises, while the faculty will grade those
assignments as they have done in the past. Now, however, we must transform
our curriculum and method of delivery to allow the faculty also to assess those
assignments from the perspective of outcomes mastery. The outcomes students
must master are designed to prepare them for service as joint warfighters, senior
staff officers, and strategists.
Accommodating the changes in OPMEP-F and ensuring alignment with the
tenets of outcomes-based military education (OBME) will require extensive effort over the next six years here at NWC and in the schools and colleges of our
sister services. Here in Newport, a College Assessment Committee has been at
work since September 2018 strategizing ways to address the large volume of
changes. These efforts will include potential revisions to the academic calendar,
core curriculum, and student assignments to accommodate the assessment of
PLOs, including by developing formal capstone exercises. Interestingly, because
of the phased accession of our students—three times a year—NWC is the only
JPME institution that has not developed a programmatic capstone event. A welldesigned capstone will give our students the opportunity to synthesize what they
have learned across their courses. That synthesis will allow them to deepen their
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learning, leading to better retention and a better ability to understand, analyze,
and evaluate situations in their future assignments. In addition to involving
faculty and leadership from across the College, assessment will require us to
determine whether additional resources are necessary. Many details have yet to
be worked out, so the groundwork will continue through the 2021–22 academic
year. Adjustments to NWC curricula then will be implemented in academic years
2022–23 and 2023–24.
I believe that the ultimate shift to OBME will bring multiple benefits to our
graduates and to the College itself. The most important of these will come in the
area of student learning. Assessing students’ mastery will provide evidence to
our faculty of what our students are learning well and which areas need improvement. Assessment data on strengths and weaknesses will allow the faculty to close
the loop on curriculum development by adjusting content coverage or teaching
methods to ensure that students are learning what they really need to learn. Most
importantly, the processes required to assess student learning in OBME will be
the same as those required for our periodic reaccreditation through NECHE, as
discussed in the paragraphs below.
Accreditation by the New England Commission of Higher Education
Over the first one hundred years of the Naval War College’s existence, students
graduating from the institution received a diploma certifying that they had met
all the educational requirements established by the College, and their personnel
records were annotated to recognize this accomplishment; but the leadership
and faculty of the College long had believed that the quality of instruction and
comprehensiveness of the curricula were equivalent to those found in many
civilian degree-granting graduate-school programs. Upon assuming command
in August 1987, Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth, USN—the first NWC president
to hold a PhD—initiated a multiyear process focused on receiving the authority
from Congress and the Navy to award a degree of master of arts in national security and strategic studies. The complex and lengthy process ultimately led to two
major milestones: the 101st Congress’s passage in November 1990 of a public law
authorizing the degree, and the March 1991 decision by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges (which in a 2018 reorganization became NECHE)
to grant initial academic accreditation.
This accreditation remains in force today and is reviewed every ten years,
with an interim assessment completed at the five-year mark between cycles. The
College continually must meet nine specific standards that include but are not
limited to the following: Teaching, Learning, and Scholarship; Educational Effectiveness; and Integrity, Transparency, and Public Disclosure. We will undergo
our next comprehensive evaluation visit in the fall of 2024, but much work must
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be done in the coming months on a detailed institutional self-study to prepare
for the on-site visit by NECHE evaluators. Our College is one of 210 institutions
of higher education that fall under the purview of NECHE; others include Ivy
League institutions Harvard, Yale, Brown, and Dartmouth. We are, indeed, in
good company!
In summary, our Naval War College can be defined as a high-functioning educational institution that operates effectively in two worlds. We provide top-quality
JPME leading to certification of our students as effective joint warriors; and we
convey world-class, graduate-level academic programs that lead to regionally accredited master of arts degrees. The only thing we are missing is a football team!
What a privilege it is to lead such a remarkable institution.

SHOSHANA S. CHATFIELD

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
(Dr. Kristin Mulready-Stone and Prof. John Jackson contributed to this article.)
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THE BRITISH AND THE LIMITATIONS OF
MARITIME MANEUVER
Geoffrey Till

T

hese days, strategists, in effect, are turning their thoughts to the concept of
maritime maneuver associated with Sir Julian Corbett as a means of achieving their ends in an era of intensifying great-power competition, not least across
the western Pacific. Proponents assure others that this strategic approach offers
a wider range of diplomatic and operational options in peace as well as in war,
while limiting cost and liability, especially for countries that are more maritime
in their outlook. But there are costs, challenges, and limitations that need to be
addressed realistically if practice is to equal theory—if, indeed, it can. A review
of the British experience should help identify some of the issues that must be
resolved if maritime maneuver is to fulfill its strategic promise. Historically, that
promise has disappointed—in realized cost, achieved effect, or both—so often
that too much should not be expected of it.
But first, what are we talking about? What does maritime maneuver mean?
Maneuver and the maneuverist approach denote the attempt to shape a conflict
and attack an adversary’s cohesion either by coming from unexpected directions
or by employing a surprising and innovative manner of attack. The broad aim
is to outsmart the adversary rather than simply to subdue him through direct,
frontal attack, and thus to avoid the heavy costs that characterized the attritionalist approach to battle on the western front in the First World War, for example.
Churchill’s view was clear. In his account of the Dardanelles campaign, the
future prime minister wrote, “Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver. The
greater the general, the more he contributes in maneuver, the less he demands
in slaughter.”1 This famous aphorism summons up the juxtaposition of the two.
Yet while they often are treated as opposites, maneuver and attrition in fact are
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complementary. Most military campaigns exhibit both, in varying relative mixtures and at varying times, depending on a range of circumstances and intentions. Alongside the maneuverist aspects of the Battle of Trafalgar, for example,
there were some distinctly attritionalist ones as well, although Nelson’s aim at that
time was to ensure that the attrition was as one-sided as possible.2
The maneuver–attrition spectrum applies to all three of the levels of war: the
strategic, which relates to the war as a whole; the operational, which deals with
campaigns; and the tactical, which concerns the conduct of battle. The differences between these three levels of war are not clear-cut. As A. A. Svechin famously
sought to explain, strategy provides the framework within which the campaign
should be fought, while campaign planning does the same for the battles.3 For
this reason, failure at one level can rise up or cascade downward, adversely affecting outcomes at the other two levels of war.
Although none of these concepts or terms were around when Britain was
conducting most of its military campaigns, this article contends that the default
approach of the British to the conduct of their amphibious and shore-based conflicts was instinctively maneuverist in conception, but that a variety of adverse
circumstances at all three levels of war meant it often was much more attritionalist in practice than they wished. At all three levels, though, the British were
seeking maneuver while trying to avoid attrition. To the charge that all sensible
militaries try to do this, the response is that the British were trying to do it more
than most. This made sense for them because their control of the seas provided
them far more strategic opportunities than their adversaries had, while the costs
of maintaining that naval superiority meant they had a much smaller army than
their main adversaries did, and thus one that was unsuited to an attritionalist
style of war.
This brings us to the second part of the concept—its maritime nature. Corbett
was at pains to emphasize that the destinies of nations were decided essentially on
land, not at sea. Accordingly, navies were most strategically significant to the extent that they could influence the course of events ashore by what they did at and
from the sea. But importantly, there were limits to the effects that navies could
produce, especially when set against countries with great continental resources,
or in peacetime, when the use of overt military force was more constrained. In
such circumstances the other services and other economic, social, and political
levers of national power had to be an important part of the effort as well. The
naval contribution was an essential but usually insufficient element in a wholeof-government, if not whole-of-country, maritime approach to the advance and
defense of national interests. As Corbett made clear, maritime simply referred to
situations in which the sea was an important factor.4 Corbett’s colleague Charles
Callwell underlines the point that for this approach to succeed, “the whole of
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the machinery [of government] . . . [needs] to be set in motion [and] there must
be harmony in the council chamber and in the theater of operations.”5 For a
peacetime example of this approach, we need look no further than China’s transnational development program, the Belt and Road Initiative, which, whatever its
motivation, is built on a range of national efforts intended to combine to deliver
strategic effects, and in which the sea and both the navy and commercial shipping
are central to the outcome.
With that in mind, how have the British attempted over the years to put maritime and maneuver together? With what success, and what problems did they
encounter? And finally, how salient is all this to today’s circumstances?
EARLY INDICATIONS OF THE BRITISH SEARCH FOR
MARITIME MANEUVER
Corbett emphasized that maritime maneuver characterized the British style of
war in the eighteenth century. It combined naval, military, and economic power in
a uniquely beneficial and cost-effective way. This allowed the British to “become a
controlling force in the European system” and to maintain and extend their interests
by manipulating the balance of power in continental Europe through the controlled
and careful application of maritime power in peace and war.6
This approach had several components. First and foremost, it meant avoiding
entangling military commitments on the Continent, and instead fighting wars to
the last Prussian, Russian, or Frenchman, as the case might be. This preference is
confirmed by Tobias Smollett, considering the Seven Years’ War in his History of
England: “[M]any friends of their country exclaimed against the projected army
of observation in Germany, as the commencement of a ruinous continental war,
which it was neither the interest of the nation to undertake, nor in their power
to maintain, without starving the operations by sea, and in America, founded
on British principles.”7 The reference to “British principles” is interesting, as it
confirms an unspoken, typically national way of warfare.
Where the effort of supported surrogates was not enough to deliver the outcomes that Britain needed, command of the sea would allow its navy and an
expeditionary army to range across the world to attack the opponent’s trade, seize
his ports and colonies, and enrich Britain itself while securing strategic gains that
could be traded against possible losses in Europe. Thus, Pitt in 1796: “While the
violence of France has been over-running so great a part of Europe, and everywhere carrying desolation in its progress, your naval exertions have enabled you
to counterbalance their successes, by acquisitions in different parts of the globe,
and to pave the way for the restoration of peace to your allies, on terms which
their own strength might have been unable to procure.”8 This no doubt helps explain why he and others regarded the army as perhaps a necessary evil, whereas
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the navy, as the source of such strategic freedom to maneuver, was “[t]hat great
foundation of our strength, of our glory, and of our characteristic superiority
over the rest of the nations of Europe.”9 It also explains why, in the words of one
speaker in the House of Commons on the eve of the War of Jenkins’s Ear, “[I]t
would be one of the greatest Favours the French could do us to provoke us to a
Sea War, and one of the greatest Injuries we can do ourselves, is to engage without Necessity in an expensive
L and one.” 10 Others were
[W]hile they often are treated as opposites,
anxious to show that sea- and
maneuver and attrition in fact are compleland-based grand strategies
mentary. Most military campaigns exhibit
both, in varying relative mixtures and at vary- (not that they had either the
concepts or these words at the
ing times, depending on a range of circumtime) were complementary,
stances and intentions.
not opposites, emphasizing
the importance of sustaining armies that could deliver the necessary effects on
land and the requirement for a flourishing economy able to fund them.
At the operational and tactical levels, of course, things were not so simple, and
the historical record does much to justify Sir Michael Howard’s conclusion concerning “virtually every British amphibious operation since the age of Elizabeth”:
“[A]ll brilliant in conception, all lamentable in execution. The surprise and mobility which [Basil] Liddell Hart had seen as the essence of British maritime strategy, so far from ensuring success, had resulted over the centuries in an almost
unbroken record of expensive and humiliating failure.”11
Such, for example, was the fate of the 1741 venture against Cartagena, which,
though maneuverist in conception, turned out to be disastrously attritional in
execution.12 Some of the reasons for this were general ones that could apply to any
military operation, while others were especially characteristic of amphibious operations. In the first category fall such deficiencies as the poor mobilization and preparation of the force, the lack of surprise, the effects of disease, and the unimaginative
frontal tactics that led, for example, to the failure to take the fort of Saint Lazare by
land assault. The difficulties special to the conduct of amphibious operations include such things as the failure of naval gunfire support, from which commanders
took away the lesson that, to be effective, ships in the future must get within half a
musket shot of a strong fort, dangerous though that might be. The navy also was
distracted constantly by the need to guard against the sudden appearance of more
Spanish or even French ships. Above all, the expedition showed the dangers of an
almost complete absence of coordination between type commanders, at sea and on
land, who necessarily had different, if complementary, priorities.13
These problems did not mean that for such operational and tactical reasons
strategic maneuver of this sort always would fail. They did not, for example, in
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the seizure of Quebec in 1759 or of Havana in 1762, and in support of Wellington’s campaign in Spain against Napoléon. But they did underline the point that
for the concept to succeed, extensive preparations had to be made; this demanded
sufficient time and, above all, the establishment of a settled clarity of aim.
Arguably, the absence of either was the problem in the Crimean War a century
after Britain’s defeat at Cartagena. Again, in essence it was a brilliant concept, especially when linked to an outflanking threat to the Russian position in the Baltic and
to Saint Petersburg itself to pressure Russia’s capacity and will to continue the war.
However, it was a venture that proved much more costly than expected through
lamentable failures of preparation; through continuous delays in execution, which
gave an obdurate adversary time to construct his defenses; and through the crass
failings of an army ill prepared to take on a determined and powerful major competitor at a distance as part of a campaign of maritime maneuver.14
THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN
From 1914, Britain’s conduct of the First World War was partly a result of its belief
that Germany had a policy and clear strategic aim of turning itself into the powerhouse of Mitteleuropa, through a “linking up of Germany, and Austria-Hungary
to Asia by means of the Balkans and Turkey,” thereby maintaining a clear threat to
Britain’s imperial communications and constituting “a direct thrust at our Indian
Empire.”15 The center, or the heartland, then would dominate the periphery, just
as Halford Mackinder had prophesied.16 In the early days of the war, such considerations led to concern about the future role of Turkey and to explorations of
the policy Britain should adopt in regard to a conflict among Greece, Turkey, and
Russia.17 This was the culmination of over a century of worry about what might
happen in this strategically crucial area.18
The immediate requirement, though, was to stabilize the western front in
Europe. Once that had been achieved, and until the mass mobilization of British forces was completed in 1916, there was little more—the so-called Easterners argued—that Britain usefully could contribute to the situation there. This
provided a maneuverist window of opportunity for the more-imaginative and
cost-effective use of Britain’s limited new reinforcements in a secondary theater
of operations—such as Gallipoli—for an indirect assault on the country’s enemies.19 The possibility of a thrust against Turkey first was adumbrated clearly by
Maurice Hankey, secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, in his Boxing
Day memorandum of 1914.20
Gallipoli: The Search for Strategic Maneuver
Again, in true Corbettian style, Britain’s command of the sea seemed to offer the
opportunity to conduct a limited intervention to achieve strategic-level objectives
in an unlimited war, thereby avoiding the costly, large-scale commitments required
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of most of its continental counterparts. At the same time, the British hoped to create decisive effects through their ability to menace the exposed vulnerabilities of a
land-bound adversary, either along the European coastline or in its colonial holdings. Nowadays this would be called the natural strategy of the “offshore balancer,”
a country able, at minimum cost, to “become a controlling force in the European
system” and to maintain and extend its interests by manipulating the balance of
power in continental Europe.21
Julian Corbett (as so often was the case) summarized the strategic aspiration
brilliantly in his history of the First World War:
[W]hen a war is sufficiently maritime in character for the sea to become an essential
factor, secondary theatres may be decisive. It was in the Peninsula we had made our
chief contribution to the overthrow of Napoleon; in the Crimea the Russian war had
been won; and by the conquest of Havana we had brought the Seven Years’ War to its
sudden and triumphant conclusion. In all three examples the result was due to the
concentration of naval and military force where the enemy was weakest.22

General Sir Ian Hamilton, British army, commander in chief of the Mediterranean Force, also understood the advantages that British sea power had to confer
in this respect. A convinced Easterner, he advocated for a defensive campaign in
the west and an offensive in the east. Otherwise, it would be a case of “not exploiting our own special characteristics, mobility and sea power!”23 Some Germans
agreed. “Should the Dardanelles fall,” declared Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, State
Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office, “the World-War has been decided against
us.”24
Other Germans disagreed. Recent experience, thought General Colmar von der
Goltz, “should put an end to the old times when a few thousand French or English
troops escorted by a fleet were able to compel the governments of large and populous countries in Eastern Asia to comply with their will.” He concluded, “In highly
civilized and thickly populated countries . . . landings never have any prospect of
great success.”25 Most in the British army thought so too. For them, the Gallipoli
project was conditional and temporary. Once Britain had mobilized fully for war,
the main effort would again need to be in France, as the seminal Committee of
Imperial Defence meeting of 1911 had concluded. General Charles C. Monro
put it forward with characteristic bluntness. “France,” he said, “is the only place
Germany can be beaten. Every man not employed in killing Germans in France
and Flanders is wasted.”26 “Westerners” like him initially went along with a scheme
in Turkey that they thought was a navy-centric forcing of the straits that would
require only limited land support and would not divert too much effort from the
western front.27 The failure of the bold, navy-only scheme to force the straits on
19 March 1915 dashed those hopes and meant that the next stage, if there was one,
would require a much greater maritime-maneuver enterprise.
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From then on, a crucial mismatch between the demands of the objective and
the size and quality of the resources allocated for the purpose seemed to confirm
the Westerners’ skepticism. It made the larger Gallipoli campaign seem “a dream
of vain imaginings.”28 The mismatch violated the German philosopher Immanuel
Kant’s imperative that whoever wills the aim also must will the means.29 In part,
this was a consequence of the extremely short timeline between the initial failure
of the naval campaign to force the Dardanelles in March and the start of what
was in effect a full-fledged amphibious operation a bare five weeks later. Given
the known complexities of amphibious operations (especially one that was in a
theater a long way from home; that would take place in an environment that was
challenging, climatically and topographically; and that would be opposed from
the start), this was a level of ambition bordering on the reckless. It fully justified
the conclusion of Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss, RN, who, in supervising the logistics
base at Mudros, Greece, was in a good position to judge. “Never in the history of
the world has such an expedition sailed, never has a big campaign been so hastily organized and got together, and never has such an undertaking had so little
consideration been given from home.”30
Uncertainty about how the strategic aim was to be achieved dramatically
increased the scale of the mismatch between the objectives and the means provided. The problem was that the exact nature and status of the operation never
really was hammered out in the highest strategy-making forum, the War Council—which itself was an essay in joined-up government, undermined by the amateur nature of its proceedings. The council’s maladroit sins included an absence of
minutes, which allowed people to draw different conclusions from its “decisions,”
or indeed to question whether decisions had been made at all, and a tendency
simply to paper over the cracks between divided opinions. Its composition was
faulty, too, with the military professionals present only as constrained advisers.31
Right from the start, there was uncertainty about how the strategic goal of the
campaign—knocking Turkey out of the war—was to be achieved, and therefore
about the extent and nature of the resources to be provided for it. The absence of a
clear-cut and agreed-upon vision for the operation was evident in the War Council’s well-known order of 13 January 1915: “The Admiralty should also prepare for
a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula with
Constantinople as its objective.”32 The last phrase was inherently ambiguous, and
it was far from clear how the Admiralty could “take” the peninsula, since obviously this could be accomplished only by land forces.33 Nor was the connection
between the taking of the peninsula and the subsequent advance on Constantinople very clear to anyone.
Hamilton’s account of the idiosyncratic manner in which Field Marshal H. H.
Kitchener, British army, the secretary of state for war, apprised him of his mission
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and the sparseness of his subsequent directives is equally familiar: “The Admiral
[de Robeck] asked to see my instructions and Braithwaite read them out. When
he stopped, Roger Keyes, the Commodore, inquired, ‘Is that all?’ And when
Braithwaite confessed that it was, everyone looked a little blank.”34 Was this a
joint maritime operation, or was it essentially a naval operation with a degree of
army support? Was it just a question of the fleet turning up off Constantinople,
or would the army have to garrison the hinterland, or the peninsula, or both?
Were the Russians to be involved, or were they not? These issues were nebulous
in themselves and, worse still,
they went through a con[T]he default approach of the British to the
conduct of their amphibious and shore-based stant shifting throughout the
conflicts was instinctively maneuverist in con- campaign.
The result was a continuception, but . . . a variety of adverse circumstances at all three levels of war meant it often ing gap between the varying
was much more attritionalist in practice than extent and nature of the commitment, on the one hand,
they wished.
and the level of resources
allocated toward it, on the other. The gap reflected fundamental differences
of opinion about what exactly the project was designed to achieve and how. A
navy-centered operation well might require fewer soldiers, and that indeed was
the original intention, but the larger amphibious operation that became necessary later required far more land forces—but did not get them at the start of the
campaign, when they were most needed for decisive effect. Thus, Walter E. Guinness, Lord Moyne, looking back on 8 November at the campaign so far, stated,
“We heard this morning that Lord Kitchener is on his way out. It is difficult to see
how we can withdraw from here without great losses. Never can a campaign have
been worse managed. Although 17 Divisions have been sent out here, it has always
been by driblets which have not even sufficed to replace the wastage. If all the men
who have been out here could have been available simultaneously, something might
have been done.”35 This meant that Hamilton rarely had sufficient resources to
reinforce success or ameliorate failure. But if the military manpower going out
was thought insufficient by the Easterners, the Westerners considered it excessive
and likely to imperil the situation in France should the Germans launch another
assault.
The rate at which the nature of the operation changed, and the rapidity of the
switch from a navy-only operation to the conduct of a contested landing, greatly
exceeded the ability of Admiral Wemyss and all the other logisticians to deliver
what the expeditionary force required. For example, the whole of the Royal Naval
Division, when it arrived at Mudros in March, had to be sent back to Alexandria
and Port Said in Egypt for reorganization and restowing of its gear after the unit’s
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chaotic loading before departing Britain. The loading failures reflected uncertainty about the contemplated nature of the task.36 Given these grotesque failures
in planning for maneuver at the strategic level, it seems hardly less than a miracle
that Hamilton and his colleagues managed to get ashore and consolidate their position. All the same, these command failures inevitably had grave consequences
at the operational and tactical levels.
Gallipoli: The Search for Operational Maneuver
In terms of operational planning, the campaign was maneuverist also—at least as
far as intentions went. The notion of the navy bypassing Turkey’s western army
and storming through the Narrows to reduce Constantinople and paralyze Turkey in one fell swoop was certainly bold, and, according to at least some reputable
historians, perhaps the best idea of the First World War.37 When this failed, the
Allies had to resort to joint and combined action in an amphibious assault against
Turkey’s defenses in the straits so the navy could try again later. The campaign’s
official historian thought that this, too, could have worked.38 The basic intention
was clear: to use a bit of imagination, to avoid the enemy’s strength, to shatter his
will and coherence, to push him off balance, and to prevent his being able to stop
the Allies from doing what they wanted.
As Hamilton was perfectly aware, “the operation of landing in face of an enemy is the most complicated and difficult in war.”39 Things could go wrong easily, and they usually did; the pursuit of operational maneuver from the sea brings
risks as well as opportunities. Thus, Hamilton adopted a decidedly maneuverist
approach that was designed to maximize the Turks’ defensive problem by posing
to them a number of threats, from Bulair all the way south to the Asian shore,
that would force them to spread their forces out against all contingencies and
increase the prospects of operational and tactical surprise at the decisive point,
just as Corbett said the British had been able to do against the coast of France
in the Seven Years’ War. In forty-eight hours, the Allies intended to get ashore,
consolidate, and establish sustainable bridgeheads before the Turks had time to
react effectively.40 Hamilton planned that “the first and foremost step towards a
victorious landing was to upset the equilibrium of Liman von Sanders. . . . I must
try to move so that he should be unable to concentrate either his mind or his
men against us. . . . I have to separate my forces[,] and the effect of momentum,
which cannot be produced by cohesion, must be reproduced by the simultaneous nature of the movement.”41
Although admirable in theory, the plan failed on practical grounds. The basic
problem was that none of the possible landing sites was thought large enough to
accommodate the follow-on forces that first would consolidate the position, then
crucially expand it into a launching area for an assault on the broader peninsula;
only a combination of landing sites could do this. Such a broad-front advance was
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unfortunate but seemed unavoidable. The diversionary feint against the Bulair
lines in the north and the landings on the Asiatic shore helped to dissipate Turkish
responses, but not enough. As a result, the Allies’ offensive force was spread too
thinly, and the Turkish defenders had time to respond, thereby confining the
invaders to much narrower bridgeheads than the hoped-for breakout required.
In part, this reflected a grievous underestimation of the resistance to be expected
from the initially quite modest level of Turkish defenses.
Later, Hamilton tried again with the Suvla landings of 6 August. As he allegedly wrote in his diary at the time:
K[itchener] sees in a flash what the rest of the world does not seem to see so clearly;
viz., that the piling up of increased forces opposite entrenched positions is a spendthrift,
unscientific proceeding. He wishes to know if I mean to do this. To draw me out he
assumes if I get the troops, I would at once commit them to trench warfare by crowding
them in behind the lines of Helles or Anzac. Actually I intend to keep the bulk of them
on the islands, so as to throw them unexpectedly against some key position which is not
prepared for defence.42

The Suvla operation was clearly an innovative, imaginative, and maneuverist approach at the operational level. Its aims were threefold: (1) to break out from Anzac
Cove and cut off the bulk of the Turkish army from land communication with Constantinople; (2) to gain such a command for British artillery as to cut off the bulk
of the Turkish army from sea communication with both Constantinople and Asia;
and (3) to secure Suvla Bay as a winter base for the Australian and New Zealand
Army Corps (ANZAC) and all the troops operating in the northern theater.43 None
of these objectives were realized. The forces of Lieutenant General Sir Frederick W.
Stopford did not go deep enough to create the necessary diversionary effect, and
the force based at Anzac Cove failed again to break out. The result was another
dead-end commitment that both sides had to service for the remainder of the year.
Hamilton’s conception of operational maneuver depended for its effect on
the coordinated activity of units acting autonomously in mutual support and
achieving surprise and momentum against a static and bewildered adversary. But
the Turks were neither static nor bewildered, and the two Allied forces at Anzac
Cove and Suvla were insufficiently coordinated and were unclear about the exact
purpose their respective parts in the operation served. Hamilton was clear that a
maneuverist approach demanded delegation of command and subordinates’ use
of their initiative in line with his intent as commander; but in this campaign it
was confusion, rather than command, that was delegated.44
The Suvla part of the operation demonstrated this particularly well. Stopford’s
unexpected decision not to go ashore until the evening of 8 August further aggravated the confusion, since it deprived him of an opportunity to sort out matters
there; moreover, his command ship, the tiny sloop HMS Jonquil, simply was not
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equipped to deal with the large number of signals that command-and-control
functions required.
To a greater extent than often is realized, however, the indecision and inactivity at Suvla was not entirely Stopford’s fault, and it is worth pausing on this
point. A good deal of uncertainty derived from inherent ambiguities about what
Stopford was supposed to do. Latter-day critics often seem to assume that he was
expected to lead a large-scale flanking operation through open country to undermine Turkish resistance to the Allied position at Anzac Cove from the rear. But
this was not the case. Hamilton’s orders certainly were ambiguous (perhaps especially after he and Stopford had sought to clarify them), but the main effort was to
be made from Anzac Cove, not toward it; Suvla was to provide first a secure port,
and only then a degree of support for the expected breakout from the cove. In
this case, the “commander’s intent” was misinterpreted more by Stopford’s critics
than by Stopford himself.45
Nonetheless, the command system in place for the Suvla-Anzac operation
was at fault in that it did not encourage subordinates (particularly Stopford) to
use their own initiative to make the most of unexpected operational and tactical
opportunities. If they had prosecuted their opportunities more aggressively, the
British could have reached the hills that dominated the landing site more quickly,
thereby helping to facilitate the Anzac breakout. Finally, as far as Hamilton was
concerned, poor communications from Suvla obscured the extent to which
things were going wrong and required his intervention. Hamilton’s delegationheavy “negative command” system proved inappropriate for the practical circumstances at Suvla.
The Turks, on the other hand, seemed to suffer much less from this commandand-control deficiency and were able to mass effectively for large-scale defensive
and offensive actions. They also were clearer about what was happening on the
ground. The Allies’ difficulties were compounded by what these days would be
called “failures of situational awareness” about details of the ground (such as
the uncharted reefs off Suvla) and of the numbers, positions, and quality of the
Turkish defenders. The British thought, wrongly, that Hill 971 above the ANZAC
position was undefended. As a result, the operation violated some of the basic
principles of war—unity of command, mass, economy of force, and simplicity.46
Still, the Suvla landing went much better than had the earlier landings in April,
and had it been prosecuted more aggressively it might have helped to deliver the
maneuverist benefits for which Hamilton had hoped.
Gallipoli: The Search for Tactical Maneuver
The operational failure to dissipate the Turkish defenders’ strength put even
greater stress on the tactical ability of the Allied forces both to overcome those
defenses and to deliver tactical maneuver. Their best chance for doing this was
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upon the initial landings and very soon thereafter. But this was exactly the time
when all the well-known problems of defective landing procedures and equipment, of compressed and inhospitable landing sites, of inadequate numbers and
situational awareness, and of the unexpected fighting proficiency of the Turkish
defenders were at their height.47 Once the situation had stabilized, all the other
factors—heat, flies, and the impact of disease; adverse ground conditions; and the
strength of the tactical defensive achieved with entrenched firepower and barbed
wire—came into play as well, making an Allied advance much more difficult.
Already, at the third battle of Krithia, attritionalist western-front patterns of
battle seemed unavoidable—a lengthy and hopefully suppressing artillery bombardment followed by a frontal assault. Many of these constraints applied to the
Turkish defenders too, when it came to executing set-piece counteroffensives.
Even after the withdrawal from the ANZAC position in December, a wellthought-out final assault by the 12th Turkish Division on the British 13th Division, with an effective preliminary mining campaign and heavy artillery support,
was beaten back barely twenty-four hours before the final departure from Helles
on 8 and 9 January 1916.48 The Turks proved incapable of the Clausewitzian “pursuit” of the defeated that the retreating British had dreaded.
However hard the British tried to be maneuverist at the tactical level, events
devolved into attrition. The fate of the fresh-faced country boys of the 5th Battalion of the Wiltshire Regiment, which was part of the 40th Brigade of the British 13th Division, illustrates this all too well.49 The 13th Division was among the
three reinforcement divisions designated for Gallipoli in June. The 5th Wiltshires
were one of the first of Kitchener’s “New Army” formations of recently trained
volunteers. They arrived in Lemnos for a brief period of acclimatization in July,
and first were introduced into the conditions of conflict by being tasked to defend
the Hampshire Cut and Essex Knoll fire trenches of the extraordinarily complicated trench system to the northeast of the Helles front.
Duly “blooded,” they then were pulled back to Lemnos and, in an attempt to
avoid the replication of the attritional outcomes elsewhere and restore movement,
were dispatched next to the ANZAC sector to reinforce the Australian and New
Zealand troops in their attempted breakout against Chunuk Bair and Sari Bair,
concurrent with the Suvla landings. For the reasons discussed already, the experiences of the 5th Wiltshires in the gruesome, late, breakout battle on 10 August
illustrate all the difficulties that had to be faced in achieving tactical maneuver
in those conditions. They found themselves operating alongside Australian, New
Zealand, Gurkha, Sikh, and other British forces that were entirely new to them.
The topographical conditions were extremely difficult, especially at night. Early
encounters deprived them of many of their officers. The supply system failed, and
for four days and nights they lacked sleep, food, and water. And then, to cap it all
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off, they found themselves directly in the path of Mustafa Kemal’s newly arrived
7th and 12th Divisions sweeping down on them from above. Not surprisingly, in
this, their first real battle, their casualties were high and morale afterward was low.
However, they recovered and were reinforced by additional draftees from
home. Toward the end of the campaign, they were taken back to the safety of
Lemnos in the evacuation from Anzac Cove in December 1915. But then the 5th
Wiltshires, as part of the 13th Division, were sent back to the peninsula almost
immediately to hold the line for the final evacuation of Helles in January 1916.
Their role was to foil an expected last-minute Turkish attack aiming to destroy
the British as they tried to leave. The attack, the last major operation of the campaign, did indeed come, was repulsed with heavy losses, and served to show yet
again how difficult it was for either side to restore movement to the battle in the
conditions that had become the norm in the Gallipoli campaign. After their success in this encounter, the 5th Wiltshires were among the last of the “bravest and
steadiest” to leave the peninsula.
The “lessons” of Gallipoli have been sought widely ever since, first by the British
military in some exhaustive studies and later by the U.S. Marine Corps, and then
of course by legions of veterans, practitioners, and historians. It is indeed important not to be seduced by the advantages of hindsight into failing to recognize
the scale of the administrative achievement in improvising so large and difficult
an amphibious undertaking at such short notice.50 The tendency to focus on the
problems of the campaign should not blind observers to the fact of its successes.
Getting the army ashore in such numbers and keeping them there for so long
remains an impressive achievement. The Suvla landing and even more the final
evacuation showed how much had been learned during the course of the campaign by both services, separately and jointly. As so often, Corbett put the point
particularly well: “In that marvelous evacuation we see the national genius for
amphibious warfare raised to its highest manifestation. In hard experience and
successive disappointments the weapon had been brought to a perfect temper,
and when the hour of fruition came to show of what great things it was capable,
it was used only to effect a retreat.”51
Far from being depressed by the Gallipoli experience, the British, having absorbed its lessons (they thought) were prepared to try again the following year,
this time against the coast of Belgium—arguably the most heavily fortified stretch
of coastline in the world. This was to be part of an ambitious scheme at the high
operational level to restore movement to the western front, partly by an advance
along the Belgian coast, supplemented by a direct landing behind the German
lines by the 1st Division of the Fourth Army to outflank the right of the whole of
the German position in northern France.52
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The British fully recognized the challenge presented by this putative exercise in
operational maneuver on a grand scale. On the one hand, after the experiences of
Gallipoli, this realism resulted in investment in amphibious equipment ranging from
floating unloading pontoons to primitive amphibious tanks, and in an acceptance
that the operation would be possible only if a major diversionary push was made
farther down the line to draw the Germans away from the critical coastal sector.
The failure of the Passchendaele campaign in 1917 did not deliver these prerequisite
conditions, so Field Marshal Douglas Haig postponed the landing in August 1917,
and then it never took place.53 It remains one of the great what-ifs of the First World
War. But otherwise, it shows that the British still were searching for maneuver, and
had not lost faith in the capacity of maritime power projection to help deliver it.54
The exploits of the 5th Wiltshires after Gallipoli confirm this point. Far from
coming home to their green and pleasant land, as they had expected after the
horrors at Gallipoli, the 5th Wiltshires instead were transported straight through
Egypt to participate in the ultimately successful Mesopotamian campaign, playing their part in the captures of Al Kut and Baghdad, and then surging northwest
for five hundred miles—once again en route to their old objective, Constantinople, in a major outflanking campaign, but this time from a different direction.
MARITIME MANEUVER IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD
Britain’s grueling experience on the western front reinforced a preference for a
smarter, less attritional way of war, and found obvious expression in the writings
of Basil Liddell Hart and his conception in 1932 of a “British way in warfare” and
the notion of “limited liability,” and later of the “indirect approach.”55 But this
did not result in a high priority being attached to preparations for the conduct of
amphibious operations. Instead, in straitened postwar years, Britain’s focus was
on the battle to retain command of the sea, partly through habit and sentiment,
and partly from the entirely logical position that if this battle were lost then
amphibious operations and other such forms of sea-based maneuver would be
impossible anyway.
Until the mid-1930s, the campaign to maintain the deterrent effect of naval
dominance (another form of maneuver, if a bloodless one) was fought in the
conference chamber, where diplomacy—to upend Clausewitz—became the continuation of war by other means; in conditions of a peace of a sort, diplomacy
naturally moved to the fore in Britain’s campaign. The result was a series of essays
in naval arms control that broadly suited Britain’s strategic aims. The British also
were generally successful in consolidating legal limits on cruiser warfare while
preserving belligerent rights and their options to blockade.56 This same proclivity for seeking to secure valuable strategic objectives by methods other than the
overt use of military force continued into the Second World War, most notably
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through Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill’s assiduous courtship of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the military-industrial might of the United States.57
Since this would dramatically shift the correlation of forces between Britain and
its enemies, for Churchill nothing was more important.
THE NORMANDY INVASION
Inevitably, once the war started, this continuing diplomatic campaign was accompanied by considerable debate about the form that British military action
should take, with Churchill once again demonstrating his preference for what
some have called the indirect and “peripheral” approach.58 Somewhat skeptical
about the efficacy of blockade even before Germany insulated itself against some
of its worst effects by taking over the resources of much of mainland Europe,
Churchill’s personal search for maneuver led him to a number of options. These
included such schemes as Operation CATHERINE in the Baltic, possibly in conjunction with an attack on the Scandinavian sources of much of Germany’s iron
ore, until he allowed himself to be dissuaded from it by his military advisers.59
He also encouraged insurgencies across occupied Europe and the launching of
amphibious raids on its coastline. More ambitiously still, fighting campaigns (or
looking to start them) in North and East Africa, the Balkans, the Aegean, and
the eastern Mediterranean—far away from the main center of German military
strength—illustrated the same impulse. Nowhere was this more evident than in
the contentions over the timing and nature of the amphibious landings in Normandy in 1944.
Normandy: The Strategic-Level Debate
British “peripheralism” increasingly was resisted by President Roosevelt and
the bulk of the U.S. political and military staffs, although it never was simply a
question of the British versus the Americans; some of Churchill’s own military
advisers concluded that the strategic benefit of such “eccentric” campaigns was
outweighed by the risks and the costs, while some of Roosevelt’s thought they
were not. For example, William C. Bullitt, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia
and a confidant of the president, was strongly in favor of opening a Balkan campaign, while Field Marshal Alanbrooke, British army, frequently dissented from
Churchill’s approach, as is immediately obvious from reading his unexpurgated
diaries.60
Neither was it a question of “doing” Normandy or not doing it, as some observers have gotten close to saying.61 In fact, Churchill was clear that sooner or
later the invasion would need to be done. He appointed Louis Mountbatten to
reinvigorate Combined Operations Headquarters in late 1941, telling him that his
command should move on from minor raids and that his “main object must be
the reinvasion of France. You must create the machine which will make it possible
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for us to beat Hitler on land. You must devise the appurtenances and appliances
which will make the invasion possible.”62 Indeed, initially Churchill himself supported the idea of invading France in 1943, but was dissuaded by Alanbrooke and
the other British service chiefs.63
Later, the real issue was the appropriate circumstances and timing for launching the operation. Churchill did all he could to resist the American view that “a
straight line is the shortest distance between two points,” if that meant either
attempting the invasion before sufficient operational experience and battlehardened forces had been accumulated, or completely missing the opportunity to
exploit additional strategic possibilities should they arise. Preparations needed to
be made and options needed
It was one of the supreme ironies of the [1944] to be maintained.64
In either case, Churchill
Normandy campaign that the maneuverist
counseled, there was much
British ended up fighting an attritionalist
to be said for delay and keepwar there, while the apparently attritionaling all options open. For the
ist Americans were able to fight a sometimes
Americans, though, there
heavy but faster-moving war to the south.
was much to be said for closing them down and getting on with it. In the First World War, they had insisted
that their only contribution would be to the conduct of war on the western front
against the main enemy, Germany. That also was their preference in the Second
World War in Europe, reinforced in this case by a dislike of getting involved in
anything that smacked of reconstituting the British Empire. More particularly, the
demands of the Pacific War were urgent and powerfully underlined by the likes of
General Douglas MacArthur, USA, and Admiral Ernest J. King, USN. The Americans’ growing strength in both manpower and matériel made them increasingly
confident of ultimate victory even in a frontal assault, and, of course, also better
able to prevail in contentious Allied councils with the “slippery” British.65
The broad result of all this is well known, even if some of the detail is being
fought over still. Most historians concede that Churchill and the British chiefs
were right to resist the hankering of Roosevelt and many U.S. senior military
leaders for a direct assault on France in 1942 or 1943.66 Churchill and his service
chiefs were able to get their way on this because at that time the bulk of the invasion forces were likely to be British. In the event, Roosevelt too was easily persuaded that delay was the wisest course of action, especially when the difficulties
of a frontal amphibious assault were made savagely clear at Dieppe in 1942 and
the deficiencies of inexperienced U.S. forces were underlined in the 1943 battle
of Kasserine Pass.67 Neither meant that Normandy should not be done, but both
suggested it should not be done before the circumstances were right and the necessary forces, equipment, and skills had been accumulated.
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But this was the crux of the issue. On the one hand, both sides agreed that
Operation OVERLORD, as a frontal assault on Germany at one of its strongest positions, would be extremely demanding operationally, and so required careful and
extensive preparation. This meant that the invasion should not be launched until
the early part of 1944. Both sides agreed, also, that in the meantime some of those
forces would be available for, and should professionally profit from, other operations. Hopefully those interim operations would take some strategic pressure off
the Russians on the eastern front, thereby solidifying the alliance. This argument
also could help keep Admiral King and the U.S. Pacific-first school at bay.
On this basis, Churchill was able to persuade his colleagues to focus on the
Mediterranean, first for the Operation TORCH landings, next for the seizure of
Sicily, and then for an invasion of peninsular Italy.68 Alanbrooke justified this as
a distracting, diversionary prerequisite for a successful landing and campaign in
France, not a substitute for it.69 Up Churchill’s sleeve, and to some extent Alanbrooke’s as well, were plans for operations in the Aegean, especially against Rhodes,
all with the aim of bringing Turkey into the war and opening up a new Balkan
front.70 To its skeptics, this scheme seemed to be fighting the Gallipoli campaign all
over again. Operation JUPITER, the concept for a major campaign against Norway,
was seen as yet another of Churchill’s “reckless and impracticable schemes.”71
It was at this point that Churchill’s peripheralist propensities ran into the sand.
The date for Operation OVERLORD had been agreed at the Quebec conference in
August 1943; it was to be 1 May 1944. At the later Cairo (SEXTANT) and Tehran
conferences of 1943, however, Churchill encountered decisive resistance to his
proposals for further indirect attempts to weaken the German position in the
strategic center by multiple threats from its edges. He and Alanbrooke did, however, win a month’s delay, pushing the invasion back to 1 June 1944.72 The battle at
Kasserine and other problems in the North African campaign, the later stages of
the Sicily operation, the extreme dangers faced in the Salerno landings, the slow
progress of the march on Rome, and the disastrous British campaign against the
Dodecanese islands all showed that Churchill and Britain’s preferred indirect approach commonly required more and stronger forces than were readily available
without a yet-longer delay to the launch of Operation OVERLORD. And against
that, Roosevelt and the American chiefs were adamant.
Churchill’s last victory in the Italian campaign was the agreement to invest
in the Anzio landing as a means of hastening the seizure of Rome. But this too
proved less effective than hoped. As Churchill confided to his doctor, “Anzio was
my worst moment in the war. I had most to do with it. I didn’t want two Suvla
Bays in one lifetime.”73 What he meant by this was that, once again, the promise
of rapid maneuver after a successful landing had been thrown away. It seemed
that the operational indecision of its commander, Major General John P. Lucas,
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USA, produced delays that allowed the enemy to concentrate forces against the
beachhead.74 Thereafter the ground favored the defense and progress was slow;
later still, the political prize of taking Rome outweighed, at least in the eyes of
Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, USA, the possibility instead of cutting off and
destroying Field Marshal Albert Kesselring’s main forces in Italy as they retreated
north. This would have forced the Germans either to abandon the country or to
reinforce it with yet more troops that otherwise would have been able to go to
France or the eastern front.
Thereafter, Roosevelt, his military men, and Stalin were adamant; the strategic
effect of such eccentric operations, even if successful, did not warrant the enormous risks that would follow delaying OVERLORD further, especially if this pushed
it back into 1945 or later. For the same reason, and even though it was launched
weeks after OVERLORD, they insisted on using the landing craft released from that
operation on a supplementary supporting invasion of southern France rather than
a further attempt at outflanking the German defenses by an amphibious assault
north of Rome. The strategic weight of the Russians and the Americans, with
their hundreds of divisions, eclipsed the British effort, and Churchill found that
imagination and eloquence made little headway against such military realities.75
Nor was Churchill alone in his disappointment. Like most of his colleagues,
Alanbrooke, who unlike Churchill was focused chiefly on the distracting effect of the Italian campaign rather than treating northern Italy as a launchpad
for offensives somewhere else, lamented the loss of a strategic opportunity that
he thought the U.S. fixation on a specific and artificial date for OVERLORD had
caused. “I despair,” he said, “of ever getting our American friends to have any sort
of strategic vision.”76 This—doubtless written in the heat of the moment—was
unfair; it was just that the Americans had a different kind of strategic vision,
one framed by the confidence that derived from large numbers, huge industrial
power, and the urgent strategic and political demands of the Pacific theater. Lacking much of this, the British hoped to gain their objectives by what they thought
more subtle means.
Normandy: The Operational Level
Unlike Gallipoli, the Normandy campaign was from the outset conceived of as
a joint exercise in maneuver, with naval forces taking a particularly crucial role
at the beginning. Indeed, without their winning sufficient sea control to ensure
the transport of troops and military and economic supplies across the Atlantic
to the United Kingdom, and then to deliver the invading forces across the Channel safely, the operation would not have been possible at all. Given the German
army’s recognized fighting proficiency, it was especially important that the Allies win the race to build up logistic support in theater, and this was thought to
require the transport of the two Mulberry harbors across to Normandy.77 This
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extraordinary feat demanded near-total command of the sea and perfectly illustrates the enabling function of sea power in a campaign of maritime maneuver.
The whole campaign in fact does much to justify the Royal Navy’s policy preoccupation throughout the interwar period on the requirements of the campaign
to win and retain sea control.
It was certainly true that both Churchill and Alanbrooke were concerned
that, even so, OVERLORD could go horribly wrong.78 The risks made them both
anxious. A catastrophic failure certainly would have lengthened the war and
even might have imperiled ultimate victory. On the day of the landings, and
subsequently, naval forces delivered the invading troops to the beaches, sought
to suppress the defenders’ powers of resistance, stood by to reembark troops if
required, and kept the necessary supplies coming. Inevitably, as the campaign
progressed, its naval element became less prominent as the baton passed instead
to the land and air forces.
However, after the initial success of the British and Canadian landings, it
rapidly became clear that once again the fates had conspired against any British attempt at operational-level maneuver in the land campaign. The British
and Canadians were allocated the eastern landing beaches, JUNE, SWORD, and
GOLD—for almost accidental reasons. Because they were slated to be later arrivals at Normandy, they largely staged from the west of England. It only made sense
logistically for the Americans to be allocated the western beaches; this would
provide the easiest access for shipping coming across the Atlantic and would
avoid crossing the British and Canadian supply lines from central and eastern
England.79
The result was that the British and Canadian forces were squeezed into the
comparatively narrow area between the potentially flooded area south of Dives to
the north and the American force to the south. They were landed directly before
the city of Caen, which initially was seen as a high priority because it seemed the
natural site from which to launch the rapid advance on Paris that General Bernard L. Montgomery, British army, in his more intemperate moments, had promised. Their totally unsurprising failure to take the city on the first day doomed
them to a slow and grinding battle of attrition, partly because of the topography
but mainly because it was the obvious place for German reinforcements to gather,
as it was nearest to their forces guarding the Calais area.80
Criticized for the slowness of the British Commonwealth advance by
Marshal Aleksandr Vassilievsky, who was visiting from the Soviet army, one
British officer explained the basic problem. While in his six-hundred-mile sector of the eastern front Vassilievsky had faced nine German divisions, the British on a front just sixty-two miles wide before Caen were fighting significant
elements of ten German divisions, six of which were panzer formations; and
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if anything, this was an underestimation of their opposition’s strength. In the
EPSOM operation, 26 June–1 July, the British faced elements of eight panzer divisions, five of which were of the Waffen-SS. In such circumstances, action hardly
could be anything but attritional and grindingly slow.81
Both at the time and since, Montgomery’s reputation has suffered also from
ambiguities about what he conceived his operational mission to be. On occasions,
the impression he gave was of an intention to take Caen rapidly, then strike out on
a dazzling march on Paris. On
other occasions he purported
British experience is worth remembering in
to be “fixing” the bulk of Gertoday’s ferment of ideas about how a new
man defenders on the Caen
campaign in the Pacific might be conducted.
front, holding them down so
That experience seems to underline the point
that Allied forces to the south
that even in the most maneuverist of campaigns there will be attritionalist moments in could loop around, smash
through thinner defenses, and
which mass still matters.
head toward Germany. If maneuver by movement against German forces at Caen proved impossible, it would
need to be replaced by controlled attrition; the hope was that fixing these German units at Caen would increase the prospects for maneuver by movement in
the American sector to the south.82 This version of Montgomery’s argument was
exactly the same as Churchill’s for extra investment in the failing Norwegian campaign of 1940 and in Italy in 1944. In both cases, critics of this approach argued
that the tactical realities on the ground and the actual correlation of forces in the
theater raised doubts about the approach’s ability to create an effective diversion.
Accordingly, the question of who would be tying down whom was moot.83
As a result of all this, it paradoxically was the Americans who, once they had
conquered the problem of the bocage, were able eventually to engage in a much
faster campaign of movement and maneuver, eventually swinging around to head
for Paris from the southwest, as arguably had been planned from the start.84 It
was one of the supreme ironies of the Normandy campaign that the maneuverist
British ended up fighting an attritionalist war there, while the apparently attritionalist Americans were able to fight a sometimes heavy but faster-moving war
to the south.
Admittedly, at various stages in subsequent campaigns in western Europe,
both were required to revert to what was supposed to be their respective “form”
of campaigning. The September 1944 assault on Arnhem in the Netherlands
indeed represented a “bridge too far” in British leaders’ attempt to restore their
concept of movement; afterward, on the northern flank of the Allied campaign,
Montgomery’s forces were more successful, if slower than anticipated. As for the
Americans, compared with the rapid advance that had preceded it, nothing could
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have been more attritionalist than the December 1944–January 1945 Battle of the
Bulge in the Ardennes region. The experiences of these partners confirm that the
relationship between the two apparent styles of war is complementary rather than
one of polarized opposites.
With the Allies having consolidated their position in France, the last flicker
of the dynamic between maneuver and attrition may be seen in the debate about
the conduct of the final phase in the war, specifically about whether they should
advance on Germany across a broad front, as General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
USA, advocated, or with a narrower, more concentrated thrust in the north, led,
inevitably, by Montgomery. This resulted in vituperative exchanges between British and American leaders, particularly during and after the conduct of the Battle
of the Bulge. As General Omar N. Bradley, USA, put it, “[T]he British came at
us like sharks at a shipwreck,” with Montgomery being the “most vicious and
ravenous” leader of the pack. It is hard not to conclude that mixed in with this
apparent debate about the best way to seek operational maneuver was more than
a dash of competing national interests, different interpretations about the likely
future of a liberated Europe, sensitivity to press impressions, and the vanities
and professional jealousies of senior military men who by this time were getting
very tired. Both Bradley and Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr., USA, also
urged, and then conducted, narrow and concentrated thrusts in which the Allies
were competing with each other (in a nonlethal manner) almost as much as they
were with the Germans. By this stage of the war, in fact, the state of the German
defenses made maneuver much easier for everyone, even if in American eyes the
British were overly cautious in taking advantage of it.85
Normandy: The Tactical Level
The British were acutely aware of the scale of risk the Normandy landings
posed at the tactical level. Experience had demonstrated that amphibious operations were uniquely complex and demanding, and their German adversaries
time and again had shown themselves to be formidable, even with the odds
stacked against them. Tactical maneuver in the landing phase was designed to
reduce the level of risk as much as possible, and was to be supplied partly by the
imaginative use of airborne forces to divert and mystify the German defenders,
and partly through mechanical means such as “Hobart’s funnies,” which were
to help the invaders get ashore and consolidate with a minimum expenditure
of life.86 Both were successful, at least in the early stages; later, things did not
go as planned.
This was in part a tribute to the tactical performance of the German defenders. Such was the resisting power of the German army—particularly its impressive capacity for effective counterattack at every level of war—that the resulting
campaign was mainly attritional for all concerned, and so yielded much the same
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casualty figures, as a proportion of those engaged, as was suffered on the western
front in the First World War.87 The battle for France resulted in roughly seven
thousand killed or wounded Allied and German soldiers every week—much the
same figure as from the Somme, Passchendaele, and Verdun.88 The combination
of determined and skilled soldiery, modern weaponry, and physical obstacles
(hedges, hills, woods, and rivers and defended farmsteads, villages, and towns)
made battle seem distinctly attritional to everyone engaged in it.
In practical terms, just as in the Gallipoli campaign, however hard they tried
in their search for maneuver, the British still seemed often to end up in attritional
conflict—certainly at the tactical level.
And after Normandy?
Probably the last flicker of strategic peripheralism was the notion put forward by
Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, British army, and Churchill for an advance from northern Italy through the so-called Ljubljana Gap and on to Vienna, a
project shaped more by the political attractions of getting there before Stalin than any
deep appreciation of such a campaign’s military feasibility.89 Against their collective
opposition, however, Operation ANVIL, a landing in southern France—portrayed as
much more directly supportive of the Normandy campaign—went ahead anyway.90
Further afield, Churchill’s peripheralist proclivities again were on display in
Southeast Asia and the Far East, where initially the prime minister was reluctant
to sanction major operations against Rangoon and Singapore, or even smallerscale and more-dubious operations such as the reconquest of the Andaman
Islands. He was long averse to the “laborious reconquest of Burma, swamp by
swamp.”91 Instead he sought Operation CULVERIN, the seizure of the western
tip of Sumatra as a base from which to prosecute the war against the Japanese,
perhaps from the soft underbelly of Southeast Asia, and as a possible means of
strategically linking up with Australia and General MacArthur’s campaign along
the Dutch East Indies to the Philippines.
Initially, the British and American service chiefs were able quickly to show that
the means for such a bold and demanding operation simply were not available. In
the longer term, Alanbrooke and his colleagues pressed for a policy focused on
directly joining the Americans in the final assault on Japan in the Pacific, rather
than on the eventual reconquest of British and Dutch possessions in Southeast
Asia, which remained Churchill’s preference (more in service to imperial interests than in the cause of strategic maneuver).92 For all Churchill’s enthusiasm for
the imaginative style of war practiced by Major General Orde Wingate, British
army, and the Chindits, the dominating feature of the final, successful imperial
Burma campaign, the spring 1944 battle of Kohima-Imphal, and arguably the
biggest defeat of the Japanese army in the whole war, hardly could have been
more attritional.93 However, the final, rushed campaign (Operation EXTENDED
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CAPITAL, from December 1944 to February 1945) of Lieutenant General William J. Slim, British army, to cross the Irrawaddy River, outflank Mandalay, seize
Meiktila and Maymyo, and open the way to Rangoon and the final destruction of
the Japanese army in Burma, all before the monsoon broke, was one of the most
successful maneuverist operations of the war. It provided a land-based example
of the British aspiration for maneuver, ultimately deriving success from the seabased capacity to move into and accumulate in theater the necessary forces and
sustain them until the conditions for victory were achieved.94
SO WHY THE BRITISH SEARCH FOR MANEUVER?
Obviously, all military forces will prefer to “fight smart” and to avoid the common costs of frontal assaults if they can, but British strategic culture does seem to
be particularly inclined that way. The following possible reasons for this are tentative and conjectural in the extreme, but may help to explain the phenomenon.
In the first place, British manpower (as opposed to voluntary Empire and
Commonwealth manpower) was limited in comparison with that of Britain’s
adversaries. From the time of the first Queen Elizabeth, the country’s population size relative to that of its major adversaries had to be a major consideration.
At the end of the seventeenth century, the population of France was more than
twice England’s. In the Second World War, Britain could not field anything like
the number of divisions in the European theater that Germany, Russia, or the
United States could. At its peak, the British army in the First World War had
mustered seventy-three divisions, but the British had no chance of reaching that
total in the second war because of the personnel demands from a huge air force
and a navy twice as big as it had been in the first war. The demands of a greatly
expanded war industry were severe too.95 In the summer of 1941, the British army
comprised just thirty-seven divisions, dubiously trained and equipped, while
Hitler controlled 250. It pained Churchill that the U.S. Army so greatly outnumbered that of Britain, but he accepted it as a consequence of the simple fact that
the U.S. population was three times larger than Britain’s.96 Nevertheless, one of
Alanbrooke’s special problems was to persuade Churchill that army manpower
had to be reduced significantly rather than increased, well before the end of the
war, if there was to be any hope of economic recovery afterward. Hence there was
an inbuilt military and economic need to husband human resources rather than
fritter them away in costly direct attacks on strongly held positions.
Allied to this, arguably, was the standard refrain, echoed by Correlli Barnett
and countless others, that Britain had mixed feelings about the maintenance
of large standing armies anyway.97 In part this is said to be attributable to the
threat that Cromwell’s army had posed to civil liberties in the seventeenth century and to the costs of keeping such an army, which could be met only by the
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trading classes, whose interests apparently were served much better by naval
investments.
This all tracked well with a Corbettian sense that sea power was the central
component that enabled strategies of maritime maneuver that intrinsically were
more cost-effective than the more land-centric and potentially attritionalist
alternatives. In comparison with battles on land, the “butcher’s bill” at sea generally was lower. Sea power, Mackinder claimed, “expended men with . . . singular
economy.”98 Moreover, by making use of the sea as the world’s greatest maneuver
space (until the advent of today’s space and cyber domains, that is), mastery of the
sea provided many more opportunities for the indirect attack of a land-bound adversary, and for the British to shape the future of the world in the way they wanted.
In consequence of all this, as Duff Cooper famously proclaimed before an
American audience, the British and their allies thought they had “found a new
way to make war—without sacrificing human lives.”99 The tragedy was that, in all
too many circumstances, they had not.
British experience is worth remembering in today’s ferment of ideas about
how a new campaign in the Pacific might be conducted. That experience seems
to underline the point that even in the most maneuverist of campaigns there will
be attritionalist moments in which mass still matters. Declines in population size
and industrial might relative to adversaries (and allies) made it increasingly difficult for Britain to accumulate the military mass necessary for decisive diplomatic
effect. Success, when it came, depended on the targeted use of transformational
technology, superior training, and seamless cooperation among the military
services, each of which needed to succeed in their supporting aims at all levels of
war. Clarity about both aim and method was essential. Success required an absolute nurturing of, and reliance on, supportive allies. Above all, “naval action,” said
Corbett, had to “be nicely coordinated with military and diplomatic pressure.”100
In today’s terminology, it needs to be part of a well-integrated, whole-ofgovernment approach. Whatever their strategic attractions, campaigns of maritime maneuver, in short, are inherently demanding—especially when up against
serious opposition—and cannot be improvised or economized safely.
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WATER UNDER THE BRIDGE?
The Revival of New Zealand–United States Maritime
Cooperation
Steven Paget

I

n unveiling the U.S. “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific in November 2011, then-President
Barack H. Obama signaled a “strategic re-balancing” toward the region.1 The
American pronouncement was made amid great fanfare—and some controversy.
Attention soon was drawn to Australia by the announcement that 2,500 U.S.
Marines would rotate through Darwin and use their time there to engage with
regional security partners. Although Alex Burns and Ben Eltham assessed that
Australia might “have been expected to welcome greater U.S. involvement in the
Pacific region,” New Zealand’s response always was likely to be subtler, given the
long shadow cast by the 1985 Australia–New Zealand–United States (ANZUS)
crisis.2 However, since the turn of the twenty-first century, New Zealand’s defense
relationship with the United States gradually has been rebuilt.
In reference to the bilateral relationship, Mark D. Gilbert, then the U.S. ambassador to New Zealand, declared in 2016, “If the relationship is not in the best
place it has been, it is in a really good place.”3 While describing the impending
visit of a U.S. Navy (USN) ship to New Zealand as “a further demonstration of
the strength of our close relationship, our friendship, and our shared values,”
New Zealand’s then prime minister John P. Key responded to a question about
the implications of the event by stating in 2016, “If the question is will there be
[a] step back into ANZUS then the answer is no. We run an independent foreign
policy. . . . [W]e make . . . decisions on a case by
Dr. Steven Paget is the director of academic support
case basis of what we want to do.”4
services (international security) at the University of
Portsmouth (United Kingdom).
If New Zealand’s interaction with the United
States is to be decided on a case-by-case basis, one
© 2021 by Steven Paget
Naval War College Review, Summer 2021, Vol. 74, No. 3
area of vital significance is maritime cooperation.
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Indeed, the inherently maritime emphasis of the New Zealand Defence White
Paper 2016 brought the issue into sharp focus. As Euan Graham has commented,
“The re-anchoring of naval ties commands a symbolic premium, given that Wellington’s 1980s ban on U.S. nuclear-propelled warships from visiting Kiwi ports
was the trigger for New Zealand’s suspension from the ANZUS alliance.”5
It is important, in both the domestic and international contexts, that New
Zealand’s contribution to addressing regional and international security is recognized, but also that the benefits of multinational cooperation for New Zealand
are understood. From a maritime perspective, a revival of ANZUS relations—in
practice, if not in name—is, and will continue to be, vital to allowing the New
Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) to fulfill the ever-increasing range of tasks expected of it. A number of impending capability-replacement decisions provide an
opportunity to enhance New Zealand’s maritime capability and, in turn, increase
the capacity of the NZDF to cooperate with forces and government agencies of
the United States.
Aside from the national and binational benefits, maritime cooperation between New Zealand and the United States is valuable for the region. As former
U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter observed, the “Asia-Pacific security
network weaves every state’s relationships together to help their militaries do
more, over greater distances, more efficiently,” which is of great significance, as
the region “is increasingly becoming the world’s economic, political, and military
center of gravity.”6 The nature of the operating environment means that maritime
cooperation is especially important.
The need for cooperation with Australia is obvious and has been covered extensively.7 The importance of cooperation between New Zealand and the United
States in the maritime domain has received significantly less attention. This article addresses the challenges facing New Zealand in the maritime domain and
the subsequent necessity for cooperation. It will examine how current and future
capability decisions will shape the NZDF’s ability to cooperate and will affect
the achievement of interoperability. The shifting defense relationship between
the two nations will be examined to demonstrate that a platform for enhanced
cooperation has been created, before the challenges posed by the strategic rivalry
between China and the United States are considered. The article will conclude
that cooperation between New Zealand and the United States in the maritime
domain, conducted in accordance with—as opposed to in contradiction to—
New Zealand’s independent foreign policy, will be essential in addressing the
ever-growing challenges. New Zealand represents a pertinent subject for study,
as its case enables the examination of a fluctuating defense relationship with the
United States and provides a small-state perspective on maritime cooperation
with a large power.
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SMALL NAVIES AND MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION
The Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) frequently is described as a small navy,
and Eric Grove has classified it as being in rank 4—an “adjacent force projection”
navy—which amounts to its being able to “project force well off shore.”8 Owing
to their size and limited resources, such navies can find it difficult to realize
their “strategic ambitions.”9 Nevertheless, the pressure on small navies is only
likely to increase. Lars Wedin has contended that “small navies will see enlarged
requirements as a result of the increased importance of the sea in the context of
the blue society—a society dependent on the sea and its use.”10 The existence of a
“capability-capacity crunch,” however, means that “the gap between available and
required military capabilities for effect is growing.”11 The capability gap is a particularly pressing concern for small navies. Ian Speller, Deborah Sanders, and Michael Mulqueen have written that “all navies face resource constraints but small
navies, denied economies of scale, need to deal with these in particular ways.
Traditional approaches include multinational collaboration, role specialisation,
the development of niche capabilities, design compromises and the abandoning
of roles and/or capabilities that no longer appear vital.”12
Small navies such as the Republic of Singapore Navy and the RNZN have
sought, as a result, to cooperate with international partners on a regular basis.13
Ultimately, it is highly likely that the RNZN and the wider NZDF will operate
with the U.S. Navy with “increasing frequency both within and beyond the immediate region” across a range of tasks.14
MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS AND RESPONSE
Then–Chief of Navy Rear Admiral John O. Martin emphasized that the RNZN
makes myriad contributions, declaring in 2018 that “[t]o focus on combat capability and the shortcomings of various vessels in high-intensity maritime combat
is to underestimate the roles that make up New Zealand’s contributions to maritime security.”15 New Zealand has afforded the maritime domain increasing importance. The Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 identified three capability
areas that “will require attention,” including “[m]aritime domain awareness and
response, particularly in New Zealand’s neighbourhood but also further afield.”16
The emphasis on the maritime domain inevitably will require cooperation with
the United States, both regionally and beyond. Reuben Steff and Francesca
Dodd-Parr have observed, “For NZ, there is perhaps no more important element
of US power than its naval dominance, which enables the free flow of trade across
the high seas, and, in extremis, could be utilised to aid NZ should its territorial
integrity be threatened or a national emergency occur.”17
The tasks that the NZDF is expected to undertake are both wide-ranging
and diverse. The protection of resources increasingly is one of the most widely
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reported maritime-security challenges in the region. Although the problem is
more prevalent elsewhere, New Zealand is not immune to the threat of illegal,
unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing. The New Zealand government has
assessed that its exclusive economic zone will become a “more attractive area”
for IUU fishing as “global pressure on fisheries” increases.18 The protection of
resources expands beyond the threat of IUU fishing to include a range of issues,
such as the preservation of undersea minerals and conservation of the environment. These challenges require close collaboration among the NZDF, the New
Zealand Customs Service, the New Zealand Police, the Ministry for Primary
Industries, and the Department of Conservation. In 2013, Martyn J. Dunne, then
the New Zealand high commissioner to Australia, declared, “[O]nly through interagency coordination can the best results occur, especially when constrained by
tight financial circumstances. The benefits are immense, the outcomes obvious
and tangible.”19 Interagency cooperation is fundamental to the provision of an effective response in the national context, but New Zealand’s wider responsibilities
necessitate a broad range of multinational interactions.
These responsibilities include the ongoing challenge of protecting natural
resources throughout the South Pacific. Jenny Hayward-Jones has noted that
while Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands have a
diverse array of natural resources, the majority of Pacific Island countries rely on
fisheries, tourism, and remittances. Maritime resources, particularly fish stocks,
are the lifeblood of many Pacific Island nation economies, with the Pacific Islands
Forum Fisheries Agency estimating that the total value of the fishing catch within
the Pacific Islands region in 2010 was US$5 billion.20 The abundance of marine
resources has led to an increase in IUU fishing, resulting in annual losses of approximately NZ$400 million. The competition for resources and the detrimental
effects of IUU fishing may contribute to instability, which the Defence White
Paper 2016 identified as having the potential to have “flow-on effects for New
Zealand and the immediate region within the next 25 years.”21
New Zealand and the United States are members of a range of regional organizations, such as the Pacific Community and the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional
Environment Programme. Both countries have commitments to fisheries enforcement as part of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission and
contribute to regional maritime surveillance through the Quadrilateral Defense
Coordination Group.22 The protection of other resources, including deep-sea
minerals such as seafloor massive sulfides, cobalt-rich ferromanganese crust,
and polymetallic nodules, may add a further layer to regional maritime-security
challenges.23 The existence and functioning of the U.S.-led Oceania Maritime
Security Initiative, which sees USN vessels transiting through the region engage
in patrols to supplement U.S. Coast Guard maritime law-enforcement operations
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and cooperate with Australia, France, New Zealand, and the Pacific Island nations, are a testament to the need to work together.24 As the pressure on the maritime resources of the Pacific increases, enhanced cooperation in surveillance and
enforcement will become ever more significant.
The ongoing meteorological and geological hazards the Pacific region faces
are likely to lead to an increased requirement to conduct humanitarian-assistance
and disaster-relief (HADR) operations. The New Zealand government has assessed that the “impacts of climate change will require more humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,” and that the NZDF will “be faced with more frequent
and concurrent operational commitments, which will stretch resources and may
reduce readiness for other requirements.”25 The Washington Declaration (2012)
specifically affirmed that New Zealand and the United States are “prepared to
respond in accordance with national approval processes in a timely and effective
way to the range of contingencies that may arise in the region, including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and multilateral cooperation with regional partners’ armed forces.”26 By comparison with Australia and, especially, the United
States, New Zealand’s capacity to respond is modest. Although New Zealand
still can make an invaluable contribution, including taking on a leadership role,
cooperation with other nations has been important and will become ever more
so if crises increase in both frequency and intensity.
The stability of Pacific Island countries is a central concern of New Zealand
and the United States. Although the Defence White Paper 2016 assessed that the
South Pacific was “unlikely to face an external military threat in the foreseeable
future,” it noted that the potential for instability remained.27 The challenges
presented by drug, firearms, and human trafficking; IUU fishing; and environmental disasters all have the potential to undermine stability. Equally, demographic pressures and fluctuating employment levels could contribute to the
diminishment of political and social cohesion. Instability in the region would
require a response from New Zealand and, potentially, the United States. Given
the nature of the operating environment, any response will require significant
maritime elements.
In view of the potential for instability and New Zealand’s “enduring interest”
in the South Pacific, the Defence White Paper 2016 projected that the NZDF likely
would have to “deploy to the region over the next ten years, for a response beyond
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.”28 The Defence Capability Plan 2019
placed emphasis on “increasing the effectiveness of the Defence Force to operate
in the South Pacific,” in line with the “Pacific Reset” introduced by the coalition
government.29
While the United States perhaps does not accord the matter the same priority
as does New Zealand, it shares the same concerns. Andrew Hyde has asserted,
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“The United States has been a steady force for and contributor to social, economic and political development throughout the Pacific region.”30 U.S. diplomats
have called for increased engagement and have sought “a regional architecture
flexible enough to respond to the material and non-material flows—of money,
information, weapons, goods, drugs, and people—that are transforming the
region.”31 Although there was some skepticism about then-President Donald J.
Trump’s “free and open” Indo-Pacific policy, the concept was based on the “simultaneous enhancement of America’s economic engagement, security cooperation,
and rule-making potential.”32
The commitment to stability has been demonstrated over the past few decades,
particularly by the American and New Zealand contributions to the International
Force for East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999. Regarding this Australian-led initiative, much has been made of the contributions of the Australian Defence Force
and, to a lesser degree, those of the NZDF. One report has noted, “No other state
was willing to match either Australia or New Zealand’s combat contributions to
East Timor in the crucial first weeks of the operation.”33 However, the broader
multinational coalition played an invaluable role. First and foremost, American
diplomatic efforts with Jakarta paved the way for INTERFET’s operations.34
While U.S. involvement was crucial at the strategic level, it also served as a
force multiplier at the operational and tactical levels. During the initial amphibious operations, an assortment of vessels, including from Australia, New Zealand,
and the United States, conducted protection operations to ensure accomplishment of the mission.35 The composition of the deployed forces was of paramount
importance and the result of effective coordination. The deployment of U.S.
forces was designed specifically to ensure the provision of unique capabilities that
the coalition did not possess otherwise.36 The presence of the Aegis cruiser USS
Mobile Bay and elements of a U.S. Navy-Marine amphibious ready group that
contained 2,500 Marines created a deterrent effect and demonstrated “alliance
solidarity.”37 INTERFET confirmed the significance of collaboration between
Australia and New Zealand, but it also emphasized the ongoing, but perhaps
more subtle, importance of cooperation with the United States.
The need to be proactive rather than reactive has culminated in the maritimediplomacy initiative known as the Pacific Partnership, which seeks to provide
humanitarian and civic assistance, as well as to enhance stability in the region.
Despite being multinational in nature, the Pacific Partnership is led principally
by the United States. New Zealand has made increasingly important contributions during recent iterations, including undertaking leadership roles. In 2013,
for example, New Zealand served as the phase lead for the Republic of Kiribati
and Solomon Islands legs of the partnership’s exercise that year.38 The Pacific
Partnership is a triservice endeavor, but maritime assets, particularly amphibious
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vessels, play an essential role. Ultimately, collaboration in the Pacific is mutually
beneficial for New Zealand and the United States.
As a “longstanding contributor to international peace and security,” New Zealand will continue to deploy the NZDF on a global basis.39 The Strategic Defence
Policy Statement 2018 laid this out explicitly: “As challenges to the international
rules-based order intensify—from our neighbourhood to the Asia-Pacific and
further afield—it will remain in New Zealand’s vital interest to act in support of
this order.”40 The Defence Capability Plan 2019 subsequently stated as follows:
“[D]eployments beyond New Zealand’s immediate region will most likely continue to be as part of operations led by New Zealand’s security partners, or as part of
United Nations–mandated peace support operations. The Defence Force must be
able to operate effectively with New Zealand’s key security partners, in particular
with our ally Australia.” While New Zealand will continue to conduct an independent foreign policy, NZDF deployment to multinational operations likely will
involve interaction with the United States as one of the “key security partners.”41
The recognition that “New Zealand’s economic prosperity depends upon open
sea, air, and electronic lines of communication” has highlighted the significance
of counterpiracy and maritime-security operations.42 New Zealand so far has
made modest but worthwhile commitments to such operations. For example,
HMNZS Te Mana contributed to NATO’s counterpiracy task force as part of
Operation OCEAN SHIELD from late 2013 to early 2014. Even before Te Mana’s
deployment, an RNZN boat crew aboard HMAS Melbourne participated in operations in the Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, and Gulf of Oman.43
The NZDF has been a useful contributor to the Combined Maritime Forces
(CMF), a “United States–led international naval coalition” that conducts
maritime-security operations in the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman,
and Red Sea.44 Between August 2014 and December 2015, a rotating Royal New
Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) detachment and an Orion surveillance aircraft flew
1,400 hours during the course of 174 maritime-surveillance flights with the CMF.
Operating as part of Combined Task Force 150, which was commanded at the
time by Canada but with a combined Australian and Canadian staff, the Orion
worked with ships from Australia, France, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and various Middle East nations.45
Although New Zealand’s previous contributions to counterpiracy operations
had been limited, the Defence White Paper 2016 forecast that the commitment
of forces was “likely to be enduring” owing to a “lack of progress towards addressing some of the underlying causes of piracy in the region.”46 That prediction
was realized by the deployment of an RNZAF Orion and 55 personnel on 10
February 2017 to support CMF counterpiracy and counter-human- and -drugtrafficking operations for a period of twelve months.47 Multinational cooperation
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is the common denominator across the diverse array of responsibilities that are
expected of the NZDF.
CAPABILITIES THAT SUPPORT EFFECTIVELY OPERATING
WITH OTHERS
Air Marshal Kevin Short, Chief of Defence Force, determined in 2018 that the
NZDF must be “integrated internationally with our military partners and likeminded nations.”48 The capability decisions that have been taken already, as well
as those that are imminent, will provide further avenues for cooperation with
multinational partners, including the United States. The New Zealand government has considered the Frigate Systems Upgrade project to be important for the
Anzac-class frigates to provide “world class combat systems,” “a global response
option for long duration operations,” and “interoperability with New Zealand’s
key defence partners.”49 The modernization and upgrade of the frigates have led
to an extension of their expected service life beyond 2030, but their subsequent
replacement also will create further opportunities to enhance interoperability.
Similarly, the Defence Capability Plan 2019 reasoned that the July 2018 decision to purchase four P-8A Poseidon maritime-patrol aircraft to replace six
P-3K2 Orion aircraft, in addition to continuing to ensure a maritime-patrol
capability, would provide “a common strategic air surveillance capability with
key Defence partners following the withdrawal from service of the P-3 Orion
fleet.”50 Euan Graham emphasized further that “possessing a meaningful, deployable capability allows New Zealand to retain some influence among its allies and
partners, rather than free riding on its presumed geographical isolation. Shared
values matter, but intelligence sharing is highly transactional. New Zealand’s P-8s
will help convince partners of its continuing value within the Five Eyes [an intelligence alliance among Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom,
and the United States].”51
The delivery of the first P-8A is scheduled for April 2023, with the entire fleet
expected to reach final operating capability by 2025.52 While the aircraft can
and will be used for independent operations, interoperability with Australia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, which also will operate the aircraft, is an
important consideration.
A second sealift vessel, which will operate alongside HMNZS Canterbury,
will be acquired in the mid-to-late 2020s to enhance the sealift capacity of the
NZDF. The second ship, which is likely to be a landing platform dock or similar,
is planned as an “enhanced sealift vessel,” with greater lift capacity than Canterbury, and will include hospital facilities, planning spaces, and self-defense capabilities.53 The intended acquisitions demonstrate the increased significance that
Australia and New Zealand attach to “amphibiosity.”54
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The enhanced sealift capability will also improve the New Zealand Defence Force’s
amphibious operations. Through the provision of a well dock, it will be able to conduct operations in a wider range of sea conditions, and will have the size and capacity
to carry large equipment, and sufficient aviation capacity to allow extended, long
duration operations. Its size will also provide for the transport of a larger number of
personnel, allowing for the value of the increased size of the New Zealand Army to be
realised.55

The plans for acquiring enhanced platforms have been accompanied by efforts
to further the conceptual aspects of amphibious operations. For example, NZDF
personnel have participated in the Pacific Amphibious Leaders Symposium,
which “brings together senior leaders of allied and partner militaries with significant interest in the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific region to discuss
key aspects of maritime/amphibious operations, capability development, crisis
response, and interoperability.”56 Long-term planning also sees Canterbury being replaced with a more capable vessel when it is withdrawn from service in the
2030s, to ensure that concurrency is maintained.57
The 2019 introduction of the dive and hydrographic vessel HMNZS Manawanui and the fleet tanker HMNZS Aotearoa further increased the RNZN’s capacity.
Manawanui supports “underwater search and recovery, hydrographic survey,
explosive ordnance disposal, mine counter-measures capability, training and
maritime presence, rapid environmental assessment, and route survey.”58 The
ship was described by then–Defence Minister Ron Mark as “a game changer
domestically and for our South Pacific region.”59 As a secondhand vessel, the ship
has only a fifteen-year service life, but there are plans to replace it with a similar
vessel in the 2030s.60
There also will be important changes to the NZDF’s patrol capabilities. The
New Zealand government adjudged that while the “inshore and offshore patrol
vessels [OPVs] have provided significant value during their service lives,” they
are “increasingly operationally limited as the ships age and regulations evolve.”61
As a result of the increased likelihood of operating in the South Pacific and the
Southern Ocean, two inshore patrol vessels—HMNZS Pukaki and HMNZS
Rotoiti—were retired on 17 October 2019.62 A Southern Ocean patrol vessel is
due to be acquired in the mid-2020s to enable the OPVs to be concentrated on
Pacific operations.63 The vessel will be ice strengthened to “cope better with the
20-metre waves in the Southern Ocean, and thus also contribute to . . . protecting Antarctica.”64 The fate of the remaining two inshore patrol vessels will be
determined prior to the commissioning of the Southern Ocean patrol vessel. The
Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 ultimately concluded as follows:
It is . . . critical for the Defence Force to maintain and develop capabilities that support effectively operating with others. This involves developing complementary
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capabilities as appropriate, ensuring mutual familiarity (developed through personnel
exchanges and exercising), and the compatibility of communications and command
and control systems. Interoperability is key to New Zealand’s strong international
reputation as a valued and credible defence partner and ally.65

Basil Germond has summarized, “Post-modern seapower is conceived as a
collective effort with shared benefits, rather than a zero-sum game.”66 The challenges facing the NZDF, especially the RNZN, point to the benefits of a “collective effort with shared benefits.” However, despite the trend toward increasing
cooperation on a regional and global basis, inevitably there are limits for New
Zealand.
NEW ZEALAND’S CONTEMPORARY “ANZUS” RELATIONS
New Zealand’s defense relationship with the United States has been somewhat
tumultuous. The nadir of New Zealand–U.S. defense relations came in 1985
when the Labour government, led by Prime Minister David R. Lange, refused a
visit from USS Buchanan (DDG 14) as part of the policy of preventing nuclearpowered or -armed ships from entering the nation’s ports. In response, the United
States withdrew its security guarantee and ended defense cooperation. Glenn
Palmer and T. Clifton Morgan have asserted that “New Zealand concluded that
a continuation of its participation in ANZUS was too costly and that the maintenance it received from the United States was not worth the cost of the required
policies.”67 But if the formal alliance was deemed too costly in 1985, developments over the past two decades have indicated that New Zealand is becoming
ever more cognizant of the benefits of a firmer defense relationship with the
United States.
The contribution of New Zealand’s Special Air Service to the conflict in Afghanistan improved relations and served as a platform for increased defense cooperation. The Wellington (2010) and Washington (2012) Declarations provided
for enhanced defense cooperation, particularly in the maritime domain.68 Since
then, in a symbolic move, HMNZS Canterbury docked at Pearl Harbor during
RIMPAC 2014, which marked the first time a New Zealand ship had done so
since the 1985 ANZUS crisis. The NZDF’s participation in RIMPAC (as well as
a range of other exercises, such as DAWN BLITZ and BOLD ALLIGATOR) also has
engendered greater cohesion between the militaries of New Zealand and the
United States.69 Consequently, the Defence White Paper 2016 asserted that the
relationship with the United States has “reached a depth and breadth not seen for
30 years.”70 New Zealand’s increasing integration into RIMPAC was highlighted
by the 2018 iteration, between 27 June and 2 August, when the RNZN for the first
time served as a commander (of undersea mine countermeasures in the Southern
California area of operations) and also won the Naval Surface Fire Support Rodeo

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss3/1

56

Naval War College: Summer 2021 Full Issue

PA G E T

51

competition.71 The burgeoning defense relationship prompted Jack Georgieff to
contend that New Zealand and the United States are “allies in all but name.”72
While the two nations are not formal allies, New Zealand’s status as a “regional
strategic partner” is testament to the increasingly close relationship.73
Notably, the U.S. Navy was invited to participate in the November 2016 International Fleet Review in Auckland. The visit of USS Sampson (DDG 102) marked
the first time a USN ship had docked in New Zealand since the ANZUS crisis.
The significance of the visit as planned would have been more symbolic than
practical, by further indicating the strengthening of U.S.–New Zealand military
ties, but as events unfolded Sampson’s assistance to the recovery efforts following
the 7.8-magnitude Kaikoura earthquake of 14 November 2016 demonstrated the
benefits of a close relationship. The NZDF deployed a range of assets, including HMNZ ships Canterbury, Endeavour, Te Kaha, and Wellington. They were
supplemented by an international contribution that was made feasible by the
imminent International Fleet Review. Support was provided by the Australian
frigate HMAS Darwin, the Canadian frigate HMCS Vancouver, and Sampson,
whose helicopters transported aid to the disaster-struck areas. In addition, a USN
P-3 and a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force P-1 aerial-surveillance aircraft also
provided assistance.74
In total, 216 tons of disaster relief, including thirteen tons of food, three
hundred kilograms of blankets, five hundred kilograms of telecommunications
equipment, four tons of medical supplies, and portable pumps and generators,
were transported.75 Sampson’s helicopters lifted almost five tons of aid across the
course of fourteen flights, the ship’s rigid-hull inflatable boats evacuated civilians,
and twenty-six personnel assisted with efforts ashore.76 In a further demonstration of the importance of cooperation and interoperability, Endeavour refueled
Sampson and other international ships.77
Granted, the ships were fortunately placed, owing to the impending International Fleet Review, but that did not detract from the multinational contribution.
On 22 November 2016, following the U.S. Navy’s contribution to the relief effort,
then–Prime Minister Key proclaimed that despite “differences of opinion on different issues,” such as trade and climate change, “New Zealand and the United
States are the very best of friends”; he cited Sampson’s visit as “proof of how strong
that relationship really is.”78 Although the example was much smaller in scale, the
crew of the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Star (WAGB 10) also was able to
assist with patrols ashore during the Port Hills fire in February 2017, while the
ship was docked at Lyttelton.79 Aside from demonstrating the utility of NZDF
assets during disaster-relief efforts in New Zealand, the Kaikoura earthquake
and, to a much lesser degree, the Port Hills fire highlighted that international
assistance is invaluable.
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In a further demonstration of the spirit of goodwill that exists between New
Zealand and the United States and the mutual benefits of the reemerging partnership between their navies, HMNZS Te Kaha was dispatched to assist the Nimitz
(CVN 68) carrier strike group (CSG) following the collision between USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and a Philippine-flagged containership off the Japanese coast on
14 June 2017. In announcing Te Kaha’s assignment to the Nimitz CSG, New
Zealand’s then defense minister Mark P. Mitchell stated that “the United States
was very quick to help here in New Zealand when the earthquake struck in the
South Island. . . . This was deeply appreciated.”80 Rear Admiral William D. Byrne
Jr., USN, then the commander of the Nimitz CSG, praised the integration of Te
Kaha as a “great honor” and indicated his hope for “future cooperative endeavors
between our two countries.”81
Subsequently, Te Kaha was awarded a U.S. Meritorious Unit Citation for its
swift and valued contribution.82 Like Sampson in 2016, Te Kaha fortuitously was
placed—in Te Kaha’s case, near Japan as part of the RNZN Naval Task Group
Asian deployment—but the proximity of RNZN and USN vessels in times of crisis only serves to emphasize further the need for and likelihood of collaboration.
Scott P. Brown, at the time U.S. ambassador to New Zealand, reflected that the
maritime responses to the Kaikoura earthquake and the Fitzgerald collision serve
as “a real testimony to both the depth of our relationship, and the strides we have
made towards increasing interoperability.”83
New Zealand’s close relationship with the United States in Antarctica includes
a contribution to the Joint Logistics Pool. That relationship has the potential for
enhancement following the 18 July 2016 announcement that the New Zealand
government would spend NZ$493 million on a new ice-strengthened and winterized naval tanker optimized for operations in Antarctica. Then–Defence Minister
Gerard A. Brownlee declared, “This will allow it to deliver fuel and other goods
to support Scott Base and McMurdo Station, during summer months once an
icebreaker has cleared a path. . . . It will increase New Zealand’s contribution
and help further demonstrate our long-term commitment to the Antarctic Joint
Logistics Pool with the United States.”84 Furthermore, the commitment in the Defence White Paper 2016 to purchase a new ice-strengthened Southern Ocean OPV
will increase New Zealand’s patrol capacity in the area. In addition, collisions
and near misses during the present decade also have highlighted the search-andrescue responsibilities that Australia, New Zealand, and the United States share in
the Southern Ocean.85 Ultimately, the ability to cooperate with the United States
in Antarctica remains an important consideration for New Zealand.
Not only is a focus on preserving and furthering maritime cooperation with
the United States a matter of pragmatism, but it also appears to have political
and public approval. Following a poll in May 2016 about whether the visit of a
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USN ship to New Zealand would be welcomed, which revealed that 75 percent
of respondents were in favor and just 20 percent against, then–Prime Minister
Key expressed his personal desire to see a vessel conduct a visit.86 Significantly,
the government announced that the United States would not be asked to confirm
whether the ship was nuclear armed, and Andrew J. Little, then the opposition
leader, indicated that he would pursue the same policy if in power. While the
election of President Trump may have led to a more cautious attitude among
both politicians and the general public, there is still momentum behind maritime
cooperation. In February 2017, New Zealand granted permission for Polar Star
to dock at Lyttelton following operations in Antarctica, as mentioned above.87
Candy Green, the chargé d’affaires at the U.S. embassy in Wellington, noted that
discussions about future ship visits “will focus on practical cooperation, friendship, and advancing shared interests.”88 When Polar Star docked in New Zealand
for a third time in Wellington, in February 2019, two RNZN officers were on
board, having spent time observing operations in Antarctica.89
The election of the coalition government in October 2017 led to less public
emphasis being placed on the significance of the relationship with the United
States, but the importance of cooperation has not diminished. During a speech
in Washington, DC, in December 2018, then–Deputy Prime Minister Winston R.
Peters pointed to the need for cooperation between New Zealand and the United
States in the Asia-Pacific region generally and the southwest Pacific in particular,
noting that “[t]here are few relationships better than that between New Zealand
and the United States. . . . Because of [our] common values and democratic traditions, it’s hardly surprising that our global interests so often correspond, and that
we have repeatedly worked together in times of international crises and in the
face of major global challenges. And we will continue to do so.”90
The election of President Trump sparked widespread debate in Australia
and New Zealand about the future of their respective relationships with the
United States. President Trump’s anticipated transactional approach prompted
far-reaching and challenging questions about the broader U.S.–New Zealand
relationship—in particular, the implications of an American foreign policy likely
to be more assertive came under consideration. Robert Ayson speculated in 2017
that New Zealand could move closer to China, depending on what policies the
Trump administration pursued.91 Yet New Zealand adopted an approach of cautious positivity toward the United States, with Joanne Wallis and Anna Powles
asserting that “although New Zealand holds concerns that the Trump Administration is a disrupting force within the international liberal order, New Zealand
views the United States as a key Pacific partner.”92
Despite the initial concerns about the potential effects of Trump’s presidency,
fissures did not appear in the burgeoning defense relationship with the United
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States. Advancing Pacific Partnerships 2019, which was released in October 2019,
seemed to go further than previous documents with regard to the importance of
the relationship with the United States, without stating so directly. The document
emphasized a “like-minded partners” construction throughout, which Ayson has
interpreted as “New Zealand’s bigger western partners”: Australia, France, and
the United States.93 Secretary of Defence Andrew Bridgman and Air Marshal
Short declared as follows in the executive report of Advancing Pacific Partnerships 2019:
A range of partners maintain special relationships and constitutional obligations in
the Pacific, and undertake efforts to support democratic values and the rules-based
order throughout the broader Indo-Pacific region. New Zealand Defence seeks to
work with these partners, alongside our Pacific partners, to make positive contributions to Pacific security, recognising that we can achieve more together than any of
us can manage on our own. Cooperation among this constellation of countries will
be most successful when it leverages respective strengths and accounts for complementary approaches to meet Pacific security priorities, as defined by Pacific partners,
with the shared goal of fostering a secure, stable and resilient region.94

As New Zealand considers the United States to be a “like-minded” partner with
special relationships and obligations in the Pacific, it can be assumed that U.S.–
New Zealand cooperation is perceived as a necessity.
The documents the New Zealand government released in 2019 reinforced the
messages that have emanated from both Washington and Wellington. On assuming his role as U.S. Secretary of Defense, James N. Mattis thanked then–Defence
Minister Brownlee for his country’s “support on various areas of mutual interest”
and espoused “strengthening the U.S.–New Zealand relationship in the future.”95
Interestingly, it was reported that the White House’s initial readout of the phone
call between President Trump and New Zealand’s then prime minister S. William English referred to a “close relationship and bilateral alliance”; later it was
amended to read that the leaders had “affirmed the close friendship and bilateral
partnership” between New Zealand and the United States.96 English revealed
that the leaders had discussed New Zealand’s role “as a small country, a long way
away, pulling our weight in the defence of our own people around the world and
working alongside the US to contribute.”97 While Brian J. Lynch has noted rightly
that “[t]o our bankable credit, New Zealand has a reputation for an independent
approach to international affairs and a readiness to do more than our share in
meeting global commitments,” political capital has to be generated continually.98
In view of the political bipartisanship and public goodwill, it would seem an
opportune time to ensure that momentum is not lost, by strengthening maritime
relations. The timing is particularly opportune given that New Zealand’s “domestic political context” has been judged to be “more amenable to the procurement
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of more advanced maritime military capabilities.”99 Cooperation with the United
States in the maritime domain—whether formally or informally—is only likely
to become more important in light of the challenges and threats raised in New
Zealand’s Defence White Paper 2016 and Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018.
A BRIDGE TOO FAR? THE LIMITS OF ANZUS COOPERATION
New Zealand’s cooperation with the United States has not been and will not be
absolute. As a result of the increased engagement between New Zealand and the
United States, including involvement in Afghanistan, Terence C. O’Brien has assessed that “American expectations of New Zealand have . . . been heightened; but
this paradoxically increases the need for New Zealand to cultivate and retain a
judicious independent sense of balance in its foreign policy.”100 Nevertheless, New
Zealand still must demonstrate that it is continuing to pull its weight nationally,
regionally, and globally. In effect, New Zealand is faced with striking a fine balance between cooperation and overcommitment.
The biggest challenge presented is the strategic rivalry between China and the
United States. China is the biggest market for New Zealand exports and, despite
some recent turmoil, the economic relationship has continued to flourish alongside deepening defense relations with the United States. Maintaining that delicate
balance has involved constant shuffling to keep the diplomatic seesaw level. One
assessment noted that “China’s leaders appear to be untroubled by a more integrated military relationship between New Zealand and the United States, given
the diminutive stature of Wellington’s forces.”101 However, New Zealand’s relationships with both China and the United States have drawn increasing attention.
The U.S. position was made clear in the 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security
Strategy. “The United States has enduring economic and security interests in the
Asia-Pacific region. And because the region—stretching from the Indian Ocean,
through the South and East China Seas, and out to the Pacific Ocean—is primarily water, we place a premium on maintaining maritime peace and security.”102
Escalations in tension between China and the United States have raised the
specter of deepening Australian and New Zealand involvement. So far New
Zealand has taken a cautious approach to the discord. In a speech at the National
Defence University in China, then–Defence Minister Brownlee stated clearly in
2015, “We place great importance on both freedom of navigation and maintaining open trading routes. These are not just rhetorical statements. They are real
and critical for New Zealand.”103 Interestingly, the Washington Declaration includes a commitment to cooperate in the development of “deployable capabilities,
in support of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific.”104
Concerns that New Zealand may be compelled to take a stronger stance against
China, including conducting freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs),
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did not eventuate to any significant degree, as the Trump administration demonstrated a tendency to pursue unilateral action. Powles has noted that New
Zealand has been able to exercise “strategic ambiguity,” given that, as Thomas
Manch writes, “[w]hile the Trump administration has urged allies to follow its
lead . . . it hasn’t waited to act in concert with traditional partners.”105 While the
Trump administration increased the frequency of FONOPs—which already had
been enhanced under President Obama, reaching an all-time high in 2019, and
notably involving the deployment of two CSGs to the South China Sea in 2020—
New Zealand has not participated yet.106
The election of Joseph R. Biden Jr. has prompted expectations that allies and
partners of the United States, including New Zealand, may be pressured to be
more assertive against China’s actions.107 Ian A. Hill has assessed that “[t]he US
will expect much from its allies and friends—including New Zealand—in their
own dealings with China. In the increasingly contested South Pacific, Washington may look to its regional partners to do more of the heavy lifting.”108 This well
may include an increased focus on maritime operations. David Capie has warned,
“There are going to be some aspects of the US-China relationship over the next
few years that are going to force New Zealand towards some more zero-sum decision points . . . where you have to make a clearer choice.”109
Richard Fontaine has suggested, optimistically, that “[b]anishing the anachronistic nuclear divide is the first step in an enhanced U.S.–New Zealand
partnership that might one day see Auckland [Wellington] participating in key
overflights or freedom of navigation exercises.”110 With New Zealand walking the tightrope between its bilateral relations with China and those with the
United States, the issue of FONOPs is fraught with complications. A change in
circumstances may prompt a shift in stance in the future, but in the short term it
is unlikely that New Zealand will participate in U.S. FONOP patrols. Wayne D.
Mapp has written, “Over the last 30 years, since the rupture of the ANZUS alliance, New Zealand has considered that it has less need to formally take sides in
such contests. This is the essence of New Zealand’s independent foreign policy.”111
In addition to the conduct of an independent foreign policy, New Zealand
governments have recognized that capacity may preclude the NZDF’s involvement in some operations. In 2019, New Zealand responded to reported British
approaches about supplementing the patrols in the Strait of Hormuz by declaring
that it was unable to do so for practical reasons.112 Then–Minister of Defence Mark
announced that New Zealand “didn’t have any boats to send,” owing to its frigates
being in Canada for upgrade. He added, “The bottom line is that I can barely
struggle to keep two P3s [surveillance aircraft] flying. . . . I just don’t see that we
have any spare capability right now to engage in that kind of a mission.”113 Capacity, as well as policy, always will shape New Zealand’s international commitments.
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New Zealand’s independent approach was emphasized by then–Defence Minister Mitchell in 2017, when he explained in regard to Te Kaha: “If the Nimitz was
to go into an area that we wouldn’t normally patrol or it doesn’t fit in within our
own policy then we would probably cut off and divert and see if there is something else they want us to do.”114 As part of the nation’s independent approach
and in view of the escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the New Zealand
government consciously set clearly defined limits on the scope of Te Kaha’s attachment to the Nimitz CSG. Despite the deepening in New Zealand’s ANZUS
relations over recent decades, they remain selective rather than unlimited.
While the upward trajectory in defense cooperation may be called into question if the rivalry between the United States and China intensifies, regional
maritime-security challenges and HADR initiatives represent low-hanging fruit
in the wider New Zealand–U.S. relationship. Continued cooperation in those
areas presents an opportunity both to maintain New Zealand’s independent
foreign policy and to ensure that the defense relationship endures despite any
potential challenges posed by a more assertive American foreign policy. If the
United States calls on allies and strategic partners to do more, New Zealand will
need to be seen to undertake a fair share of the burden in the South Pacific and
the wider region. Relieving pressure in the less-contentious aspects of the defense
relationship may be sufficient to negate the risk of a blowout. ANZUS maritime
cooperation within the confines of an independent foreign policy will allow New
Zealand to maintain and deepen the defense relationship with the United States
while eschewing direct involvement in the U.S.-China strategic rivalry. Although
the maritime domain could be an arena of further tension in the future, it also
offers a number of avenues for cooperation. The comparatively limited size of
the NZDF means that the service can contribute in a number of important areas
while remaining on the periphery of any escalating tension.
The 1985 ANZUS crisis is becoming an increasingly distant memory. Admiral
Scott H. Swift, USN, then Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, declared pointedly in
2017, “I’m encouraged that the bonds of friendship forged between our navies
during World War II continue to flourish today.”115 Then-Ambassador Brown
observed in 2018, “New Zealand’s reputation as a long-term partner and steady
friend in time of need is not only renowned in the isles and atolls of the Pacific.
The United States has long admired this Kiwi approach. And today we continue
to work together for our shared values and common goals throughout the region
and the world.”116
New Zealand appears, even without the formal bonds of alliance, to have been
restored to the status of valued partner of the United States. While New Zealand,
understandably, does not couch the relationship in terms of ANZUS, the wider
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Five Eyes relationship offers a structure on which to anchor the bilateral and
multilateral relationships. In observing that “[a]longside Australia, New Zealand
benefits from close engagement with its other Five Eyes partners,” the New Zealand government proclaimed in 2018, “New Zealand values these relationships
and is committed to strengthening and broadening them where possible through
more regular interaction and cooperation.”117
In reference to New Zealand and the United States, Graeme Dobell has opined,
“Both sides have shown a pragmatic ability to step around the ANZUS cadaver to
try anew.”118 Events and decisions over the past decade have revived old elements
of the relationship, and many of them have been reassembled to form a composite
ANZUS bond. Tellingly, in 1967, Frederick L. W. Wood reasoned, “If we need
American protection, it will be found not by insistence on the terms of ANZUS
but by fostering that ‘relationship of confidence and common purpose.’”119 Cooperation in the maritime domain is one of the most obvious and most useful
examples of a common purpose.
Progress over the preceding decade has resulted from and demonstrated New
Zealand’s increased awareness of the ongoing relevance of a close defense relationship with the United States. In reference to the effect of the ANZUS crisis on
New Zealand, Gerald C. P. Hensley has written, “Before that it had some ability to
manoeuvre between its two partners, but the move towards greater independence
left it much more reliant on Australian goodwill. Sitting on a two-legged stool
proved rather less comfortable than a three-legged one.”120
Improvements in all aspects of the trilateral defense relationship have the
capacity to provide New Zealand with greater balance and flexibility. Increased
collaboration in the maritime domain, in particular, has the potential to generate enhanced capacity to conduct operations, reduce financial burdens, and
provide political credibility. With the range and level of threats, challenges, and
opportunities continuing to expand and rise, the ability to band together with
the United States can reduce the strain on the NZDF. The introduction of new
maritime-patrol aircraft and vessels will be a significant boost; but, with the scale
of the roles undertaken by the NZDF ever increasing, New Zealand runs the risk
of swimming merely to tread water in the maritime domain.
A 2017 New Zealand editorial, following the visit of the two American ships,
proclaimed, “Our helpful American friends are very welcome here, but it is good
to extend the hand of friendship on our own terms, and not as a junior partner in
an outdated alliance.”121 Rather than an attempt to hark back to a bygone era as a
result of historical affinity, a move to enhance ANZUS maritime cooperation can
provide a number of practical benefits. ANZUS relations can be situated clearly
within the broader approaches to regional engagement by both nations. It need
not be an exclusive club—it does not preclude cooperation with a range of other
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nations, including not only Australia and the United States but France, Japan, the
United Kingdom, the Pacific Islands, and ASEAN states.122 Nor does it require an
unfettered commitment to U.S. endeavors within or beyond the region.
Ultimately, while many of New Zealand’s nationally focused security and defense tasks will be undertaken unilaterally, there are few, if any, roles within and
beyond the region that cannot be enhanced through increased cooperation with
the United States. Commodore James Gilmour, RNZN, acknowledged in 2016,
“We’re aware—particular[ly] a country the size of New Zealand and . . . armed
forces the size of New Zealand[’s]—that almost nothing from a security perspective, meeting our responsibilities from a security perspective, will be dealt with
on our own.”123 In advocating a federated approach to defense in the Asia-Pacific,
Andrew Shearer has argued that closer cooperation among Australia, Japan, and
the United States makes “compelling strategic, operational, budget, and political
sense.”124 The same compelling logic points to the benefits of a federated approach to maritime-security challenges in the South Pacific. For New Zealand,
the significance of an effective Pacific Partnership—both within and beyond the
region—cannot be overestimated.
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“AN OBJEC T LESSON TO THE COUNTRY”
The 1915 Atlantic Fleet Summer Exercise and the U.S. Navy on the
Eve of World War I
Ryan Peeks

O

n 26 May 1915, the Washington Post warned its readers that an invading
force had “established a base, and landed troops on the shore of Chesapeake
Bay,” in preparation for a march on Washington. The cause of this invasion? Defeat of the U.S. Navy’s Atlantic Fleet by “a foreign foe of superior naval strength.”1
Over the course of several days, the enemy fleet had made its way across the
Atlantic and destroyed the American scouting line. The American commander,
Admiral Frank Friday Fletcher, was convinced that its target was New England
and let the enemy fleet slip unmolested into the Chesapeake with a twentythousand-man invading force, the vanguard of another hundred thousand
soldiers en route from Europe.2 Shortcomings in the quantity and quality of the
Atlantic Fleet’s scouting force had rendered its seventeen battleships irrelevant.3
Fortunately for the capital, this enemy fleet and invasion army were imaginary, part of the Atlantic Fleet’s summer exercise. They were, however, the
culmination of a very real campaign to embarrass the Secretary of the Navy,
Josephus Daniels, and force a naval expansion program onto the heretofore
skeptical Wilson administration. The leader of this campaign, the outgoing
Aide for Operations, Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske, designed the exercises for
maximum political effect.4 By grafting an unrealRyan Peeks is a historian at the Joint History and Research Office. Prior to that, he worked as a historian
istic and lurid invasion scenario featuring a thinly
at the Naval History and Heritage Command from
disguised German fleet onto the Atlantic Fleet’s
2015 to 2021. He received his PhD in history from the
exercise program, he hoped to “prove” that DanUniversity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2015
and is the author of Aircraft Carrier Requirements iels had failed to prepare the Navy for war and
and Strategy, 1977–2001 (2020).
force Woodrow Wilson’s administration to support a renewed naval buildup.
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Although the scenario for the invasion was almost certainly beyond the logistical capacity of the German fleet—lacking, as it did, any bases in the western
Atlantic—the maneuvers were not merely an exercise in spite by a disgruntled
admiral keen on embarrassing his political masters. The U.S. Navy’s leadership
was greatly concerned about the German Empire’s High Seas Fleet and its (highly
exaggerated) potential to conduct aggressive action in the Western Hemisphere,
although the consensus believed its targets would be in the Caribbean or Latin
America rather than the Atlantic coast of the United States.5 The purely naval
portions of the scenario, especially the weakness of American scouting vessels,
reflected the contemporary concerns of the Navy’s strategic elite and their assumptions about the nature of naval warfare.
More than a mere historical curiosity, the full story of the Atlantic Fleet’s 1915
exercise illuminates three aspects of the U.S. Navy on the cusp of America’s entry
into the First World War. First, it allows us to examine an underexplored, but serious, rupture in civil-military relations as the Navy’s uniformed leadership sought
to undermine Secretary Daniels by working with opposition politicians. Second,
it reveals the Navy’s use of its German counterpart as both an administrative
model and a strategic threat. Finally, the episode allows us to see how the Navy’s
leadership assessed its force structure and readiness for war after two decades of
naval buildup.
Viewed through the lens of civil-military relations, these exercises were one
salvo in a long fight between Secretary Daniels and an influential cabal of disgruntled officers, led by Fiske, that lasted from Daniels’s installation in 1913
through a bruising set of charges laid against Daniels’s war record by Admiral
William S. Sims in 1920. Whatever the relative merit of their complaints, these
bureaucratic insurgents stretched the bounds of American civil-military relations
in their desire to rearrange the administration of the Department of the Navy to
reduce the authority of civilian officials and place control over naval operations
and policy in the hands of uniformed officers.
Fiske crossed clear boundaries of professional conduct in his effort to reform
the department. Alongside the 1915 exercises, Fiske was busy feeding embarrassing information to hostile elements of the press and pro-Navy Republicans such
as Representative Augustus P. Gardner of Massachusetts and Senator George
Clement Perkins of California. Here, Fiske was joined by Daniels’s assistant secretary, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who colluded with the secretary’s “bitterest personal enemies in active ways that [could] have led to his dismissal.”6 The exercises themselves were catnip for the heterogeneous, though mostly Republican,
collection of pressure groups that wanted the Wilson administration to increase
military manpower and spending in response to the Great War.
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The exercises also highlight the Navy’s peculiar fascination with Germany as
both an enemy and administrative model.7 From about 1900, the Navy viewed
the German Empire as a likely threat, imagining its expansion into the Caribbean
or South America as the flash point. A 1903 scenario developed at the Naval War
College even suggested that German shooting clubs in Brazil represented a potential fifth column intent on destabilizing that country.8 Successive iterations of
the Navy’s Plan BLACK for war against Germany assumed that the Atlantic Fleet
would have to stop the High Seas Fleet from capturing an intermediate base in
the Caribbean Sea on the way to carving out colonies in Latin America.9Although
fanciful, this scenario was one of the key measuring sticks that USN officers used
to judge the capabilities of their fleet.10
Even as they were inflating the threat from the High Seas Fleet, some American officers looked to the German navy’s administrative structure as a model
to emulate, chiefly its strong general staff and lack of effective civilian control.11
From 1900, the U.S. Navy possessed an advisory General Board, led by Admiral of the Navy George Dewey, the hero of the Spanish-American War, and supported by a small number of personal aides.12 Along with answering questions
from the secretary on topics spanning the breadth of Navy business, the board
generally submitted to him yearly recommendations on a construction plan to
propose to Congress, and supervised the production of rudimentary war plans.
Although Dewey, the senior officer in the Navy, maintained that his board adequately served the functions of a German-style general staff, Fiske and his cabal
disagreed.13 Instead of the weak General Board, these reformers desired an independent naval staff only nominally responsible to the secretary.
Finally, this episode allows us to see how the Navy’s uniformed leadership assessed its force structure and advocated for greater resources. It is true that most
elements of the Navy’s strategic apparatus, including the General Board and the
Naval War College, viewed a strong battle line as the most important determinant
of naval strength. By mid-1915, however, many influential officers, among them
Fiske and Sims, were sounding the alarm about the Navy’s lack of small scout
cruisers and large, fast battle cruisers. These fears, incubated at the College, were
heightened in the wake of an unsuccessful—and unpublicized—set of exercises
earlier that year.
It was no accident, then, that the summer exercise in 1915 prominently featured an inadequate scouting line. Fiske intended to sound the alarm about the
parlous state of the Navy’s cruisers. A decade had passed since the U.S. Navy
last received funding for new cruisers, as the General Board and successive Navy
secretaries declined to support cruiser construction over battleships in front of
Congress. The Navy possessed only three modern scout cruisers, ordered as an
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experiment in the 1904 budget. Beyond those, scouting was tasked to older armored cruisers and a grab bag of superannuated protected cruisers entirely unsuited for modern combat. Fiske’s intention was not just to embarrass Daniels but
to highlight what he saw as the path forward by creating the political preconditions for the secretary and Congress to increase naval funding.
The force structure gaps highlighted by the 1915 exercises successfully informed the landmark 1916 Naval Expansion Act, which provided for an unprecedented construction program, one that included ten battleships and, critically, six
battle cruisers and ten smaller cruisers to improve the Navy’s scouting capability.
Not only did the exercises play a role in convincing the Wilson administration to
support a large construction program in the first place, but a close examination
of the record shows that the composition of the bill itself reflected the force structure gaps that the exercises were designed to evince.
Despite this programmatic importance, the 1915 Atlantic Fleet summer exercises have often been discussed in the historical literature only as a spiteful
gesture by Fiske, who was facing retirement after Daniels selected the relatively
unknown Captain William S. Benson to serve as the first Chief of Naval Operations, which replaced the Aide for Operations position that Fiske held.14 This
article argues that the form of Fiske’s challenge to the secretary is important as
well. Although Fiske was their animating spirit, the Atlantic Fleet’s 1915 summer
exercises reflected a consensus view among the service’s leadership that the Navy
lacked the right mix of ships for modern warfare.
THE NEW NAVY’S MISSING SCOUTS
The roots of the force structure issues exposed in 1915 lay in the birth of the “New
Navy” in the late nineteenth century. In the late 1880s and early 1890s, a group of
naval officers, many connected with the then-new Naval War College, convinced
Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy that the United States needed a fleet of
oceangoing battleships to ensure its security. In 1890, Tracy convinced Congress
to authorize three battleships.15 These officers, including Captain Alfred Thayer
Mahan and Commodore Stephen B. Luce, may have been too successful; as Robert
Greenhalgh Albion has noted, battleships dominated congressional discussion of
naval appropriations for decades after 1890, making it “difficult to get enough of
the lesser types of ships [through Congress] to form a well-balanced Fleet.”16
Theoretically, the Navy’s uniformed leadership understood the importance of
cruisers to a modern fleet. In 1903, Secretary William Moody asked the General
Board to lay out force structure goals. Its response, General Board Memorandum No. 420, remained at the heart of the board’s construction “wish list” for
years to come. The document laid out a seventeen-year plan for building a gargantuan fleet of forty-eight battleships, supported by twenty-four large armored
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cruisers, ninety-six smaller cruisers, and forty-eight destroyers.17 While the
board’s vision stood no chance of full congressional funding and was, perhaps,
beyond the country’s ability to build, it was a blueprint for a well-balanced fleet of
varied ship classes serving complementary roles.
As it soon became obvious that there was no congressional appetite for the
entire 1903 fleet plan (table 1), the board made it clear that it was only willing to
request cruisers if Congress built battleships at a rate to sustain the goal of having
forty-eight battleships by 1920, rather than bending to political reality and making plans for a smaller, balanced fleet with appropriate numbers of other classes.18
This was in keeping with the belief, widespread in the Navy, that battleships were
the only determinant of naval strength that mattered.
The board’s approach highlights one of the less appealing aspects of the Navy’s
uniformed leadership in the early twentieth century: its unwillingness to modify
its “professional” advice in the face of reality. Rather than acknowledging that
its forty-eight-battleship fleet was politically impossible, the board continued to
insist on the original plan.19 At other times, the board urged preparation for war
with powers (such as imperial Germany) that American political leaders had no
intention of fighting. While this fit with the officer corps’s self-identification as a
disinterested “naval aristocracy” providing expert (if not always realistic) advice
to politicians, it also suggested a certain contempt for the roles of Congress and
the secretary in setting naval budgets and policy.20 Fiske’s actions in the Wilson
administration, although extreme, fit neatly into this worldview.
At any rate, while the General Board nearly always recommended cruiser construction, it undercut those recommendations by classifying them as secondary
to “the purely distinctive fighting ships of the navy—battleships, destroyers, and
submarines”—in its construction requests, leading successive secretaries to strip
cruisers out of the construction programs forwarded to Congress.21 As shown in
table 1, not a year passed without the secretary requesting, and Congress providing, at least one battleship. While it certainly was possible for the board to ask
the secretary for cheaper scout cruisers at the expense of battleships—Daniels’s
1915 report put the cost of a new scout cruiser at $5 million, compared with $18.8
million for a battleship—it simply did not.22 In practice, this meant that the U.S.
Navy received no money for new cruiser construction after the Navy bill passed
in 1904, which provided funds for three experimental light scout cruisers (Chester, Birmingham, and Salem) and the Navy’s last two armored cruisers (North
Carolina and Montana).23
By the start of the First World War, the U.S. Navy was far behind its competitors in cruisers of all types. Not only did the British, German, and Japanese navies possess more scout cruisers, but all three had built large, fast, and powerful
battle cruisers, a class that was absent from the U.S. Navy’s force structure, in part
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TABLE 1
GENERAL BOARD PLANS VERSUS REALITY, 1904–14 BILLS
General
Board
Program
Cruisers

Year

SECNAV
Program

Cruisers
Authorized

General
Board
Program
Battleships

SECNAV
Program

Battleships
Authorized

1904

8 (1 armored,
3 protected, 4
scout)

6–8 (1 armored,
3 protected,
2–4 scout)

5 (2 armored, 3
scout)

2

1

1

1905

5 scouts

0

0

3

3

2

1906

3 scouts

2

0

3

2

1

1907

2 scouts

0

0

2

1–2

1

1908

4 scouts

4

0

4

4

2

1909

4 scouts

4

0

4

4

2

1910

4 scouts

0

0

4

2

2

1911

4 scouts

0

0

4

2

2

1912

4 scouts

0

0

4

2

1

1913

2 battle cruisers

0

0

4

3

1

1914

0

0

0

4

3

3

Sources: Tillman, Navy Yearbook, pp. 619–23; General Board to Secretary Daniels, “Ultimate Strength of the United States Navy,” [September] 1912 and
[December] 1914, General Board Subject File #420-2, RG 80, NARA I; Daniels, “[1915] Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” pp. 85–93.

because the General Board declined to request them prior to 1913.24 Up to 1912,
the General Board defended this lack of battle cruisers by defining them as a type
of battleship. The board’s earliest mention of battle cruisers, in October 1906,
categorized the British battle cruisers as “in reality battleships[—]armored ships
available for the battle line.”25 By 1910, it argued that battle cruisers were simply
“big gun armored cruisers,” and unnecessary for the United States so long as the
Navy had enough battleships “to force the enemy to place armored cruiser[s]” in
the battle line.26
In contrast, at the Naval War College, opinion increasingly held that battle
cruisers were integral to searching for enemy fleets and blinding their scouts.
Officers attending the College’s 1909 Summer Conference claimed that the battle
cruiser “is the only ship that can meet the qualifications of speed, endurance, size,
and fighting power” needed for effective scouting.27 Most American supporters
of battle cruisers made a similar argument, suggesting that battle cruisers were a
solution to the Navy’s scouting woes.
This stance was bolstered by at least some practical evidence from the fleet.
In mid-1910, the Secretary of the Navy solicited suggestions on future scouts
from the commanders of the Navy’s three Chester-class scout cruisers. Birmingham’s captain, Commander William B. Fletcher, responded that “the ideal scout
would be a vessel of the highest speed, together with large radius, capability of
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maintaining speed, and with battery and protection such as to [engage successfully] vessels of equal speeds.” In other words, a battle cruiser.28
In 1911, then-Captain William S. Sims, attending the first “Long Course” at
the College, revived the battle cruiser issue. Sims and his colleagues spent much
of their time studying the “Blue-Black” problem—a war between the United
States and Germany—and Sims highlighted scouting as the U.S. Navy’s major
deficiency demonstrated in war games. In a personal letter to a British contact,
Vice Admiral Henry B. Jackson, Sims noted that battle cruisers “will be necessary
to ensure the success” of scouting and screening in future conflicts, and criticized
his navy’s unwillingness to build the type, now that it had a sufficient number
of battleships.29 Further along in his course, while playing the role of a German
admiral in a Blue-Black war game, Sims observed that the American fleet “would
remain wholly in the dark as to our movements while crossing the ocean. . . .
[The German fleet] is vastly superior, both as to the number and power of [its]
scouting forces.”30
His conclusions impressed the College President, Captain William L. Rodgers, and in December 1911 he forwarded one of Sims’s reports on the matter to Secretary George von Lengerke Meyer.31 Meyer was interested in battle
cruisers, having already asked the Bureau of Construction and Repair to draft
potential battle cruiser designs in 1910.32 What is unclear, however, is the nature of that interest: Did Meyer regard them as part of the battle line, or as
scouts? Likewise, the General Board’s views remained in flux. In 1911, it made
a tepid request for battle cruisers “with a special view for service in the Pacific
Ocean,” but only if their construction did not interfere with the construction
of new battleships.33
In 1912, battle cruisers again were on the agenda at the College’s Summer Conference, with the General Board in attendance. Most attendees appear to have
been in favor of battle cruiser construction for the U.S. Navy, so long as that did
not interfere with battleship numbers.34 The available evidence suggests that their
time in Newport made an impression on the members of the General Board. Prior to the Summer Conference, a board subcommittee had drafted a building program that omitted “problematical” battle cruisers.35 Yet in its final report, written
after the conference, the full board claimed that “we must have [battle cruisers] to
hope for successful conflict. . . . These vessels have a military value not possible to
obtain from other types,” and strongly implied that such vessels were to be used
for scouting, screening, and other operations away from the battle line.36 Despite
this, Secretary Meyer left cruisers out of the Navy Department budget submitted
to Congress, which called merely for three battleships and twelve destroyers.37
Still, as the Wilson administration prepared to enter office, it was clear that
the Navy was warming up to the idea of spending serious money to remedy its
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scouting woes. However, the case had not been made sufficiently outside the
Navy to affect the secretary’s budget request or congressional appropriations, and
the new administration was more skeptical of naval spending than its Republican
predecessor.
FISKE AND DANIELS
Josephus Daniels, heretofore most prominent as a violently white-supremacist
newspaper publisher and Democratic Party power broker in North Carolina, was,
like most Navy Secretaries of his era, entirely new to naval affairs.38 Apart from
his marriage to the sister of Worth Bagley—one of the few USN officers killed
during the Spanish-American War—he had little connection to, or interest in,
the Navy.39 Daniels was, however, an absolutist on the subject of civilian control
of the military and intensely skeptical of senior naval leaders, whom he “saw as
part of a closed aristocracy” leading a “life of privilege.”40 This view was perhaps
exacerbated by the advice Meyer gave him to “keep the power to direct the Navy”
in the secretary’s office and to reject any measure that threatened it.41
Ironically, the main threat to Daniels’s power came from one of Meyer’s last
appointments, Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, the Aide (sometimes spelled Aid)
for Operations since February 1913. Meyer created the position to provide independent advice, separate from the Navy’s administrative bureaus and the General
Board. Thus, soon after taking office in 1909, he created four “Aides”—for inspections, material, operations, and personnel—to advise him.42 These positions
rested on an uncertain foundation. Despite his best efforts, Meyer never received
congressional sanction for the aides. While Congress did not take action to disestablish the positions, it did not pass enabling legislation either, leaving them
dependent on the secretary’s forbearance.43
Daniels entered office in 1913 with Democrats controlling both houses of
Congress for the first time since the 1890s. Lacking experience with naval matters, Daniels took many of his personnel cues from congressional Democrats,
especially fellow southerners, who were, by and large, opposed to the aide system and naval expansion.44 Soon after taking office, Daniels removed the head of
the Bureau of Navigation (which was responsible for personnel matters), Captain
Philip Andrews, replacing him with Commander Victor Blue, who was elevated
over a host of senior officers.45 Although very junior for the position, Blue was
a fellow North Carolinian with whom Daniels had a preexisting relationship.46
Daniels also took steps to get rid of the aide system. In addition to Andrews, he
fired Captain Templin Potts, the Aide for Personnel, and then left the billet vacant.
Beyond Potts, Daniels intended to let the other aides serve out their terms before
letting the billets lapse. Even with those changes, at least one of Daniels’s political
allies felt that he had not gone far enough. In late April, Senator “Pitchfork Ben”
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Tillman (D-SC) warned him, “You are surrounded by a naval clique which is ever
on the watch to control your actions and movements and thoughts.”47
Prominent among this clique was the imperious Fiske, who surely represented
all that Daniels disliked about the Navy’s officer corps. An author, inventor, and
strategist of some renown, Fiske was one of the ablest officers of the age—and he
knew it. A man of strong views, Fiske had a history of intemperance in defending
them.48 By 1913, he maintained that the material and organizational underpinnings of the U.S. Navy were well behind those of its rivals, especially Germany,
and desired to change this situation through the creation of an independent naval
general staff.49 This was anathema to Daniels and, indeed, ran contrary to the
fundamentals of American civil-military relations. Previously, Fiske’s personal
respect for Meyer had acted as a check on his behavior, but he was barely able to
contain his contempt for Daniels, whom he viewed as an intellectual lightweight
focused on trivia at the expense of preparing the fleet for war.50
It is possible that this was Meyer’s intent in naming Fiske to the Aide for Operations post as one of his last acts as secretary.51 Even if he had been unaware of
the precise identity of his successor, the Democratic Party’s skeptical views on
naval affairs were a matter of public record.52 Furthermore, Meyer would have
been aware of Fiske’s views on administration either because his reputation preceded him or from his time on the General Board in 1910–11. Those views were,
of course, unacceptable to Daniels and most of the ascendant Democratic Party.
In his autobiography, Fiske claimed that “nine tenths [of military officers], except
those who come from the South, prefer to have the Republican party in power[,] . . .
the more patriotic of the two [parties], and . . . more favorably inclined toward an
adequate army and navy,” suggesting that Fiske found the new administration unacceptable himself, despite the theoretically apolitical nature of the Navy’s officer
corps.53 Indeed, throughout his tenure Daniels leaned on southern-born officers,
and his preference may have rested on more than simple sectional bias.
Fiske’s views on the needs of the service were shared passively by many naval
officers and actively by a relatively small, but influential, group of officers who
had spent time thinking and writing about naval strategy, professional development, and service organization. Many of these officers, such as William Sims,
Dudley Knox, and William Pratt, had spent time at the Naval War College, either
as students or staff. Since, in many ways, those at the early-twentieth-century
College acted as an ersatz, and formally powerless, general staff, they were acutely
aware of, and unhappy with, the lack of a “real” staff.54 What separated Fiske from
many like-minded officers was his willingness to violate professional norms to
put his views across. Amusingly, Sims worried that Fiske, “constitutionally opposed to conflict of any kind,” was unequal to the task of promoting naval reform
in Washington.55
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On the contrary, Fiske clashed immediately with the new Secretary of the
Navy. After a month under Daniels, Fiske was concerned that he would be forced
out after a major row over promotion policies.56 That summer, he took the opportunity of Daniels’s first visit to the Naval War College to argue in favor of
administrative reform (Fiske suggested superciliously that Daniels’s trip would be
enhanced if he could “prevail upon himself to come as a student”).57 There, Fiske
invited Daniels to dinner with a group of officers assigned to the College, along
with Sims, whom he specially invited to “help out” with the secretary. One of the
attendees, Captain Josiah McKean, suggested that Daniels abdicate some of his
military authority in favor of the Aide for Operations, a suggestion the secretary
immediately rejected.58 It is unclear whether Fiske put McKean up to it (although
it would have certainly been in Fiske’s character), but Daniels can be forgiven if he
developed a certain skepticism toward his Aide for Operations and Fiske’s circle
of reformers. Indeed, Daniels attempted to shift Fiske out of Washington—to run
the Naval War College—and was only stayed by an intervention from Dewey.59
Understandably, Daniels preferred to receive his professional advice from
other quarters. Despite Fiske’s pretentions, he was not the only conduit for information from the Navy to the secretary. In addition to the corporate General
Board (on which Fiske sat, but did not run), Daniels placed a great deal of trust in
Captain Albert G. Winterhalter, the Aide for Material, despite his concerns about
the aide system, and Blue, his handpicked chief of the Bureau of Navigation.60
Whatever Fiske claimed, Daniels was not lacking for professional naval advice.
Put bluntly, Fiske’s main objection was that his was not the professional advice
Daniels sought.
With the outbreak of war in the summer of 1914, Fiske’s concern about the
Navy’s administration took on a new urgency. The Aide for Operations worried
that Germany would win the war and then turn against the United States.61 In his
words, he saw “the German machine smashing its way across . . . France, crushing the comparatively improvised machines of England and France,” while his
country was “watching the spectacle as a child watches a fire spreading.” He was
especially concerned at Daniels’s seeming unwillingness to take action to prepare
for potential war, instead investing his time on “an elaborate system for educating
the enlisted men.”62
Fiske’s first suggestion concerned the disposition of the Atlantic Fleet, the
Navy’s primary battle fleet. The Aide for Operations, who had expressed admiration for the High Seas Fleet’s large-scale exercises, pushed Secretary Daniels to
concentrate the Atlantic Fleet in one anchorage in mid-August, including withdrawing several battleships from the Mexican coast, where they were supporting
the U.S. occupation of Veracruz (a deployment sparked, in part, by the delivery of
arms for the Mexican government aboard a German steamer).63 With the entire
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fleet in one place, it could then conduct large-scale target practice, drills, and exercises to better prepare itself for war. Daniels vetoed the suggestion.64
Similar suggestions on how to respond to the European war fell on deaf ears.
Undeterred, Fiske decided to put his views in writing, preparing what he called
“the most important” paper he had ever written on 9 November. In this memorandum to Daniels, Fiske laid out the case that the U.S. Navy was “unprepared”
for war on the grounds of material and personnel shortages, as well as organizational inefficiency. The greater part of Fiske’s note was taken up with a plea for a
general staff. Without an organization for developing war plans and overseeing
training, the U.S. Navy, he claimed, “shall be whipped if we ever are brought into
war with any one of the great naval powers of Europe or Asia.”65 Fiske also convinced the General Board to make a formal recommendation, on 11 November,
to Daniels regarding preparation for war and the need for more trained sailors
and officers. Daniels declined to act on these recommendations, correctly noting that the role of the General Board was to answer questions posed to it by the
secretary, not to offer unsolicited advice.66
Someone on the board, perhaps Fiske, leaked its 11 November recommendations to the press, where they became fodder for the nascent “preparedness”
movement.67 This heterodox movement, linking politicians with advocacy organizations such as the Navy League and those founded after the commencement
of war in Europe such as the National Security League, was split between those
who wanted the United States to enter the war and those who wanted the country
to defend itself from belligerent powers. Both wings, however, agreed that the
military needed bolstering immediately. Critically, partisan rancor strengthened
the preparedness movement. Mostly led by organizations and politicians from
the Republican Party and the remnants of Theodore Roosevelt’s Progressives, the
movement took a dim view of the Wilson administration.68
Evidently believing that the international situation made his advice more important than the chain of command, Fiske threw his lot in with the administration’s enemies—and manufactured a civil-military relations crisis. Here, he was
aided by Daniels’s assistant secretary, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who also supported
enlarging the fleet. In October, both men met with Massachusetts congressman
Augustus P. Gardner, “Daniels’s most vehement critic in the House,” and fed him
detailed information on the gap between Daniels’s shipbuilding requests and the
programs suggested by the General Board.69 That same month, Fiske also met
with California senator George Clement Perkins, another Republican; passed information to the New York Herald; and ghostwrote a column in the Army and
Navy Journal.70
By this point, Fiske’s activities already were well beyond established norms of
behavior for the Navy’s officer corps. While unsigned and ghostwritten articles
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were just on the right side of regulations regarding advocacy, Fiske’s involvement
with legislators crossed a bright line. For example, Theodore Roosevelt, although
a staunch navalist, was so incensed by naval officers lobbying Congress over legislation in the early 1900s that he threatened to court-martial any officer caught
doing so.71 Secretary Meyer went a step further, adding article 1517 to the Navy
regulations, barring naval officers from contacting representatives and senators
without going through Navy Department channels. It specifically directed them
to “refrain from any attempts to . . . form proposed bills.” While Daniels tended to
take a laissez-faire approach to the strict letter of article 1517, Fiske undoubtedly
knew that his behavior was beyond the pale.72
Nevertheless, Fiske persisted in his campaign. At the end of the year, he convinced former naval officer Representative Richmond P. Hobson, a Democrat
from Alabama, to invite him to testify in front of the House Naval Affairs Committee.73 Fiske also planted questions with Massachusetts Republican representative Ernest W. Roberts.74 As one historian noted, with some understatement,
Fiske’s gambit of arranging for himself to testify before Congress “bordered on
insubordination” and ran contrary to long-established practice regarding the testimony of serving officers.75
In front of the committee on 17 December, Fiske gave blistering testimony,
contradicting Daniels’s assurance to Congress that the Navy was prepared for any
eventuality. Fiske publicly aired the criticisms of administration policy he had
been making for some time, including issues with manpower, fleet size, and naval
administration. His biggest salvo (in response to a possibly planted question from
Roberts) was that the Navy was five years away from being able to fight a war. As
one might imagine, Fiske’s testimony was the final straw in the worsening relationship between the admiral and the secretary. From that point, Daniels “took
Fiske’s testimony as a justification for overlooking him henceforth.”76
Fiske’s allegations and charges caused a minor media sensation, with antiadministration and pro-preparedness organs using his testimony as a cudgel against the
government. In The Navy, a Navy League–aligned journal opposed to Daniels, an
editorial claimed that “[t]he country owes [Fiske] a debt of gratitude. . . . [I]t can
only be that he is remaining on this duty out of a sense of obligation to the service.” It went on to criticize the administration and Congress for failing to build a
“properly proportioned program providing the needed units,” including scouts and
battle cruisers.77 Even ex-secretary Meyer weighed in, with an early February piece
in the North American Review attacking the policies of his successor and calling for
a naval general staff.78
The 1914 hearings also fanned the flames of invasion scares, which peaked the
following year. Even before Fiske’s testimony, Harper’s Weekly published a piece
by ex–War Secretary Henry Stimson alleging that “an unknown enemy could
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seize New London, Connecticut, and move south.”79 In February, the New York
World suggested that the Atlantic Fleet should make a mock attack on New York
to highlight the nation’s unpreparedness.80 Fiske later pointed to this article as an
influence on his plans for the 1915 exercises.81
Taking advantage of this surge of favorable press, Fiske went even further,
crossing the line into outright rebellion against the secretary. Frustrated with
Daniels’s unwillingness to countenance organizational changes, Fiske and six
other officers met at Representative Hobson’s house on the night of 3 January and
drafted a bill that would, if passed, create a general staff led by a strong Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO).82 Hobson quickly took the bill to Congress, where a
subcommittee of the House Naval Affairs Committee unanimously advanced it.83
If Fiske’s autobiography is to be believed, this plotting occurred with the tacit
support of Admiral Dewey. In support of his claim, his band of conspirators practically constituted a committee of the General Board. Three—Captains Harry
Knapp, John Hood, and James Oliver—were themselves General Board members. The other three—Lieutenant Commanders Dudley Knox, William Cronan,
and Zachariah Madison—were assigned to the Navy Department in Washington.
Knox worked under Oliver in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), while Cronan and Madison worked on war plans under Fiske.84 Further, prior to joining
ONI, Knox had worked with Captain William S. Sims at the Naval War College
and in the Atlantic Torpedo Flotilla, helping him apply College methods to the
development of tactical doctrine in the fleet.85
Luckily for Fiske’s cabal, it appears that Daniels was unaware of just how involved his advisers were in drafting the bill, although he surely would have seen
the aide’s hand in the bill’s provisions.86 Dirk Bönker has described Fiske’s goal
as remaking American “naval politics and institutions in an idealized Germanic
image,” and the original CNO proposal was his masterpiece.87 Under Fiske’s plan,
“the General Board, the Naval War College, and even the bureau chiefs would
lose power,” to say nothing of the secretary.88 Using his prodigious political gifts,
Daniels was able to water the bill down in the Senate, with the help of three bureau chiefs. The final bill kept the CNO position but removed management from
his portfolio, as well as stripping his authority over the bureaus.89
Naturally, Fiske viewed himself as the ideal choice for the new billet but was
aware that Daniels never would select him. Instead, the secretary—rightly convinced that much of the Navy’s leadership was hostile to him—tapped Captain
William Shepherd Benson, another southerner and the commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard, to be the first CNO, bypassing the Navy’s twenty-six rear
admirals.90 Although Fiske had no real need to resign from a post made redundant, he nonetheless presented his resignation—because of, he claimed, Daniels’s
interference and disrespect.91
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Fiske spent the final year of his career marooned as a supernumerary at the
Naval War College, but before moving to Newport he left a parting gift for Daniels in the form of the 1915 Atlantic Fleet exercises, which he was able to shape
substantially before departing.92 According to Fiske, his original idea was to
“show what would really happen if a hostile [German] fleet should start for our
eastern coast. . . . [I]t would not be a game at all, but a one-sided slaughter.”93 By
purporting to demonstrate what would happen if his warnings were not heeded,
Fiske hoped to change the government’s policy through a war game “educational
to the people.”94
THE U.S. NAVY OBSERVES WORLD WAR I
Before we turn to the exercises themselves, it is critical to understand naval
developments in the United States and abroad in 1914 and early 1915. Although
the United States was not a belligerent, the members of the U.S. Navy’s officer
corps paid rapt attention to the naval component of the First World War and
judged their own service against those observations, and what many of them
saw cast it in a bad light. However, rather than adopting German or British
practices in toto, their solutions to the perceived deficiencies of the U.S. Navy
were, unsurprisingly, tempered by their existing appreciation of its strategic and
operational contexts.
The early course of the war gave a boost to those officers concerned about the
U.S. Navy’s cruiser force. Although accurate and detailed information from the
belligerent powers was hard to come by, the war at sea clearly failed to match the
prewar assumptions of naval officers on both sides of the Atlantic, who expected another Trafalgar or Tsushima. Instead, the British and German battleships
mostly sat in Scapa Flow and Wilhelmshaven, respectively, while other classes of
warship took the lead. The naval war began with the chase of the German battle
cruiser Goeben and light cruiser Breslau in the Mediterranean and the cruiserdominated battle of Heligoland Bight in the North Sea, and cruisers continued to
play a dominant role in the naval war through the first year of the war.
Two events in December 1914 proved especially instructive. The first, the
battle of the Falkland Islands, demonstrated the power of battle cruisers against
armored cruisers. The battle pitted the German navy’s East Asia Squadron, composed at the time of two armored cruisers and three light cruisers, against a hastily organized British squadron centered on two battle cruisers, Invincible and Inflexible. The German force left the western Pacific in a desperate attempt to reach
home. It defeated a squadron of older British cruisers at the battle of Coronel off
the coast of Chile in early November. Having rounded the tip of South America,
the German commander, Vice Admiral Maximilian von Spee, attempted to attack
the British port of Stanley in the Falklands on 8 December. Unbeknownst to him,
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the British squadron had arrived the previous day; it proceeded to give chase and
destroyed the German squadron, while sustaining minimal casualties.95
Eight days later, German battle cruisers shelled the towns of Hartlepool, Scarborough, and Whitby in northeast England, causing little military damage but
killing more than a hundred Britons, mostly civilians. British intelligence had
given advance notice of the sortie, although not its destination, and Britain’s
entire Grand Fleet steamed to catch the raiders on their way back to Germany.
However, poor visibility, confused communications, and a convoluted chain of
command allowed the German ships to make a narrow escape.96 These events
made an impression in the United States and contributed to unfounded fears of
invasion and attack. The next day, the New York Times ran a slew of articles on
the attacks, including one that claimed ominously that Whitby and Scarborough
“are as open to the enemy as is Atlantic City.”97 Like other lurid predictions of
invasion or attack, this one failed to note why any hostile power would undertake
a transatlantic crossing to attack New Jersey.
Nevertheless, among naval officers and navalists these engagements reinforced
the concerns raised at the College about the Navy’s lack of scouts and battle cruisers. At the Falklands, Spee’s armored cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau—roughly
comparable to the U.S. Navy’s newest (though hardly new) Tennessee-class cruisers—were no match for two ships of the Invincible class, the Royal Navy’s oldest
and weakest battle cruisers. Likewise, the American fleet possessed no ships that
could hope to catch a battle cruiser raid on the coast, coming or going.
Judged solely on the basis of battleships, the United States was the world’s third
naval power, behind only Britain and Germany, but construction of battleships
and destroyers to the exclusion of cruisers over the previous decade had left the
U.S. Navy with an unbalanced fleet. Britain, Germany, and Japan all possessed
battle cruisers, while the U.S. Navy had none. Both the British and Japanese navies had more armored cruisers than the U.S. Navy. In light cruisers, the disparity was even more pronounced. A table drawn up for Congress comparing the
U.S. Navy against the prewar strength of the Great War’s combatants showed the
United States with fourteen light cruisers as compared with thirteen Japanese,
thirty-one German, and seventy-four British. On the U.S. side, only three of the
cruisers had been built since the turn of the century, as opposed to ten of the Japanese ships.98 The disparities with the Japanese navy were especially problematic,
suggesting that the American advantage in battleships disguised a lack of overall
combat effectiveness against a potential enemy with a smaller battle fleet.99
Many American officers recognized these weaknesses. In London, Commander Powers Symington, a naval attaché, wrote the director of ONI on the subject of cruisers soon after the battle of the Falklands. Symington, who had supported battle cruiser construction during his time at the College’s 1910 Summer
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Conference, insisted that the U.S. Navy was generally “very weak in not having
any fast light cruisers,” and at a disadvantage against Japan in the Pacific because
of the threat the four Japanese battle cruisers represented against American lines
of communication.100
The General Board expressed similar concerns. Even before the Falklands action and the German battle cruiser raids, it had warned that “the fleet is very seriously lacking in vessels of the cruiser and scout classes that could do effective
work in war,” forcing the Navy to keep superannuated nineteenth-century relics
such as the cruisers Cincinnati and Raleigh (both completed in 1894) in service.
While these ships, which were slower than the newest battleships, “should under
ordinary circumstances be relieved from active service,” they remained “a very
considerable percentage of such few vessels as we do have of even the approximate
speed and qualities that would make them valuable for scout and cruiser work.”101
The Atlantic Fleet’s winter exercises in early 1915 fed these concerns. In January, the fleet conducted three short war games on its way to winter quarters in the
Caribbean. All three scenarios divided the fleet into “red” and “blue” squadrons,
and a major part of their intent was to work on effective scouting and screening
techniques. To make up for its lack of cruisers, the fleet’s destroyers were pressed
into service as scouts.102 These ships, designed to protect the battle fleet from
torpedo attacks and to launch torpedo attacks of their own, had neither the seakeeping qualities nor the endurance for successful use as scouts. Using them as
such did not improve greatly the scouting picture and stripped vital protection
from the battle line. According to the fleet’s commander, Rear Admiral Fletcher,
in the moderate seas encountered during the exercises the fleet’s destroyers “were
forced to slow to fifteen and then to ten knots.” This was far too slow for effective
scout work.103
Indeed, “due to the absence of heavy scouts,” the superior Blue fleet “lost” the
first of the Atlantic Fleet’s exercises. This outcome, according to Fletcher, highlighted the need for specialized heavy scouts: “Without these scouts our battle
fleet will be unable to bring to action an inferior enemy fleet or to evade a superior
one. . . . Fast powerful scouts . . . are essential to utilize the power of battleships.”104
To be clear, Fletcher was not necessarily calling here for battle cruiser scouts,
merely for larger and more robust cruisers than the Navy’s existing scouts, to say
nothing of its destroyers.
Sims, commanding the Atlantic Fleet’s destroyers, pointed out the absurdity of
the fleet’s predicament in a letter to Fiske after the exercises.
The experience on the way down . . . has convinced a good many people that the
successful screening of a battleship force could not be accomplished without vessels
large enough to maintain their speed in a seaway, having heavy enough guns to drive
off the enemy’s cruisers, and heavy enough armor to resist their gun fire. In other
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words, there seems to be a majority of opinion that of two fleets the one having a
certain number of battle cruisers to support their screen would enjoy a tremendous
advantage.105

Two days later, Sims officially relayed his thoughts in a memorandum to the
General Board, again urging battle cruisers as a solution to the Navy’s scouting
woes.106 An editorial in The Navy (no doubt using information provided by sympathetic officers) took a similar lesson from the January exercises, noting that
a previous attempt to scout with destroyers had resulted in vessels “nearly lost,
reaching port battered by the seas and severely damaged, while a number had to
run for Bermuda.” In short, the U.S. Navy was “a fleet lacking scouts that can keep
the sea in all weather.”107
Late in January, asked by Daniels to comment on the charges from Fiske’s December 1914 testimony, Fletcher took the latter’s side. In a radio message to the
secretary, Fletcher predicted that “[i]t will require at least five years to provide
the necessary scouts . . . to effectively utilize the present battleship strength.”108
In August, Fletcher elaborated on the lessons of the winter exercises: “Our fleet
lacked the fast cruisers that are necessary to give information of the position of
the enemy as well as to deny the enemy information of our position and to screen
our own forces. . . . The winter’s work has made it evident that destroyers are quite
unsuited for scouting except under very favorable circumstances. . . . Destroyers
in no sense can be relied upon to take up the duties of fast cruisers.”109
There is little to suggest that these concerns from the fleet swayed Daniels;
Fletcher’s implicit endorsement of Fiske’s testimony probably did not help his
cause with the secretary. In the face of brickbats from the preparedness movement and concern from within the Navy, Daniels continued to insist that the
service was perfectly ready for war, should it come. In his annual report to Congress dated late 1914, he lauded the Navy’s role in the occupation of Veracruz
under the heading “Proof of the Preparedness of the Navy”—a surely deliberate
misinterpretation of “preparedness.”110 As Daniels well knew, critics of Wilson
administration defense policy were concerned about the military’s ability to fight
with or against one of the Great War’s belligerents, not questionable constabulary
operations in the Americas.
In 1914, in preparation for the 1915 Navy bill, Daniels declined to follow
the General Board’s recommendation for new construction. It urged a focus on
construction of cruisers, terming them ships of “great use . . . for scouting and
screening” that were “markedly lacking” in the Navy. Altogether, the board called
for a program of sixteen destroyers, nineteen submarines, four scout cruisers,
four battleships, and assorted auxiliaries and gunboats.111 From this list, Daniels
submitted a program to Congress consisting of two battleships, six destroyers,
eight submarines, an oiler, and a gunboat.112 That was still too much for President
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Wilson. According to Daniels’s diary, the president expressed a desire to cut the
program to one battleship at a 22 January 1915 cabinet meeting.113
DEFEAT BY DESIGN
By early 1915, then, all the elements were in place for Fiske to make a splash on
his way out of Washington. The outbreak of war in the summer of 1914 gave military affairs greater political salience, as shown by the preparedness movement,
which Fiske already had exploited with strategic leaks to the press and Congress. Likewise, there existed a marked disagreement between the secretary and
the Navy’s senior officers on the service’s fitness for war. Not only had Daniels
pointed to the Veracruz incident as proof of the fleet’s readiness, but he declined
to follow the General Board’s advice on the size and makeup of the construction
plan submitted to Congress in late 1914.
Finally, Fiske recognized that the Navy’s uniformed leadership was preoccupied with the vanishingly unlikely risk of a foreign advance into the Western
Hemisphere rather than an intervention in Europe. In February 1915, the Atlantic Fleet’s chief of staff, Captain Harry P. Huse, sounded the alarm about the
Allies or Central powers attacking American holdings and interests in the Caribbean, the location where “our next war will be fought, and [where] we could offer practically no defense.” Huse further warned, with great exaggeration, that a
European power could capture Cuba easily, in which case “our whole Atlantic and
Gulf seaboard would be exposed.”114 Likewise, the February 1915 Atlantic War
Portfolio, produced by Fiske’s small Operations staff and endorsed by the General
Board, assumed that the most likely enemy was Germany and the likeliest theater
of operations was the Caribbean.115
Therefore, when Fiske expressed a desire for “realistic” war games to Daniels in early February, he probably considered the highly improbable Germany
scenario to be a genuine test of the Navy’s capabilities against a likely threat.116
In his diary, Fiske indicated his desire to “show what would really happen if a
hostile fleet should start for our eastern coast.” To further his goals, Fiske convinced Daniels and a hesitant General Board to draw up the Atlantic Fleet’s May
exercises in Washington—“the modern and foreign method”—rather than letting
Fletcher plan his own. This, Fiske argued, would allow the exercises to help the
board refine its war plans. But Fiske also had political motives in mind; in a 24
February diary entry, he noted that the New York World had printed a “sensational suggestion for [a] sham attack on N. Y. by [the] Atlantic Fleet, using all the
ships in the Atlantic—125 in all!! To attempt this would expose our unpreparedness”—no doubt to the political advantage of Fiske’s friends in Congress.117
With permission secured, Fiske set about convincing the General Board to
write up plans for an invasion. Fiske was only partially successful. Daniels had
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approved the exercises with the caveat that the side representing the U.S. Navy
emerge victorious. The board, although in agreement with Fiske about the magnitude of the German threat, refused to allow an aggressor fleet of a similar size.
An exercise with an accurate German fleet would, most members of the board
argued, “not be a game at all, but a one-sided slaughter.” Fiske and the rest of the
board compromised on an aggressor fleet somewhat less than half the size of
the full German battle fleet.118 Interestingly, Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, who
attended the board meeting that finalized the plans, wanted to take the games a
step further. Desiring to create an “object lesson to the country,” Roosevelt, like
the New York World article from February, suggested that after the main exercises
concluded the Atlantic Fleet “could represent a Black [German] force pushing
home its attack on our coast,” highlighting the ostensible consequences of naval
unpreparedness.119
While the board declined to take up Roosevelt’s suggestion, the scenario as
written contained a tremendously inflammatory element: a German army. The
earliest draft of the exercise plan noted that the attacking fleet was carrying
twenty thousand soldiers, the advance guard for a further two hundred thousand
soldiers in the main invasion force.120 While the first wave of soldiers were nominally part of the exercises, in the form of transports that the German fleet needed
to protect, the second wave of two hundred thousand (later reduced to a hundred
thousand) played no role at all in the exercise—only serving to raise the stakes of
“defeat” for the Atlantic Fleet.121 Without belaboring the point, it should be noted
that the notion of sending 220,000, or even 120,000, soldiers across the Atlantic
to land on a hostile shore was utterly risible, and beyond the logistical capacity of
any military at the time.122
Despite Daniels’s clear instructions, the scenario devised by Fiske and the
General Board left little chance of an American victory. The exercise pitted ten
German dreadnoughts, four battle cruisers, eight predreadnoughts, thirty destroyers, “and a number of scouts,” along with transports carrying the vanguard
of an army, against an American fleet of six dreadnoughts (later increased to
seven), ten predreadnoughts, twenty-three destroyers, twelve submarines, and “a
number of inferior cruisers and merchant scouts.”123 Perhaps the board did not
intend for a “one-sided slaughter,” but there could be no doubt about the result of
such a lopsided balance of forces.
Even the orders for the invader suggested something of the framers’ preoccupations. In laying out the “General Situation” for the aggressor fleet’s commander,
Rear Admiral Frank Beatty, the board noted that the invasion was sent “[w]ith
full knowledge of Blue’s state of preparedness for war, and the consequent inability of Blue to mobilize quickly and efficiently its Naval and Military forces.”124
Given the prevailing political situation, this was a shocking—and, for the
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purposes of the exercise, entirely unnecessary—attack on government policy.
Critically, the imbalance between the two fleets
German
American
Type
(“Red”/“Black”)
(“Blue”)
was most severe in cruisers, as shown in table 2.
Dreadnoughts
10
7
The instructions identified the American cruisers
Predreadnoughts
8
10
by name; outside of the Navy’s four newest armored
Battle cruisers
4
0
cruisers and its three scouts, very few of these ships
Modern
4
6
were suited for modern warfare.
armored
cruisers
The five older cruisers included Chicago, comOlder
6
5
missioned in 1885, in use at the time as a training
cruisers
ship for state naval militiamen. The two protected
Civilian liners
0
4
cruisers, Tacoma and Des Moines, were overgrown
Scouts
20
2 + 1 as
a flotilla
gunboats and significantly slower than modern
leader
battleships, to say nothing of proper cruisers. Not
Modern
0
2
a single ship in the American order of battle could
protected
cruisers
keep pace with the German battle cruisers, boastSources: [General Board], “Red Situation”; [General Board], “Blue
ing top speeds of twenty-five knots or more, nor the
Situation.”
generally-as-fast scout cruisers.125
In a departure from the Atlantic Fleet’s winter exercises, this plan made extensive use of imaginary ships to represent elements of both fleets, including all the
scouting forces. Four ships represented the German battle fleet, one represented
its scouting line, and another the Blue (American) scouting line. The German
fleet and the single ship representing the Blue scouting line would steam together,
with the Blue scout sending periodic position updates on a schedule set by the
instructions.126 Whatever else happened, this protocol ensured that the Atlantic
Fleet could not use its exercises to practice scouting techniques with real ships.127
It ensured, too, that much of what followed would be governed by the assumptions about scouts and scouting held by senior Navy leadership.
The scenario’s details also blazed a path to the desired outcome. According to
the initial problem, the German fleet was steaming from the Azores (for reasons
unremarked on in the scenario), accompanied by the vanguard of an invasion
force. The game was to begin with the invaders approximately five hundred miles
off the American coast, bound for a location between Eastport, Maine, and Cape
Hatteras in North Carolina—comprising nearly half the eastern coastline, and
constituting a vast area for the defenders to cover.128 Rear Admiral Beatty, the
“German” commander, was under orders to steam for Cape Cod until encountering Blue units; after that, he was to turn south and make for the Virginia Capes at
the entrance to the Chesapeake.
Blue’s force started the exercise concentrated in Rhode Island’s Narragansett
Bay, under orders to “locate the Black fleet[,] . . . place his entire fighting force . . .

TABLE 2
EXERCISE FLEET APPORTIONMENT
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between the Black fleet and its objective, and bring Black fleet to battle near the
end of its voyage, and before it has reached its objective.”129 The last point was
critical. Under the terms of the problem, Fletcher could not attempt to attack the
German fleet at its most vulnerable position: after it reached its target but before
the landings were completed.
Contrary to Fiske’s earlier assertions to the secretary and the board, the exercise was not intended to help further the development of a war plan, or even to
allow the Atlantic Fleet to improve its tactical efficiency. Instead, it was designed
to “prove” a point on which the Navy’s leadership already agreed: the U.S. Navy
was not ready for a war with a great power. As Sims put it in a letter to Fiske
before the exercises, “[W]e will be able to get a good deal out of [the exercises]—
perhaps not a little in the way of things to be avoided next time.”130 By devising
such an incendiary scenario, Fiske and the board ensured that it would have the
maximum political impact.131
Still, the exercise scenario differed only slightly from the service’s own war
plans. Navy planners in the Atlantic Fleet, the General Board, and the Naval War
College had spent a great deal of time planning for a war with Germany. As we
have seen, those same planners assumed that the German fleet would escort a
large army across the Atlantic, and those who had spent time considering a war
with Germany were rather pessimistic about the odds of American victory. The
main difference was location; the plans assumed that any actual German landings
would occur in Latin America, not New England or the Middle Atlantic states.
The onset of the exercises was well reported in the national press, with a frontpage story in the New York Herald and articles in other major papers. The Washington Post even carried a piece, using an interview with Secretary Daniels, which
assured readers that the war game would “have a greater degree of realism than
such exercises in the past.”132 Also, it should be borne in mind that over a thousand passengers and crew, including 128 Americans, had been killed earlier that
month when the cruise liner RMS Lusitania was sunk by a German submarine,
inflaming American opinion against Germany and heightening attention on naval issues. Even President Wilson, no fan of martial displays, traveled to New
York to review the fleet before the exercise.133
The exercise itself, as intended, was anticlimactic, resulting in a resounding
“German” victory. According to the referee, Naval War College President Rear
Admiral Austin Knight, the Atlantic Fleet started off the exercise facing “the difficult problem of meeting an enemy force stronger than his own . . . and especially
stronger in scout’s [sic],” and could not overcome that disadvantage. Despite an
“excellent” scouting plan developed by Admiral Fletcher, “his smaller number of
slow scouts” ran into the opposing scouting line on the third day of the exercise
and were mauled, with “the most effective work against them being done by the
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enemy battlecruisers[,] whose high speed and long range guns enabled them to
pick off the slower and weaker . . . cruisers almost at will.”134
As a result, Fletcher’s force was blinded, and the “German” fleet “made its every
move with full knowledge of the enemy’s whereabouts.” While Fletcher withdrew
his fleet to cover potential landing sites in New England, Rear Admiral Beatty,
following his initial orders, made for the Chesapeake, well ahead of the Blue fleet.
After sending his transports ahead to the landing site, Beatty turned his battle fleet
northward toward the Atlantic Fleet. At this point, Knight stopped the exercise,
determining that the attacking fleet “was decidedly more powerful” than Blue’s
and “could, without difficulty, seize a base.”135 In his annual report Fletcher himself
blamed “the lack of heavily armored fast vessels and light cruisers” and the opponent’s “superior cruiser force” for the defeat. With such an imbalance in scouts, “the
enemy . . . was well informed of our movements and dispositions at all times.”136
The public-relations aftermath of the exercise went according to Fiske’s plan
as well. The New York Times reprinted Knight’s report on the exercise under the
headline “Battle Cruisers Won for ‘Invaders,’” musing that “[t]he lesson of the
war game, pointing to the need of fast and powerful scout cruisers . . . , will, it is
believed . . . , result in a recommendation that the coming Congress inaugurate
the policy of building battle cruisers.”137 The Washington Post went a step further,
noting the obvious similarities between the invaders and the German High Seas
Fleet and luridly claiming that the Atlantic Fleet was “adjudged incapable of protecting the United States from invasion by a foreign foe[,] . . . [who] was considered able to establish a base [and] march against Washington.”138
Supporters of naval expansion derived similar lessons. The Navy, of course,
claimed that the game showed “decisively that the navy of the United States is
lacking in battle cruisers.”139 Scientific American argued that the exercise provided
“an instructive lesson in the need for” scouts and battle cruisers.140 At the College,
Lieutenant Commander Harry Yarnell, a budding naval strategist, wrote soon
after the exercise that the U.S. Navy needed scouts with “speed and gun power
sufficient to overtake and destroy enemy vessels of the same class”—attributes
noticeably lacking in the 1915 fleet.141
Fiske, having resigned from the Aide for Operations post, took time to bask in
his success. While the war game was under way he took Assistant Secretary Roosevelt to lunch—and asked whether the latter was ready to take over at the Navy
Department in case Daniels was forced out.142 At the annual dinner of the Naval
Academy Graduates Association on 3 June, Fiske gave what he called “destructive
criticism”—in front of a crowd that included Daniels—laying out the supposed
dangers of a foreign invasion:
[A]n attack by one of the great naval powers is the only kind we need consider. . . .
[T]he attacking force would include battle cruisers, dreadnoughts, pre-dreadnoughts,
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scouts, cruisers, destroyers, . . . all fully manned and all strategically directed by a
General Staff.
What have we with which to oppose this force—a smaller number of dreadnoughts,
pre-dreadnoughts and destroyers than the enemy would bring; no battle cruisers, no
effective scouts. . . .
This means that, reasoning on the assumption that the United States desires that the
navy shall be able to guard our coast effectively against the only kind of attack that
would be made, the navy must obtain several types of vessels and instruments that we
do not now possess.143

In the speech, extracts of which were published on the front page of the New
York Times the next day, Fiske went on to urge members of the audience to make
the public understand the Navy’s alleged inadequacies, even in the face of official
censure and risk to their careers. He himself continued to agitate for naval expansion and a staff from his new perch in Newport, sparking another major confrontation with Daniels, with support from preparedness advocates in and out of office.144
The exercise also helped to increase pressure on President Wilson—already
under fire from the Lusitania sinking—to loosen the Navy’s purse strings. Outside the government, the Navy League agitated for a $500 million naval construction bill. Inside, men such as Assistant Secretary Roosevelt and Wilson’s closest
adviser, Edward House, urged the president to expand the military in the service
of preparedness.145 It is difficult to assign to the exercises a specific share of the
credit for the shifting political momentum, but they certainly gave ammunition
to the administration’s opponents.
Wilson, who earlier had tried to cut the 1915 program to one battleship, told
Daniels in July to prepare a large ship-construction program for the next fiscal
year.146 Armed with that knowledge, the General Board drafted a new naval policy, aiming to make the Navy “equal to the most powerful maintained by another
nation . . . not later than 1925.” At the same meeting, the board agreed tentatively
to place battle cruisers in their construction plan for the next year’s Navy bill.147
The sentiments expressed about the exercises certainly contributed to the
shape of the Navy’s final construction proposal. In October, Daniels clarified the
scope of the new program, asking the board to prepare a five-year, $500 million
program, echoing the Navy League’s calls for such a program in May.148 Two days
later, the board gave Daniels a program built around ten battleships, six battle
cruisers, and ten scouts.149
As the board related in November, this program had little to do with war
experience, instead resting on its assessment of the existing American fleet.
Noting that many American observers had been impressed by the performance of British battle cruisers in the war to date, the board took pains to make
the caveat that “the particular course of the present war does not justify the
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prevalent exaggerated idea of their importance.” Instead, the role of battle
cruisers was “chiefly . . . to secure information . . . and break through a hostile
screen” while protecting their own, not the roles demonstrated by the belligerents in the North Sea.150 This scouting rationale, however, matched exactly the
concerns expressed by Fiske, Sims, Fletcher, and others, as well as the preordained outcome of the summer 1915 war game.
While civilian officials have the final say on the specifics of the military’s budgetary requests and Congress authorizes acquisition programs and appropriates
their funding, military officers play a critical role in this system. Yet few politicians enter Congress with a working knowledge of the intricacies of military
policy, and frequently they defer to the judgment of uniformed professionals.
With their technical knowledge and experience, military officers often set the
bounds and terms of debate over providing for their services. Congress can
accept proposed budgets, cut them, or increase them, but very rarely do they
change the fundamental nature of the military’s requests for new acquisitions.
For example, Congress may not fund the number of attack submarines the Navy
wants in a given budget, or even kill the program entirely, but the legislature is
unlikely to force the service to build conventional submarines instead of the
nuclear submarines it desires.151
In the 1880s and 1890s, a relatively small group of naval officers convinced
leading civilian policy makers to fund a battleship navy, often in the face of opposition from other parts of the service. As this article shows, they may have
swung the pendulum of political opinion too far in favor of battleships. Viewed
in this context, for Fiske to take part in advocacy for the Navy was in keeping
with the recent history of American civil-military relations, although the means
he employed to intervene in political processes were wildly inappropriate. Still,
his campaign of dissent and underhanded politicking must be judged a partial
success. He did not create dissatisfaction with the Wilson administration or lead
the preparedness movement, but he skillfully turned critics of the administration
toward supporting his desired program for the U.S. Navy. Wilson’s about-face on
naval appropriations cannot be traced to Fiske alone, but his actions—influenced
by and coordinated with Wilson’s political adversaries—clearly played a role in
creating the domestic climate for a large Navy construction program. Furthermore, the nature of Fiske’s actions primed the pump for a construction program
incorporating more scouts than battleships.
Standard accounts of the 1916 Navy act’s genesis, even those written from a
naval history perspective, often have overlooked the active role that Fiske played
(and the General Board’s more passive role) in helping to create the preconditions for its framing and passage.152 Let us be clear about what happened. Led
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by Fiske, the members of the Navy’s uniformed leadership conspired to undermine the stated policy of their political masters, stopping only when the
administration agreed to pursue a large construction program (although Fiske,
especially agitated by Daniels, carried on for some time afterward).
The May 1915 exercise was a critical part of this strategy. As the evidentiary record makes clear, its framers were well aware of the effect an “invasion” of
the United States would have on domestic opinion. Likewise, they were aware
that Secretary Daniels had demanded that the exercise show proof that the Navy
could defend the Eastern Seaboard from attack. Instead, the scenario the General
Board wrote made success for the “American” side in the war game a near impossibility. This outcome was then spun as the inevitable failure of an unbalanced
fleet, as in (ex officio board member) Knight’s report on the game, which ended
up substantially reprinted in the press.
The nature of the Atlantic Fleet’s failure was critical to Fiske’s project. The scenario did not just guarantee American defeat; it guaranteed defeat as a result of
inadequate scouting capability. As theoretical work from the College and the Atlantic Fleet’s exercises earlier that year had demonstrated, major elements of the
Navy’s planning components were concerned about the U.S. Navy’s paucity of
scouts compared with its ostensible peer competitors. The summer exercise scenario broadcast as widely as possible—and more forcefully than the board’s construction memorandums—that the Navy’s leadership wanted new cruisers as soon
as possible.
At the same time, none of this should imply that war games or exercises with
overdetermined outcomes are somehow rare. Readers may remember U.S. Joint
Forces Command’s “Millennium Challenge 2002,” which was dogged by allegations that the game was rigged to validate “transformationalist” military stratagems.153 More benignly, framers of war games are forced to make any number of
assumptions about the capabilities of untested weapons, an unknown enemy’s
order of battle, and the like, which can have major effects on the course of an
exercise or chart maneuver.154
Even the political effects sought by Fiske and the General Board have had
echoes in other exercises. Ex–Secretary of the Navy John Lehman recently wrote
that the Navy’s exercises in near-Soviet waters during the 1980s were intended to
reassure allies and affect Soviet estimates of the balance of naval power.155 Likewise, the Soviet Navy’s OKEAN exercises in the 1970s were designed to impress
observers with the global reach of conventional Soviet power.156 Contemporary
American exercises with foreign militaries are designed with diplomatic and signaling objectives in mind, alongside testing operational efficacy.
What makes Fiske’s exercise unique is that the desired political effect and
predetermined result were intended to embarrass the administration he served
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and, perhaps, spark the removal of Daniels as Secretary of the Navy.157 Fiske was
only partially successful with this risky enterprise, and then only because his
objectives reflected a settled consensus on strategy and judgment of the Wilson
administration’s policies in critical nodes of naval leadership, including the General Board, the Naval War College, and the Atlantic Fleet.158 Even after his ouster, the General Board drafted and justified the 1916 bill using language similar
to Fiske’s. When asked to defend their recommendations in Congress, General
Board members did not treat the battle cruisers and scout cruisers as supernumerary add-ons, but “special ship[s] for special duties,” critical for conducting
modern naval warfare. Even after the Battle of Jutland in May and June of 1916
threw the future of the battle cruiser type into doubt, American officers continued to insist, truthfully, that their ships were intended for a different mission, and
that British and German practices and outcomes were inappropriate evidence on
which to judge American plans.159
One of Fiske’s biographers has stated, rather generously, that he “at times . . .
allowed his blue-and-gold professionalism to place him at variance with accepted
precepts of civil-military relations in a democracy.”160 This flaw was shared by
many naval officers of the early twentieth century. As members of the American
elite, they felt themselves free to engage with members of their stratum of society,
including newspapermen and politicians. The Navy League—firmly embedded
in the political, social, and financial elite of the coastal regions—was created in
part because President Roosevelt had threatened to court-martial any officer who
lobbied Congress directly.161
Even against that background, Fiske’s behavior stands out for its audacity. Any
flag officer seeking to follow his path today would be relieved of command and
court-martialed, and rightly so. Even though he was not the only naval officer of
the period willing to ghostwrite newspaper columns and advise congressmen and
senators on policy under the table, he was the only one willing to write controversial legislation in a congressman’s sitting room. Even so, Fiske only felt comfortable designing the exercises when he knew his career was effectively over. More
research is needed to state this conclusively, but 1915 may be the only time in
American history that a senior military officer designed an exercise for the express purpose of embarrassing a sitting administration.
We also should not ignore the role that personal animus played in these events.
Naval officers of the day tended to have a generalized disdain for politicians, but
many of the officers discussed here appear to have had a thoroughly personal
contempt for Daniels specifically. It is difficult not to see this as a motivating factor in Fiske’s actions. His autobiography, published in 1919 while Daniels was still
in office, drips with hatred for the secretary. Beyond Fiske’s individual feelings,
many of the actions of other officers discussed in this article—from the other six
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conspirators who met at Representative Hobson’s house to officers at the College
asking the secretary to cede some of his power—hardly suggest respect for the
man or his position.162
Most naval historians, this author included, would argue that Fiske and his
supporters had a more realistic understanding of the Navy’s operational shortcomings than did Daniels; their fixation on the virtually nonexistent threat of
a German invasion in the Western Hemisphere is a different story. That said,
Daniels was not a naval, but a political, professional. Fiske’s forays into Daniels’s
arena were amateurish; his hope that he could induce Wilson to fire a member of
his cabinet over caterwauling from the opposition or a failed exercise was absurd.
Yet even though Fiske was only partially successful, that should not blind us
to how wildly inappropriate his political machinations were, almost from the
beginning of Daniels’s installation as secretary. Fiske’s activities violated a host
of regulations and civil-military norms. Any contemporary officer following his
lead would be lucky indeed if he only ended up waiting for retirement in a deadend assignment.
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REDEPLOYMENT OF THE GERMAN BREST
GROUP THROUGH THE ENGLISH CHANNEL ,
11–13 FEBRUARY 1942 (OPER ATION CERBERUS)
Milan Vego

T

he successful operational redeployment of the German Brest Group (consisting of two battleships and one heavy cruiser) plus six destroyers from
Brest, France, to home waters from 11 to 13 February 1942 (dubbed Operation
CERBERUS) was a major defensive naval/joint operation for the Germans.1 Operation CERBERUS remains one of very few such operations aimed not at destroying
hostile forces but at carrying out an operational redeployment. Although the
British prepared an operation plan to respond, it was incoherent and executed
as a series of poorly coordinated tactical actions carried out by several major
commands. The Germans were highly successful in both planning and executing
Operation CERBERUS; while both battleships suffered some damage from enemy
mines, they eventually reached home waters. Despite the passage of time, this
operation is rich in operational lessons that are still valid today and will remain
so in the future.
The 32,600-ton (standard), thirty-one-knot
Milan Vego has been a professor in the Joint Military German battleships (often referred to as battle
Operations Department at the Naval War College
cruisers) Scharnhorst and Gneisenau arrived at
since 1991. He is the Admiral R. K. Turner Professor
of Operational Art (2013) and a University Professor Brest in March 1941 after a highly successful cruise
(2017). Dr. Vego holds a PhD in European history from in the Atlantic (Operation BERLIN). The 18,750the George Washington University. The most recent of
his fourteen books are General Naval Tactics and Ex- ton (full), thirty-two-knot heavy cruiser Prinz
ercising Control of the Sea (both October 2020).
Eugen joined them in June 1941, after the ill-fated
Operation R HEINÜBUNG , in which it operated
© 2021 by Milan Vego
with the battleship Bismarck.2
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The Brest Group soon became the focus of reconnaissance aircraft and heavy
bombers of Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF). British bombers started attacking
Brest on 6 April 1941. In a night raid on 10/11 April, Gneisenau was hit with four
bombs that caused serious damage and left fifty crewmembers dead and ninety
wounded. In a raid on 1 July 1941, Prinz Eugen was hit with one bomb, killing fifty
and wounding thirty-four crewmembers. Scharnhorst sailed to La Pallice to conduct engine trials and gunnery/torpedo exercises that were to be held 21–26 July;
however, attacks by British bombers on 24 July scored five bomb hits and caused
extensive damage.3 Scharnhorst took on some three thousand tons of water.4
Between 23 November 1941 and the beginning of February 1942, the British
conducted twenty-five twilight or night air raids against the Brest Group.5 However, by the end of December 1941 the RAF concluded that, despite its intensive
air attacks, the German ships had not been damaged seriously. This was confirmed by Allied agents in Brest.6
GERMAN OPERATIONAL COMMAND ORGANIZATION
Both the Kriegsmarine (German navy) and Britain’s Royal Navy (RN) were highly centralized organizations. The Kriegsmarine was led by Grand Admiral Erich
Raeder; he also headed the Oberkommando der Marine (Naval High Command)
and was chief of the Seekriegsleitung (Naval Warfare Directorate—SKL), which
had been reestablished on 1 April 1937.7 The principal operational commanders
of the Kriegsmarine involved in Operation CERBERUS were the Flottenkommandant (commander of the fleet) and the commanders of Marinegruppenkommandos (Naval Group Commands) West and North. The fleet commander was General Admiral Otto Schniewind, who was appointed in June 1941.8 He exercised
control of all battleships, cruisers, torpedo boats, S-boats, auxiliary cruisers, and
fleet supply ships.9 Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax was Befehlshaber der Schlachtschiffe
(commander of battleships), appointed in June 1941.10 Admiral Ciliax was at the
same time commander of the Brest Group. He was embarked in Scharnhorst for
the operation. His alternate flagship was destroyer Z-29, the flagship of Commodore (one-star admiral) Erich Bey, Führer der Zerstörer (Leader of Destroyers).11
Torpedo-boat (T-boat) flotillas and S-boat flotillas that took part in the operation
were subordinate administratively to the Führer der Torpedoboote (Leader of
Torpedo Boats).12
The operational commanders of the forces that took part in Operation CERBERUS were General Admiral Alfred Saalwächter, Commander, Naval Group
Command West, with headquarters in Paris, France, and General Admiral
Rolf Carls, Commander, Naval Group Command North, with headquarters at
Wilhelmshaven-Sengwarden, Germany. Saalwächter was the supported commander, while Carls was the supporting commander.13 Naval Group Command
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West’s Operationsgebiet (operational area, similar to theater of operations) was
the Westraum (Western Area), consisting of the southern part of the North Sea,
the English Channel, and the waters off the French Atlantic coast.14 The Brest
Group came under the operational control of Naval Group Command North
after it transited across the boundary of Naval Group Command West at the
latitude of Zeebrugge, Belgium (see map 1).15 Naval Group Command North’s
operational area encompassed the central and northern parts of the Nordsee
(North Sea), the waters of Norway, and the Nordmeer (Arctic).16
As the supported commander, Admiral Saalwächter had overall responsibility
for the planning and execution of CERBERUS.17 The Befehlshaber der Sicherung
West (Commander, Security Forces, Naval Group Command West—BSW) was
Commodore Friedrich Ruge, with headquarters in Paris. Directly subordinate to
Ruge were the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Security Divisions. The 2nd Security Division
was responsible for the coastal area from the Scheldt estuary to Cherbourg, the
3rd from Cherbourg to the latitude of Saint-Nazaire, and the 4th from SaintNazaire to the Franco-Spanish border. These security forces were responsible
for surveilling coastal waters, providing escorts to larger warships and convoys
carrying raw materials (e.g., iron ore from Spain) and troops, maintaining routes
free from enemy mines, and laying defensive minefields.18 Protection of the
southern part of the North Sea was the responsibility of the 1st Security Division
(established in February 1941). This division was subordinate to Naval Group
Command West until October 1941, then was transferred to the Befehlshaber der
Sicherung der Nordsee (Commander, Security Forces of the North Sea—BSN),
who was responsible for the area from the Scheldt River estuary to Hanstholm in
the northern part of Denmark.19
The principal operational-level command of the Luftwaffe (German air force)
in the west was the 3rd Air Fleet, with headquarters in Paris and units based in
northern France, Belgium, and the Netherlands; it was led by Field Marshal Hugo
Sperrle. In February 1942, major subordinate units were the IX Air Corps in Soissons, Flugführer Atlantik (Air Leader of the Atlantic) in Lorient, Jagdfliegerführer 2 (2nd Fighter Leader—Jafü 2) in Le Touquet, and Jafü 3 (3rd Fighter Leader)
in Deauville, plus three Luftgau Kommandos (air district commands): Holland,
Belgium–Northern France, and Western France (see sidebar).
BRITISH OPERATIONAL COMMAND ORGANIZATION
The highest British naval authority was the Admiralty, led by First Lord Albert V.
Alexander, a civilian. The First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff was Admiral Sir
Dudley Pound.20 The Home Fleet (created in 1902) was the largest operationallevel command in the Royal Navy; the waters around the British Isles constituted its operating area. The Home Fleet was organized into several type-force
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LUFTWAFFE ORDER OF BATTLE FOR OPERATION DONNERKEIL
CINC, LUFTWAFFE
(Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, Berlin)

COMMANDER, LUFTWAFFE, CENTER
(General Hubert Weise, Berlin)
1st Night Fighter Division
6 air district commands (administrative): III, IV, VI, VII,
XI, XII

3RD AIR FLEET
(Field Marshal Hugo Sperrle, Paris)
IX Air Corps (operational) (Soissons)
Air Leader of the Atlantic (Fliegerführer Atlantik) (Lorient)
2nd Fighter Leader (Jagdfliegerführer 2—Jafü 2) (Colonel Joachim-Friedrich Huth, Le Touquet)
3rd Fighter Leader (Jafü 3) (Major Karl Hentschel,
Deauville)
Air district commands (administrative): Holland,
Belgium–Northern France, Western France

RECONNAISSANCE
123rd Reconnaissance Group (Toussus-le-Buc)
1.(F)/123 [1st squadron of the 123rd Group, Fern (longrange)] (Toussus-le-Buc)
3.(F)/123 (Lannion)
Temporary organization for Operation DONNERKEIL:
General der Jagdflieger / Inspector of Fighters
(Colonel Adolf Galland, Le Touquet, France)
Jafü 2 (Le Touquet)
Jafü 3 (Deauville, France)
Jafü Holland-Ruhrgebiet (established 1 February 1942)
(Schiphol-Amsterdam, Netherlands)
Jafü Deutsche Bucht (subordinate to Fighter Leader,
Center) (General Lieutenant Werner Junck,
Jever, Germany)

FIGHTER UNITS
Note: A regulation fighter wing had three groups,
and each group three squadrons, thus nine
squadrons per wing. The arrangement and
notations below reflect the original German
document.
Operational: 406 fighters (27 Me-110s, 125 Fw-190s,
254 Me-109s)
III/Night Fighter Wing 3 (Abbeville): (less 1 squadron)
II/Night Fighter Wing 1 (Koksijde): 3 squadrons
II/Fighter Wing 26 (Abbeville-Drucat): 20 + 16 aircraft (a/c)
I/Fighter Wing 2 (Calais-Marck): 8 + 12 a/c
I/Fighter Wing 26 (Saint-Omer-Arques): 32 a/c
III/Fighter Wing 26 (Coquelles): 32 a/c
II/Fighter Wing 2 (Calais-Marck): 32 a/c
III/Fighter Wing 2 (Gorhde): 32 a/c
II/Fighter Wing 26 (Maldegem): 16 a/c
I/Fighter Wing 26 (Moenbrecht): 16 a/c
II/Fighter Wing 2 (Schiphol [Spenburg]): 16 a/c
III/Fighter Wing 2 (Schiphol [Bergen]): 16 a/c
I/Fighter Wing 2 (Katwijk): 16 a/c
Sea search-and-rescue aircraft
3rd Air Fleet / Luftwaffe Commander Center, Berlin
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Sources: “Flottenbefehl für das Unternehmen DONNERKEIL,”
p. 52; Luftflotte 3, “Vorläufige Zusammenstellung des Jagdeinsatzes der Lfl. 3 am 12.2.1942,” p. 2; Unternehmen DONNERKEIL (zum Akt Kanaldurchbruch), RL 7/115, BA-MA.
Note: Particulars given in this sidebar are based on the sources
listed here. They may not align exactly with the particulars given
in the text, as that information is based on British and German
intelligence sources. The former reflects what we know now; the
latter reflects what the combatants thought they knew then.

commands (for carriers, battleships, battle cruisers, destroyers, and submarines),
each of which was led by a flag officer.21
Traditional major shore commands were at the Nore, Portsmouth, and Plymouth. The Nore Command (named after a sandbank in the Thames River estuary), led in peacetime by a vice admiral, was responsible for the Strait of Dover
and north to Flamborough Head, Yorkshire. The Portsmouth Command had
responsibility for the central part of the English Channel, from Newhaven to
Portland. This was the most prestigious of all major shore commands, and was
led by a four-star admiral. The Plymouth Command, also led by a four-star admiral, was responsible for the western part of the English Channel, the southwest
approaches, Bristol Channel, and the Irish Sea.22
The major wartime shore commands were the Orkneys and Shetlands, Rosyth,
and Dover. As the name implies, the Orkneys and Shetlands Command was responsible for defense of the Orkney archipelago and the Shetland Islands, north
of the Scottish mainland. The Rosyth Command was reactivated in August 1939;
its area of responsibility stretched from Cromarty in the north of Scotland down
to Flamborough Head in Yorkshire. The Dover Command, led by a vice admiral,
was carved out of the Nore Command, with a main responsibility of protecting
maritime traffic in the strait itself.23
In the operation against the Brest Group, participating aircraft came from the
Royal Navy’s Fleet Air Arm (FAA) and the RAF’s Coastal, Bomber, and Fighter
Commands. The FAA, with headquarters at Lee-on-Solent, was responsible for
providing air support to the fleet. In February 1942, the FAA was led by Rear Admiral Clement Moody. Coastal Command was led by General Philip Joubert de
la Ferté, with headquarters in Northwood. Its main responsibility was to defend
British (and later Allied) convoys from the attacks of U-boats and the Luftwaffe.
In 1941, the principal subordinate commands of Coastal Command deployed
on the British Isles were No. 15 Group, with headquarters in Liverpool; No. 16
Group, at Chatham, Kent (in southeast England); and No. 18 Group, at Pitreavie
Castle (near Rosyth, Scotland).24 The RAF’s Bomber Command was established
in July 1936. In World War II its main mission was to carry out “strategic” bombing of Germany and German-occupied territories. It was led by Air Vice-Marshal
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Jack Baldwin, with headquarters (after 1940) at High Wycombe, in Buckinghamshire. RAF Fighter Command, with headquarters at Bentley Priory in northwest
London, was established in July 1936. Its main mission was to provide air cover
for bombers and RN ships.
GERMAN DECISION-MAKING
Preliminary Discussions
The question whether the Brest Group should remain in Brest or redeploy to
home waters (and then to Norway) was discussed in great detail by Admiral
Raeder, the commanders of the naval groups, and the commander of battleships beginning in the late spring of 1941 and continuing into the first few
weeks of January 1942. Admiral Raeder and some members of his staff and
the staff of Naval Group Command West also had meetings with Hitler at the
Wolfsschanze (Wolf ’s Lair), the führer’s headquarters near Rastenburg, East
Prussia (now Kętrzyn, Poland).
In a memo of 17 July sent to his operational commanders concerning the future employment of the heavy ships, Raeder discussed the advantages and disadvantages of using the English Channel for pocket battleships and cruisers. Among
the advantages were shorter transits to operating areas and the greatly reduced
possibility of suffering a total matériel and personnel loss. A major disadvantage
was the significant threat that enemy forces posed in the Vorfeld (outpost area
or patrolling area); such opposition included air forces once ships entered the
Hoofden (the triangular area Dover–Calais–Dunkirk) and the eastern part of the
North Sea. In Raeder’s view, the odds of deploying battleships successfully were
zero throughout the Channel, while those for cruisers were low. He concluded
that any transit that cruisers might conduct through the Channel needed to be a
planned operation, as did any corresponding material preparations applicable to
auxiliary cruisers and supply ships.25
During his meeting with Raeder on 29 December 1941, Hitler stated that the
enemy threat to Norway required redeploying Germany’s heavy ships to that area
as a deterrent. He considered Norway the “Schicksalzone” (Zone of Destiny) of
the entire war.26 (When he met with Raeder again on 22 January, Hitler said that
every German heavy surface ship that was not in Norway was in the wrong place;
Raeder fully agreed.27) With regard to the Brest Group, Raeder informed Hitler
that the intent was to have Prinz Eugen ready on 31 December 1941, Scharnhorst
on 5 January, and Gneisenau on 10 January 1942. Prior to the final sortie, the
group must carry out an exercise at the pier and receive gunnery personnel as
soon as possible. Exercising the ships at sea would be very risky, yet without that
training the ships could not be employed in combat.28
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Hitler believed that the enemy was well informed about all things and would
do everything possible to prevent a sortie from Brest. In Hitler’s view, it was pure
luck that the ships had been able even to complete their repairs. Beyond that, they
could not conduct underway training near Brest—exercises at sea would lead to
a catastrophe. An effective defense of the ships during those activities, even with
the strongest employment of the Luftwaffe, was impossible, he asserted—the
ships would be lost in any such circumstance. There was only one possibility:
seizing an opportunity of favorable weather conditions to speed a run up the
Channel to return home. If that failed, the ships should be decommissioned and
disarmed. Hitler stated that he must consider the overall situation; he could not
leave the ships’ crews and matériel unused when every man was needed at the
front. Hitler also believed that the time for large ships had passed; they were only
good for employment as aircraft carriers. Hitler stated that he understood the
Kriegsmarine found it difficult to accustom itself to his thinking, especially since
in the past he himself had been an advocate of very large ships. The problem now
was to use personnel and matériel purposefully.29
In his memo to Hitler of 8 January 1942, Raeder wrote that the Brest Group
should remain at Brest. However, if the ships did have to transit to Norway, there
were two route possibilities: through the Iceland passages or through the Channel. Return via the Iceland passages was possible only if the ships regained full
combat readiness. This would require longer underway operational training in
the Westraum. But even then, the current enemy situation did not offer favorable
prospects for a return through the Iceland passages.30
Raeder stated that even for a return through the English Channel, it was absolutely necessary to conduct a one-time trial cruise that would start in darkness
and conclude with a gunnery exercise in the morning hours. Raeder believed
that an unobserved return to Germany through the Channel was “barely possible.” The ships’ movements in and outside Brest would not escape the enemy’s
detection. The transit would require that minesweeping forces conduct a very
intensive search of the route immediately prior to sailing. Even the placing of beacon buoys at difficult navigational locations or points would arouse at least some
attention from the enemy. And even if the Germans achieved surprise initially,
at least by the time the ships were transiting the Strait of Dover the enemy would
be in a situation to use all available air forces, torpedo boats, destroyers, and
mines against them. Raeder pointed out that navigational difficulties abounded,
because of shallows, tides, and mines, although they could be overcome. Redeployment of the Brest Group, if it were ordered, should take place during the new
moon and the Schiebenstrom (push current).31 Raeder wrote that in the immediate future, those conditions would prevail on only four days: 11–14 (actually 15)
February. The weather also needed to be favorable for the operation.32
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In his memo, Raeder pointed out that the Germans lacked sufficient minesweeping forces to gain control of the mine situation. The effect of new types
of mines on heavy ships was unknown; “contact counter” mines could pose a
great danger, and there was no practical way to neutralize them. While the mine
danger to the Brest Group’s redeployment should not be overstated, countering
it would require bringing in modern minesweepers from the Baltic, even though
they were needed badly there to escort fast convoys, and were needed as well in
Norwegian waters. The redeployment also would require the temporary transfer
of three destroyers, then based in Norway, to Brest for service as escorts.33
Raeder anticipated that the enemy would employ his torpedo boats energetically, but that the battleships and escorts could be defended effectively against
their attacks. Even so, because of the small sea area involved it might not always
be possible to maneuver to avoid torpedoes fired from long range; hence, the possibility of chance torpedo hits could not be excluded. Raeder did not expect the
enemy heavy ships to be present during the Kanalmarsch (Channel march); they
might be brought to bear by the time operations were taking place in the southern
part of the North Sea, but even that was unlikely.34
Raeder believed it was the superior air forces the enemy could bring to bear in
the Channel that posed the greatest threat to the German battleships. In his view,
if the enemy successfully massed his air forces and employed them fully, no effective defense was possible, even if the Luftwaffe’s fighters were part of the picture.
Certainly, self-defense by the Brest Group and its escorts alone could not prevent
hits by bombs and torpedoes.35
Admiral Raeder came to the conclusion—on the basis of his discussions with
the commanders of Naval Group Command West, the fleet, the battleships, and
Security Forces West—that the return of the battleships through the Channel
would have a high probability of total loss, or at least heavy damages to the ships.
He concluded as follows: “I therefore see myself according to my innermost conviction not in a position to propose such a transfer operation.”36
Consequently, Raeder proposed to Hitler that the battleships remain at Brest,
operationally ready. Training in gunnery and protection via smoke screen should
continue. Germany would continue to enjoy the strategic effect of the battleships’
presence at Brest (supposedly reducing the burden on the Japanese in East Asia)
until the German situation in the northern area and the Atlantic improved. Raeder also told Hitler that he was strongly against disarming the heavy ships at Brest.
In his view, not only would doing so impose a heavy burden on the Kriegsmarine
and its officers, petty officers, and sailors; it would represent a great success for
the enemy naval leadership. It also would have negative effects in the northern
area (Norway) and on warfare in the Atlantic Ocean. The same likely was true of
the Indian Ocean; the action’s influence on Japan’s posture could not be foreseen.
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Raeder asserted that it would take one to two years to remove the guns from the
battleships and make them ready for use elsewhere. Writing as commander of
the Kriegsmarine, Raeder concluded, “Therefore, I want once again to urgently
advise against such measures, which are decisive for the development of the war
situation at sea and the future of the entire Kriegsmarine.”37
Hitler’s Decision
Hitler was firmly committed to redeploying the Brest Group to home waters.
The final decision was made at the meeting of Admiral Raeder and the commanders involved in the planning and execution of the operation at Hitler’s
main headquarters, held at Rastenburg on 12 January.38 At the meeting, Raeder
stated that the question of the Kanalmarsch was based on the führer’s desire that
the Kriegsmarine make its main task the defense of the Norwegian coast and
ports. Hitler acknowledged that in Brest the ships exerted a positive effect by
tying down enemy air forces; however, that effect continued only so long as they
remained undamaged. He said, “If I could see any chance of the ships remaining undamaged for four or five months, and a new situation is created allowing
their employment in the Atlantic, I might be more inclined to consider leaving
them at Brest,” but this would not happen. That being the case, the ships had to
be taken out of Brest rather than continuing to hope and trust they would not be
hit. Hitler also was very concerned by the worsening of Sweden’s posture toward
Germany; some information he possessed indicated a possibility of “NorwegianRussian [actually Swedish-Russian] action in northern Norway.” Hitler believed
the Norwegian coast must be defended by a strong group of battleships and cruisers. Employment of practically the entire German fleet, in cooperation with the
Luftwaffe, would be decisive in providing security to the Norwegian area. Hence,
he wanted, under all circumstances, to shift the Schwergewicht (main weight) of
German naval forces to Norway.39
The discussion at Hitler’s headquarters also dealt with the details of the pending Kanalmarsch. Admiral Ciliax stated that the Brest Group must leave the port
in darkness and transit the Strait of Dover during daylight, because that offered
the best use of available defenses. Hitler agreed, but pointed out the value of
surprise, which would be enhanced by sailing out at the beginning of darkness.
Also discussed was the need for a strong fighter escort, especially on the day of
Durchbruch (penetration); Ciliax stressed the need for a continuous cover of at
least ten aircraft in “low cover” and ten aircraft in “high cover.” General Hans
Jeschonnek, Chief of the General Staff, Luftwaffe, believed that, with the 250
fighters available, continuous protection of the ships could not be maintained;
however, he promised to bring two heavy (night) fighter squadrons from other
air units to provide protection at dawn. Hitler also asked about the possibility
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of the Brest Group using the northern route (through the Denmark Strait past
Iceland), but remarked that he “did not care which route the ships took as long as
they ended up deployed to the Norwegian area.”40
Raeder; Admiral Kurt Fricke, Chief of Staff, Naval Warfare Directorate; and
Ciliax believed it was impossible to conduct comprehensive combat training at
Brest, because of the strength of the Home Fleet and a lack of support by the
Luftwaffe.41 Commodore Ruge stated that there was no 100 percent protection
against deepwater mines. Hitler again emphasized that the success of the operation depended on its secrecy. Hence, the commander of battleships and the Naval
Warfare Directorate should do everything to avoid giving the enemy advance
warning of the sortie from Brest. Raeder repeated that the Luftwaffe must provide
the strongest fighter protection, as well as conduct attacks on enemy airfields
in the early morning of X+1 (A+1, in Luftwaffe terms) and several days prior
to that. General Jeschonnek repeated that the Luftwaffe in the west, owing to
the general situation of the war, could not assign any larger number of fighters
to support Operation CERBERUS. However, he undertook to reconsider this if
Hitler ordered so. The Luftwaffe’s intent was to use 250 fighters in three shifts; in
contrast, Ciliax wanted to have sixty fighters provide standby cover, while the remaining 190 aircraft would provide cover in the afternoon hours of X+1.42 Hitler
again stressed the need to achieve surprise to enable a successful transit at Dover
during daylight hours; in his view, derived from experience, the British would
not make and execute decisions quickly enough to interrupt the transit. Hitler
compared the situation of the Brest Group to that of a cancer patient. “Without
an operation he will certainly die, while an operation was a ‘horse-cure’ and has
some chances of saving a patient.” Hence, Kanalmarsch must be executed. The
decision was made that the sortie would be carried out if the two battleships were
ready, even without the cruiser; or if one battleship and the cruiser were ready;
but not for the cruiser alone.43
BRITISH OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
The main sources of British intelligence were radio intercepts of German Enigma
messages and aerial photoreconnaissance. Some information on the Brest Group
was obtained by a French agent in Brest and British submarines patrolling off
the port.
On 17 and 19 December 1941, Enigma provided some valuable information about gunnery exercises that the crews of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had
conducted between 1 and 14 December on board Admiral Scheer in the Baltic; the gunnery crews of Prinz Eugen practiced on board Admiral Hipper. On
16 December, photoreconnaissance revealed that Prinz Eugen was out of dry
dock; Gneisenau suffered more damages from a blast on 18 December, yet by
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23 December it too was already out of dry dock and back along the pier.44 Photoreconnaissance conducted on 29 and 30 December revealed the arrival of two
enemy destroyers and eight minesweepers at Brest.45
On 6 January, British bombers attacked Brest again and Gneisenau received
one bomb hit, but by 25 January the ship had been repaired, enabling it to carry
out engine trials and a gunnery exercise. Between 18 and 23 January, Enigma
intercepts indicated that the gunnery crews of Scharnhorst again had exercised on
board Admiral Scheer. Enigma also revealed that the battleship Tirpitz (the sister
ship of Bismarck, commissioned in February 1941) had moved to Norway in
mid-January. The Admiralty was concerned about the possibility that Tirpitz and
the Brest Group might operate together in the Atlantic. However, the Admiralty’s
Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC) assessed on 19 January that, “in the view
of the high degree of efficiency demanded by the Germans before their warships
undertake operational war cruises, it is possible that these vessels on leaving Brest
will . . . make for an area in which they can work up with comparative immunity.” The only such area was in the Baltic. In other words, all the activity at Brest
pointed not to a sortie into the Atlantic but to a breakout through the Channel.46
On 22 January, British photoreconnaissance showed three enemy destroyers and six E-boats in Brest. In its appreciation (the commander’s estimate of
the situation) of 24 January, the Admiralty stated its belief that Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau would sail out from Brest, and that Gneisenau was not yet ready but
would be operational by the end of January. On 25 January 1942, the German 5th
Destroyer Flotilla moved from the North Sea into the Channel.47 On 31 January,
British reconnaissance aircraft observed that all three heavy ships at Brest were
out of dry dock. That same day, both photoreconnaissance and Enigma indicated
that the two battleships had left the harbor during the night and returned in the
morning. The OIC concluded that the ships had carried out trials, probably at
Douarnenez Bay, sixteen miles northwest of Quimper, Brittany. This, in conjunction with the massing of the destroyers, five torpedo boats, and eight minesweepers, indicated that a departure from Brest was near at hand.48
On 3 February, the OIC summarized the German naval strength (excluding the Brest Group) that had accumulated in the area between Brest and Hoek
van (Hook of) Holland over the preceding ten days: seven destroyers, ten torpedo boats, twenty Minensuchboote (M-minesweepers—large, modern vessels),
twenty-five motor torpedo boats (MTBs) (between Boulogne and Hoek van
Holland), six Sperrbrecher (mine barrage breakers), and a number of smaller
vessels.49 On 5 February, the OIC stated that the several recent exercises by the
battle cruisers (actually battleships) and the raising of Admiral Ciliax’s flag in
Scharnhorst were indications of an impending departure from Brest.50 On 8 and
9 February, Scharnhorst was observed to be in dry dock again. Two more enemy
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destroyers arrived at Brest, bringing the total there to four.51 In the afternoon of
11 February, photoreconnaissance indicated that all three heavy ships were out
of dry dock.52 Torpedo booms were in place protecting the ships.53 Yet there was
no sign of an unusual concentration of enemy fighters.54 That same afternoon,
the British submarine HMS Sealion, on patrol off Brest, drew closer to the port’s
entrance but did not observe the enemy’s big ships.55
GERMAN OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Leading up to Operation CERBERUS, Germany’s Marinenachrichtendienst (Naval
Intelligence Service—MND) possessed fairly accurate knowledge of the naval,
air, and mine situation in the English Channel and its approaches.56 Its estimate
of the British order of battle was based on radio intercepts conducted by the
Beobachtung-Dienst (Observation Service—B-Dienst), the Kriegsmarine’s naval
intelligence radio-intercept service; no information on enemy forces was obtained by air reconnaissance. The Germans believed that a majority of the Home
Fleet’s heavy ships were based in northern Scotland—specifically, that four battleships (King George V, Duke of York, Howe [not combat ready], and Rodney), one
carrier (Victorious), and six cruisers (including one or two heavy cruisers) were
located in that area. In the Iceland area were one battleship (Renown) and two
to four heavy cruisers. Based on the British west coast were two carriers (Formidable and Illustrious) and one battleship (Nelson [under repair in the Clyde]).
In the Channel area was one cruiser (Hawkins [returned from East Asia at the
beginning of December 1941, and probably under repair]). The presence of other
enemy cruisers was possible.57
The Germans assumed that the enemy light forces—two cruisers and one
destroyer flotilla—were in Plymouth, while individual destroyers for escorting convoys were based at the Channel ports. Two antiaircraft (AA) cruisers
and several destroyer groups were based in ports on England’s eastern coast.
The Germans believed—incorrectly—that fifteen to twenty MTBs, ten motor
gunboats (MGBs), and ten motor antisubmarine (A/S) boats were based on the
Channel coast and that of southeastern England. They made this overestimation
on the basis of the enemy’s use of groups of six to eight boats in his attacks on
German coastal shipping moving through the Channel.58 This miscalculation of
the number of MTBs they faced considerably affected the Germans’ assessment
of the threat the enemy would pose to the Brest Group during its transit of the
Strait of Dover.
The Germans had some information about the presence of enemy submarines in Devonport (part of the Plymouth area, in southwest England). They
speculated that these submarines were in the process of being transferred to the
Mediterranean or were undergoing training and trials, or both. On the basis of
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radio direction finding (RDF) fixes obtained on 20 and 27 January, the Germans
also established the presence of enemy submarines in the North Sea. The enemy
had patrol craft and minesweeping units in the Thames estuary and on England’s
North Sea coast. The Germans had information that convoys between Bristol in
the west of England and the western portion of the Channel ran every two days
(one northbound and one southbound), and convoys between the Thames and
Portsmouth in the south of England ran every eight days (in both directions).59
The Germans lacked precise information on the enemy coastal gun batteries
in the Strait of Dover; however, they assumed that he had coastal defenses in the
south of England. They also believed that the enemy had installed radars along
the entire English coast. The effective range of these radars against surface targets
was estimated to extend up to thirty-five nautical miles.60
German naval intelligence estimated that the enemy had a considerable
number of reconnaissance aircraft based in southern England. Specifically,
these forces consisted of the 16th Group at Chatham (five squadrons of landbased reconnaissance aircraft) and the 19th Group at Plymouth (six squadrons
of land-based aircraft and seven squadrons of seaplanes). The MND noted that
the enemy had increased the intensity of air reconnaissance in December 1941,
especially in the Brest area. All reconnaissance flights were focused on detecting
the German surface ships.61
German naval intelligence believed that all five enemy bomber groups considered relevant, comprising sixty-seven squadrons, were deployed in southern
and southeastern England. They were employed in attacking targets in Germany
and occupied territories. These attacks were conducted using the 1st, 3rd, and 5th
Groups, with forty-one squadrons, and predominantly during the night hours.
Large-scale attacks were conducted against naval bases/ports at Brest and La Pallice, France. The 2nd Group, with fourteen squadrons, conducted daylight attacks
on German ships. Yet the Germans believed that the 2nd Group also might conduct night attacks on the Brest Group. (The 4th Group, with twelve squadrons,
was used for mining.)62
The Germans estimated that the enemy’s 10th and 11th Fighter Groups, believed to be based at Felton (actually Bentley Priory) and Uxbridge in southern
England, respectively, could be employed in the Channel and the Brest area.
These groups had forty-five squadrons of single-engine fighters and seventeen
squadrons of twin-engine fighters. Each squadron consisted of fifteen aircraft.
Only about 60 percent of these enemy fighters were combat ready. Twin-engine
fighters were predominantly used at night.63
German naval intelligence also evaluated the mine situation on both the main
and avoidance routes projected for the Brest Group’s Channel transit. The Germans believed that the enemy’s mine activity was focused on German maritime
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traffic routes, the entrances to ports, and avoidance routes in coastal waters.
They judged that the threat posed by the enemy’s “moored and moored remotely
activated mines will be strongly reduced in the entire area owing to dominant unfavorable current and tidal conditions.” The enemy’s ground mines posed a great
threat in the Strait of Dover and in shallow water. While the Germans believed
there was little danger in conducting mine-avoidance maneuvers in the section
of the route running through deep water, any avoidance maneuvers conducted
in the declared warning area or mined area in the Strait of Dover would be very
dangerous.64
GERMAN PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
To ensure a successful outcome for Operation CERBERUS, the German planners
had to define and then satisfy, or at least address, the following several key considerations: (1) the month, day, and time of sailing out; (2) the time of day for
transiting the Strait of Dover; (3) the threat from enemy forces; (4) achieving
surprise; (5) the route and waypoints; (6) weather conditions; (7) the size and
composition of the screen; and (8) the mine situation.
Timing of Sailing Out
The primary factor in selecting the time of year for the sortie was the length of
the night; the longer the night, the greater the possibility of a successful transit
from Brest to home waters. Given that winter nights are the longest, the time
frame for executing the operation needed to be the beginning to the middle of
February.65 Admiral Ciliax requested delaying the sortie until March, but SKL
rejected this because the nights only would get shorter and brighter, lessening
the possibility of achieving surprise on departure, which would favor the enemy.
In addition, a four-week delay would allow the enemy to carry out more air raids
against Brest.66
Selection of the day for the sortie also depended on the occurrence of the new
moon. After the beginning of February 1942, the first new moon occurred on
15 February. Hence, the group’s departure was set for 11 February.67 During that
period, the duration of full darkness was twelve hours.68 Tides played a crucial
role because of the need to have sufficient depth of water for safe navigation and
to provide adequate clearance from mines, as the route was swept for mines up
to a depth of thirty-nine feet (twelve meters).69 To reduce the danger of activating
ground mines, the most favorable timing of the sortie was during the new moon,
when spring tides (the highest [and lowest]) would occur. A tidal current of four
to five knots was predicted during that period at Ouessant (Ushant), Cap de la
Hague, and Calais.70 The naval planners had in hand a tidal current prediction
from the Marine Observatory in Wilhelmshaven (see map 2). The planners also
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considered making use of the strongest possible current in their selection of a
time frame for executing Operation CERBERUS.71
Timing of the Dover Transit and the Threat from Enemy Forces
The Germans could time the transit of the Strait of Dover for the nighttime or
daylight hours. The distance from Brest to Cherbourg is about 240 miles, and
some 120 miles of water separate Cherbourg and the Strait of Dover. The Brest
Group could transit one of those segments during darkness, but not both.72
At first glance, it might seem to make sense to pass the Strait of Dover during the night. However, this would require the Brest Group to sortie during the
morning of 11 February, and during the daytime early detection of the Brest
Group—before it entered the Strait of Dover—would be unavoidable. The German planners believed that the enemy would have timely warning that the group
had departed Brest, enabling him to concentrate not only his torpedo bombers
and heavy bombers but his torpedo boats. He also might be able to employ heavy
units out of Scapa Flow in a timely manner; the distance from Scapa Flow to
Terschelling in the West Frisian Islands is 450 nautical miles, while the distance
from Brest to Terschelling is 575 nautical miles. During the night the main disadvantages for the German ships would be the lack of adequate fighter protection
and the ineffectiveness of the ships’ AA guns and defenses against enemy torpedo
boats.73
Conversely, transit of the Brest Group through the Strait of Dover during
daylight offered a different set of advantages and disadvantages. The Germans
concluded that conducting the transit during daylight would allow moreeffective protection by Luftwaffe aircraft from expected attacks by enemy MTBs
and torpedo bombers while the ships were in the navigationally confining waters
of the English Channel (i.e., before they passed through the Strait of Dover and
thence into the North Sea). While enemy torpedo bombers and heavy bombers
would pose a greater threat to the transit during daylight than during darkness,
enemy aircraft would encounter very effective AA defenses by the Brest Group
and German fighters.74
The main threats to the Brest Group during its transit of the Strait of Dover
would be torpedo bombers and torpedo boats. The German planners believed
that the enemy enjoyed tactically favorable conditions for the employment of
torpedo bombers and torpedo boats in the eastern part of the Channel (between
Étaples-sur-Mer and Dunkirk), where his coastal radars could detect the German
ships. The enemy torpedo boats were based in that area, and night attacks even
by enemy torpedo aircraft could be expected. Despite all the jamming efforts the
Germans intended to carry out, their ships could not count on remaining undetected during that part of the transit. Hence, this section of the route “must be
transited during the daylight.”75
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Thus, Admiral Ciliax’s initial intent was to sail out from Brest at 1630 on 11
February (X-day). From then until about 2020, the Brest Group would sail on
a deceptive course at twenty-five knots. Having turned onto its true course,
the group would pass the latitude of Cherbourg at about 0415 on 12 February,
Terschelling at 1900 (sundown), and Borkum (in the East Frisian Islands) at
2100.76
However, the final plan envisaged the Brest Group casting off at 2030 on 11
February.77 Ushant would be passed at 2400. By cruising at twenty-five knots,
aided by the strong following current, the Brest Group would pass the latitude
of Dieppe at sunrise and the Strait of Dover at 1230, shortly after high water. By
sundown on X+1, the larger part of the Brest Group would reach a position off
Egmond aan Zee, Netherlands.78
Achieving Surprise
Perhaps most important to the success of Operation CERBERUS was the factor of
surprise. The German intent was to sail undetected up the English Channel for
as long as possible; the longer the true German intent was not recognized, the
less time the enemy would have to react. Yet surprise should have been almost
impossible to achieve, given the highly unfavorable geographic situation and the
enemy’s ability to monitor movements in the Channel. However, the Germans
were highly creative in combining diverse tactical, technical, and organizational
measures to enable them to surprise the enemy; most important of these was
extensive jamming of British radars.79
Given the assumed range of the British land-based sea-target radars of thirtyfive nautical miles, the most dangerous area during the proposed penetration
was between the Somme River estuary and Dunkirk; the earlier part of the route,
from Brest to the Somme estuary, runs no closer than forty nautical miles from
the English coast, preventing land-based radars from detecting the Brest Group
there. The Germans would be able to track the Brest Group using Ortunggeräte
(location devices—their equivalent of RDF) on the island of Guernsey and near
Cherbourg. The chief of MND requested installation of such a device at middistance between Fécamp and Dieppe. The Germans could conduct continuous
tracking of their ships with their own location devices in the area between the
Somme estuary and Dunkirk. The MND chief also intended to have installed on
board the flagship (Scharnhorst) a DeTe-Erkennungsgerät (radar detector). The
flagship also would have one radar jammer installed aboard, operating on the
wavelength of the enemy’s sea-target devices. The MND chief promised that ten
radar jammers against the enemy’s coastal sea-surface radars would be installed
on the Channel coast by mid-February 1942. Both the Kriegsmarine and the
Luftwaffe would conduct radar jamming simultaneously.80
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Besides CERBERUS, the Germans used five different code words (KORSIKA,
MANDARINE, GANGES, TORERO, and LABYRINTH) to enhance the secrecy of
various aspects of the pending operation, and they changed these code words
often.81 To preserve secrecy, Admiral Ciliax directed that knowledge of the operation order be limited to the smallest number of people. Orders to the destroyers and torpedo boats would be issued only a short time before sailing out. The
S-boats and Security Forces of Naval Group Commands West and North would
be provided only the information necessary to execute their tasks.82 To maintain
secrecy with regard to their preparations, the Germans conducted repeated mine
sweeps, covering the entire route through the English Channel. This also helped
to maintain secrecy even among the forces involved in the operation; the flotillas
were given some pretext when ordered to conduct sweeps of small portions of the
route, while being kept ignorant of the overall plan. Any minefields located during this process were swept away or else the route was changed to avoid them.83
To enhance the secrecy of Operation CERBERUS, preparatory measures were
kept to a minimum. However, SKL possibly exposed the intent when it ordered
some tankers to be moved out of the area of Naval Group Command West on 4
February. A serious breach of security occurred on 16 January 1942, when an
officer from Gneisenau informed a shipyard worker in Kiel that the ship subsequently might undergo further dry-docking in that port, and that the shipyard
already was prepared for its arrival. Whether this officer actually had knowledge
of the intent or simply was chattering thoughtlessly—or both—is unknown.84
As part of ensuring operational security by keeping the circle of those “in the
know” small, only the commanding officers of the three heavy ships and some
staff officers were informed about the entire operation.85 Others were told that
the purpose of the sortie was to conduct a joint exercise with the Luftwaffe south
of Brest; targets and tugs were directed to waters off Saint-Nazaire for gunnery
practice, and A/S patrols were conducted in the same area. Supposedly, the ships
would leave Brest after sunset on 11 February, carry out their exercises between
La Pallice and Saint-Nazaire on 12 February, then return to Brest on the night
of 12/13 February. The usual small numbers of personnel from the ships’ crews
were sent on leave.86
Most staff officers were led to believe that some valuable units would be moved
through the Channel—from east to west, not west to east.87 However, some officers in the Brest Group began to speculate (correctly) about the true purpose
of the pending sortie. Senior Commander Hans-Jürgen R. Reinicke, Admiral Ciliax’s chief of staff, decided to put a stop to these rumors with an unusual trick. He
persuaded an officer in Paris to send a fake invitation from Admiral Saalwächter,
Commander, Naval Group Command West, to all captains and commanders
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in his command for a dinner on 12 February. This would require them to leave
Brest on 11 February. The invitation was handled through the ships’ offices in
unclassified form and was received and answered quite seriously; it proved to be
“a wonderful remedy against rumors and suspicions.”88
The Luftwaffe’s success depended on the enemy not becoming alarmed by a
large-scale transfer of fighters. The 3rd Air Fleet’s planning to support the Brest
Group stipulated that “only the circles of people who must without question have
knowledge of it in order to carry out their work are to be initiated into the real
aim of the undertaking.”89 Other members of the 3rd Air Fleet who took part in
the operation were told that a merchant ship with very important cargo was to
transit the Channel from east to west.90
The Route
Generally, the following three conditions had to be satisfied in selecting a route
for the Brest Group: (1) passing over deep water to minimize the danger from
contact mines; (2) as far as possible, remaining beyond the effective range of
enemy radars; and (3) traveling at high speed to shorten the transit time.91 The
route also should be navigationally simple. These factors were intertwined—for
instance, routing the ships over deep water would allow the Brest Group to sail at
high speed, and it would reduce the danger from moored and ground magnetic
mines.92 The danger from acoustic mines needed to be taken fully into account
as well. The movement had to be carried out in several stages because enemy
torpedo-boat and torpedo-bomber attacks and difficult navigational conditions
could be expected.93
The resultant route was determined jointly by the commander of battleships
and Naval Group Command West staffs. The route ran some 30.5 nautical miles
west of Ushant and then over deep water to a point in the estuary of the Somme
River. The distance to be traveled from Brest to that point was some three hundred nautical miles, or eleven hours of steaming. Even though the route ran close
to the French coast, the water was in fact deep: between sixty-five and ninetyeight feet (twenty to thirty meters). The route passed to the eastward of Vergoyer
Bank; past Boulogne, at three nautical miles distance; and around Cap Gris-Nez,
at a distance of only one and a half nautical miles, between Sandettié and Outer
Ruytingen. Before the Strait of Dover the route would keep the ships some thirtyfive nautical miles away from England’s coast, but after that point it would run
within the effective range of the enemy coastal radars.94
The Weather
Weather conditions played a major role in German planning for the operation.
The ideal weather (for their purposes) would be conditions bad enough to make
it difficult for the enemy to employ his torpedo forces—boats and, especially,
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bombers. On the other hand, such weather would not facilitate German employment of screening forces and fighter aircraft.95 This was a very complex problem,
because weather conditions ideal for the Brest Group and its screening forces
were diametrically opposite to those ideal for the employment of the 3rd Air
Fleet’s aircraft. Ideal conditions for the Luftwaffe would be to have weather over
southeast England that was so bad it prevented British aircraft from operating,
or at least hindered them, while simultaneously the conditions prevailing over
airfields in France and the Low Countries were favorable for taking off and
landing.
For the Kriegsmarine, the main weather requirements were a lack of fog (so
the big ships could proceed at high speed), a low sea state (for the sake of the
torpedo boats and S-boats), and following winds.96 Good weather and visibility
were favorable for navigation and friendly air cover, and therefore unfavorable to
enemy attempts to conduct air reconnaissance of and aerial attacks on German
surface forces. Bad weather conditions would enhance the chance of the Brest
Group’s movement going unobserved and make it more difficult for the enemy
to employ his light forces; however, they also would reduce the effectiveness of
the efforts of Security Forces West.97
Escorts
The transit would require the use of a relatively large number of escorts—for
instance, more than those needed to screen German convoys traveling along the
French Atlantic coast. Owing to the danger from mines, the Brest Group had to
sail neatly lined up in a column, enhancing the threat from torpedo bombers and
torpedo boats; this factor required doubling the usual number of escorts. However, Admiral Ciliax believed that, except in the area around Brest itself, there was
little likelihood of encountering enemy submarines.98
Both Saalwächter and Ciliax agreed that for a group of two heavy ships, at least
twelve escorts (four to six in the inner screen and the remainder in the outer screen)
would be required, and at least sixteen escorts (six to eight in the inner screen and
the remainder in the outer screen) for a group of three ships.99 The inner screen
would be composed of destroyers and torpedo boats, while the outer screen would
consist of S-boats. In addition, during daylight hours Admiral Ciliax would be able
to count on support from all available S-boats in the area of transit.100
Mines
The mine situation was an important factor in the planning for the redeployment
of the battleships through the Channel. A data point for comparison was a different confined area especially threatened with mines: the German route through
the southeastern part of the warning area in the German Bight. In that area, on
10 November 1941, a Swedish steamer had been sunk.101
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The Operations Department of SKL noted that the enemy could not mine
certain parts of the Strait of Dover, because he had to use routes there himself;
however, in addition to the mine barriers laid earlier in the Strait of Dover, the
enemy laid an additional barrier northwest of the Outer Ruytingen Channel.
Hence, it was necessary to mark searched routes with buoys.102
GERMAN PLANS
In planning the redeployment of the Brest Group, the Germans used their experience in redeploying the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper from the German Bight to
Brest in November 1940. That experience had shown that the number of destroyers and boats available always ended up being smaller than planned, because of
mechanical malfunctions. In the earlier instance, air cover was provided from
sunrise to darkness by at least six fighters; during the night, heavy fighters were
used. Additional strong fighter units were kept in a state of high readiness in the
coastal area in case of an attack by strong enemy surface forces. For deception,
one training cruiser (Nürnberg) was deployed off the Norwegian coast; the aim
was to make the enemy believe that the cruiser would attempt a northern penetration maneuver (through the Greenland–Iceland–Scotland passages).103
The Germans developed separate but highly coordinated naval and air plans
for their redeployment of the Brest Group. In line with standard German practice, Admiral Saalwächter issued an operational instruction and an operation
order for Operation CERBERUS, while Admiral Ciliax issued only an operation
order. Field Marshal Sperrle issued an operation order for the employment of
his Luftwaffe units in support of the Brest Group, code-named DONNERKEIL
(THUNDERBOLT).
In his operational instruction, issued on 1 February, Admiral Saalwächter
specified that the Aufgabe (task) of the Brest Group was to “penetrate” the English Channel to the homeland during the new moon period of February 1942.
The Brest Group would consist of two battleships (Gneisenau and Scharnhorst)
and one heavy cruiser (Prinz Eugen). It would be escorted by the 5th Destroyer
Flotilla of six destroyers. Screening forces consisted of the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Tboat Flotillas (T-flotillas) and the 2nd, 4th, and 6th S-boat Flotillas (see sidebar).
Both escort and screening forces were under the temporary tactical control of the
Leader of Destroyers.104
Admiral Saalwächter directed that the operation would be executed when at
least one battleship was ready for breakout; it would be canceled if only the heavy
cruiser was ready to sail out. In a case in which the sailing out from Brest (X-day)
was delayed for only a short time, the operation still would be executed; if that
delay stretched to more than two hours, however, the Brest Group would not
sortie until a new code word was issued.105
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GERMAN NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE FOR OPERATION CERBERUS
CINC, German Navy; Head, Naval High Command;
Chief, Naval Warfare Directorate
(Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, Berlin)
Fleet Commander
(General Admiral Otto Schniewind)
Naval Group Command West
(General Admiral Alfred Saalwächter, Paris)
Commander, Battleships
(Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax)

THE BREST GROUP
Commander, Brest Group
(Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax, in Scharnhorst)
2 battleships: Scharnhorst, Gneisenau
1 heavy cruiser: Prinz Eugen
Leader of Destroyers
(Commodore Erich Bey, in Z-29)
5th Destroyer Flotilla, 6 destroyers: Richard Beitzen
(Z 4), Paul Jacobi (Z 5), Friedrich Ihn (Z 14),
Hermann Schoemann (Z 7), Z-25, Z-29

SCREENING FORCES
Leader of Torpedo Boats
(Captain Hans Bütow, Scheveningen, The Hague)
2nd Torpedo-Boat Flotilla (T-flotilla) (Le Havre): T-2, T-4,
T-5, T-11, T-12
3rd T-flotilla (Dunkirk): T-13, T-14, T-15, T-16, T-17
5th T-flotilla (Vlissingen): Kondor, Falke, Seeadler, Iltis,
Jaguar
2nd S-boat Flotilla (IJmuiden), 10 boats: S-29, S-39,
S-53, S-62, S-70, S-103, S-104, S-105, S-108,
S-111
4th S-boat Flotilla (Boulogne), 9 boats: S-48, S-49, S-50,
S-51, S-52, S-64, S-109, S-110, S-107 [no
crew]
6th S-boat Flotilla (Ostend), 8 boats: S-18, S-19, S-20,
S-22, S-24, S-69, S-71, S-101

SECURITY FORCES WEST
(Commodore Friedrich Ruge, Paris)
Forces that took part in the operation consisted of 21
M-boats, 22 R-boats, 21 luggers, 7 fishing
steamers (FDs), 9 mine barrage breakers; for
A/S duties: 21 luggers and submarine chasers
They were organized as follows:
1st M-flotilla (6 modern M-boats) (probably from the
Baltic, assigned here only for duration of
CERBERUS)
2nd M-flotilla (8 modern M-boats) (Brest)
5th M-flotilla (3 modern M-boats) (probably from the
Baltic)
12th M-flotilla (7 fishing trawlers) (Brest)
2nd R-flotilla (10 R-boats) (probably from the Baltic)
3rd R-flotilla (5 R-boats) (Boulogne)
4th R-flotilla (7 R-boats) (Boulogne)
18 beacon boats (16 outpost patrol boats, 2 R-boats)

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss3/1

128

Naval War College: Summer 2021 Full Issue

VEGO

123

SECURITY DIVISIONS
2nd Security Division (Souverain-Moulin, near Boulogne)
3rd R-flotilla, 4th R-flotilla, 36th R-flotilla, 38th R-flotilla
15th Outpost Patrol Boat (Vp) Flotilla, 18th Vp-flotilla
4th Mine Barrage Breaker Flotilla
3rd Security Division (Brest)
2nd M-flotilla, 12th M-flotilla, 40th M-flotilla
8th R-flotilla
14th Submarine Chaser (U-J) Flotilla
2nd Vp-flotilla, 7th Vp-flotilla
6th Mine Barrage Breaker Flotilla
4th Security Division (La Rochelle)
8th M-flotilla, 16th M-flotilla, 42nd M-flotilla
4th Vp-flotilla
2nd Mine Barrage Breaker Flotilla
18 beacon boats (10 FDs, 2 R-boats, 5 whalers, 1 pilot
boat)

NAVAL GROUP COMMAND NORTH
(General Admiral Rolf Carls, WilhelmshavenSengwarden)

SECURITY FORCES NORTH
(Rear Admiral Eberhard Wolfram, WilhelmshavenSengwarden)
1st Security Division (Utrecht-Oudenrijn)
3rd M-flotilla, 6th M-flotilla, 17th M-flotilla, 18th Mflotilla, 31st M-flotilla
5th R-flotilla
1st Mine Barrage Breaker Flotilla
8th Vp-flotilla, 11th Vp-flotilla, 12th Vp-flotilla
11th U-J-flotilla
2nd Antiaircraft Hunter Flotilla

SECURITY FORCES EAST
(Rear Admiral Herbert Stohwasser, Aalborg, Denmark)
3rd M-flotilla, 19th M-flotilla
3rd Mine Barrage Breaker Flotilla
9th Vp-flotilla, 10th Vp-flotilla, 17th Vp-flotilla, 19th
Vp-flotilla
1 net obstacle unit (2 net layers, 1 net lighter, 2 netlaying tenders)
1 training ship

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
4 tankers: Heligoland (1), Wilhelmshaven/Jade (2),
Wesermünde (1)
1 supply ship (Heligoland)
17 seagoing tugs: Vlissingen (2), Hoek van Holland (4),
Den Helder (2), Ems-Borkum (2), Jade (2),
Heligoland (3), Wesermünde (2)
Sources: “Operationsbefehl des Befehlshabers der Schlachtschiffe für Operation GANGES,” p. 12; Marinegruppenkommando
West, “Operative Weisung für Marsch der Brestgruppe durch
den Kanal nach Osten,“ p. 29; “Brennstoffbereitstellung,”
Anlage 2 in “Operationsbefehl des Befehlshabers der Schlachtschiffe für den Marsch der Brestgruppe,” p. 85; “Verteilung der
Seeschlepper,” Anlage 3 in “Operationsbefehl des Befehlshabers der Schlachtschiffe für den Marsch der Brestgruppe”;
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Befehlshaber der Sicherung West, “Aufstellung der B.S.W.—
Streitkräfte,“ pp. 112–14; Lohmann and Hildebrand, “Marinegruppenkommandos Ost-Nord-West,” pp. 40-3, 40-6; Lohmann and Hildebrand, “Sicherungsstreitkräfte,“ pp. 61-3, 61-4,
61-6, 61-7; Giermann, Schnellbootseinsätze der Kriegsmarine
im Westraum 1942–43, p. 13; Gerhard Hümmelchen, Die
deutschen Schnellboote im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Hamburg/Berlin/Bonn: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1996), pp. 65–66; Hans Frank,
Die deutschen Schnellboote im Einsatz: Von den Anfängen bis
1945 (Hamburg/Berlin/Bonn: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 2006), p. 56.
Note: Particulars given in this sidebar are based on the sources
listed here. They may not align exactly with the particulars given
in the text, as that information is based on British and German
intelligence sources. The former reflects what we know now; the
latter reflects what the combatants thought they knew then.

Admiral Saalwächter’s operational instruction specified the following timeline
for passage through the selected points on the route:
X-day 2400

Ouessant (Ushant)

X+1 0600

Cap de la Hague

X+1 0930

Point Q(uatsch) (latitude 50° N, longitude 00°30′ E)

X+1 1300

Point Ä(rger) (latitude 51°05′ N, longitude 01°45′ E)

X+1 1630

Boundary-crossing point from Naval Group Command West
to Naval Group Command North106

The Brest Group would be screened by destroyers and torpedo boats. The
S-boats would be employed for defense against enemy MTBs.107 Long-range
gun batteries under the commander of the Pas de Calais sector were directed to
open suppression fires against enemy batteries during the passage of the Brest
Group.108 Air cover would be provided by Jafü 2, Jafü 3, and Jafü of the Deutsche
Bucht (German Bight). Reconnaissance would be conducted by the 3rd and 5th
Air Fleets. Sea search and rescue would be conducted by the 3rd Air Fleet and the
Luftwaffe’s Befehlshaber Mitte (Commander, Center), the command in charge of
Germany’s air defenses, established in March 1941 and located in Berlin.109
In his operation order to Ciliax, issued on 4 February, Saalwächter stated that
the task was “execution of the East March [Ostmarsch] with full employment and
use of high speed during new moon period.” (Note that the wordings describing
the task used in the operational instruction and the operation order were not
identical.) On 6 February, Saalwächter sent to Ciliax annex 7 of his operation
order, listing the composition of the minesweeping forces tasked to support the
Brest Group. Specifically, on X-day the 1st, 2nd, and 12th M-flotillas and the 4th
Räumboote (small minesweeper) Flotilla (R-flotilla) would take up their positions
in their assigned sectors of the route. In case of bad weather, the 5th M-flotilla
would replace the 4th R-flotilla and be put in immediate readiness at Boulogne;
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss3/1
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at the same time, the 3rd R-flotilla would be put in immediate readiness at Calais.
An attempt would be made to have in readiness two fishing steamers each at Cherbourg, Le Havre, Fécamp, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, and Ostend.110
Admiral Ciliax’s operation order for Operation GANGES (one of the alternate
code words used for the breakout operation) was issued on 4 February (it was
eighteen pages long, with some one hundred pages of appendices).111 In the paragraph titled “Information on the Enemy,” Ciliax wrote that the enemy would use
aircraft to attack the Brest Group with bombs and torpedoes. He also expected
night attacks by radar-fitted enemy aircraft. Yet the Germans were not overly
concerned about the enemy air attacks; they believed that their ships, accompanied by an effective destroyer screen and air cover and sailing at high speed,
would make difficult targets.112
The time of greatest danger for the Brest Group would be the afternoon of X+1.
Attacks by light forces would follow if the enemy learned about the movement of
the Brest Group. Ciliax anticipated that the enemy destroyers would be encountered
in the area north of Brittany and north of the Seine River estuary. East of longitude
01° W he expected attacks by enemy MTBs from their operating bases at Dover and
Ramsgate. In the night of X+2 (13/14 February), the enemy light forces could be
expected to attack the Brest Group, seeking to reduce its speed of advance.113
In his operation order, Ciliax pointed out the danger from enemy mines. He
stated that control of the entire route was not possible, because of an insufficiency
of minesweeping forces. And no protection was possible against the enemy’s
Zahlkontaktminen (moored mines fitted with contact counters).114
Admiral Ciliax estimated, correctly, that the danger of attack by the enemy’s
heavy surface forces was low. The extent of the enemy-mined area (the so-called
East Wall) and the German-mined area (the West Wall), plus additional enemy
mines laid in the Hoofden area, would pose difficulties for the employment of
enemy heavy forces. Ciliax also took into account the possibility of fire from
enemy coastal gun batteries; although Ciliax did not exclude the possibility of a
stray hit occurring, he believed fire from such guns would be inaccurate because
of the long distances to the German ships.115
In contrast to the operational instructions issued by Naval Group Command
West, Ciliax’s order initially contained thirteen code-named waypoints within
the area of Naval Group Command West and three waypoints within the area
of Naval Group Command North. After the Brest Group sailed out, the 5th
Destroyer Flotilla would join it; after sunrise on X+1, the 2nd T-flotilla from Le
Havre and the 3rd from Dunkirk would join them at Point Q. At 1300 on X+1,
the 5th T-flotilla, from Vlissingen, and the 4th S-boat Flotilla, based at Boulogne,
would join in two groups some 6.5–7.5 miles from Point Y (latitude 50°23.2′ N,
longitude 01°09.3′ E).116
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Ciliax’s operation order stated that the 3rd Security Division would secure
the Brest Group’s sailing out from Brest and its transit to Point Rosa 30 (latitude
48°28.6′ N, longitude 05°14.2′ W). It would provide defense against enemy submarines, aircraft, and surface forces up to fifteen nautical miles westward and
northward from Brest.117 Security Forces West envisaged employing the following minesweeping elements in support of the Brest Group: the 1st (six modern
M-boats), 2nd (eight modern M-boats), 5th (three modern M-boats), and 12th
M-flotillas (seven fishing trawlers); and the 2nd (ten R-boats) and 4th (seven Rboats) R-flotillas. The planners precisely determined the time frame and area for
each minesweeping flotilla to perform its duties.118
For navigational support, the Brest Group would rely primarily on nine beacon
boats anchored at specified waypoints.119 An annex to the operation order was
issued on 7 February by Security Forces North (subordinate to Naval Group Command North). Among other things, this annex described the route from the boundary point of Naval Group Command West / Naval Group Command North to the
German Bight, the ports designated for refueling, and the locations of sea tugs.120
The 3rd Air Fleet operation order for providing support to the Brest Group
was issued on 6 February. It specified that the Brest Group would sortie on A–1
(identical to X–1) after the fall of darkness. The group’s planned position at 0840
on A-day would be some twenty-two miles northwest of Cap d’Antifer; at 1400,
32.5 miles northwest of Calais; at 1930, some twenty-two miles northwest of
IJmuiden. The group then would steer toward the Elbe estuary. On A-day the
3rd Air Fleet would take over responsibility for providing fighter protection,
conducting reconnaissance, and engaging enemy air and naval forces.121
Colonel Adolf Galland, Inspector of Fighters, was appointed to control all
Luftwaffe units assigned to provide support to the Brest Group and its escorting
forces. He was directly subordinate to Commander, Luftwaffe Mitte, in Berlin;
intermediate levels were excluded from controlling fighters.122 Temporarily subordinate to Galland were Jafü 2, Jafü 3, and Jafü Holland-Ruhrgebiet (Schiphol/
Amsterdam). The Luftwaffe’s German Bight commander and his staff at Jever
were tactically subordinate to Colonel Galland. Galland’s main command post
was at Le Touquet, with alternate command posts at Caen, France; Schiphol/
Amsterdam, Netherlands; and Jever, Germany.123 Scharnhorst embarked a small
staff detachment from Jafü 3, led by a colonel, to direct the fighter aircraft supporting the Brest Group.124
Fighters would be employed in accordance with the Merkblatt (fact sheet) issued by the General of Fighters, entitled “Schutz von Geleitzügen und Einheiten
der Kriegsmarine durch Jagd- und Zerstörerverbände” (“Protection of Convoys
and Units of the Kriegsmarine by Fighters and Heavy [Night] Fighter Units”).
Fighters would provide cover for the Brest Group from dawn to twilight, at
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which point night fighters would take over.125 During daylight, air cover would
be provided by fighters of the 2nd Jagdgeschwader (Fighter Wing—J.G. 2) and
J.G. 26 (see sidebar). Colonel Galland’s plan was to have at least sixteen fighters
constantly over the Brest Group during daylight hours.126 Each sortie would last
about thirty-five minutes and each wave of fighters would arrive ten minutes
before the other left; this would result in an overlap of preceding and successive
waves of about twenty minutes, during which thirty-two fighters would be providing air cover.127 The released squadron then would fly back to its airfield; it
would sortie again in the afternoon to provide additional air cover. Colonel Galland’s plan would ensure continuous employment of fighters from 0830 to 1810,
using a combined 176 fighters and heavy (night) fighters. In reserve was the J.G.
1.128 The Schwerpunkt (weight of the main effort) of the attacks by fighters would
be the enemy torpedo bombers. In a case of weather bad enough that fighters
could not operate, heavy (night) fighters would provide direct protection of the
Brest Group.129 Galland also planned to have a force of fighters on the ground,
ready to take off, that would be large enough to meet British air attacks.130 For distraction, Kampfflugzeuge (combat aircraft—bombers) of the IX Air Corps would
conduct a feint attack on Portsmouth.131 If the weather was bad enough to prevent
the employment of both fighters and heavy fighters, combat aircraft of the IX Air
Corps would provide direct protection of the Brest Group.132
On direct orders from Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, no Messerschmidt
Bf-109 fighter could fall into enemy hands; hence, they would not be allowed to
fly over the British coast. Before takeoff, all flight units would be briefed about
the probable position of friendly ships, but radio would not be used once aloft.
Any attacks within 120 kilometers (74.6 miles) of the French-Belgian coast
would be allowed only when the ships had been identified as hostile.133 AA
defenses in ports of refuge (Le Havre, Vlissingen, and Hoek van Holland) would be
reinforced.134
The Germans also prepared a plan for a comprehensive reconnaissance of the
North Sea and the English Channel, plus an area west to the Bristol Channel and
south to the Bay of Biscay. The flights involved would be conducted by the Air
Leader of the Atlantic, the 123rd Aufklärungsgruppe (Reconnaissance Group),
and the IX Air Corps, plus aircraft of the 5th Air Fleet (with headquarters in
Oslo, Norway). However, the reconnaissance plans of the 3rd Air Fleet were more
detailed than those cited in Ciliax’s operation order.135
BRITISH PLANS
The Admiralty consistently believed that the safest and thus most likely option
for the enemy battleships was for them to leave Brest and sail up through the
Channel. It believed (correctly) that after their long stay at Brest the ships could
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not be ready to operate as entirely effective fighting units; the enemy objective
must be to sail them to waters where they could “work up” in comparative safety.
Other options for the Germans were to break out into the Atlantic and work up
in open spaces there; proceed to the Mediterranean and work up at Genoa; or
return to German waters by breaking out into the Atlantic, then return to home
base by sailing through the passages north of Scotland. But breaking through the
Strait of Gibraltar or through the northern passages was a highly unfavorable option—the Brest Group would be at great risk of attack by either Force H (based at
Gibraltar) or the Home Fleet.136
British planning for a possible action to prevent the movement of enemy
ships from Brest to German home waters was conducted by two strategiclevel commands (the Admiralty and the Air Ministry), three operational-level
commands (Coastal Command, Fighter Command, and Bomber Command),
and three operational/tactical-level commands (Vice Admiral Dover, Commander in Chief [CINC] Nore, and the FAA). The Air Ministry had the lead
in planning.137
On 29 April 1941, the British prepared a plan, dubbed FULLER, to respond
to any German attempt to redeploy the Brest Group to home waters via the
English Channel. One of the main assumptions in Plan FULLER was that there
was a “strong probability that the enemy ships would seek to pass the Narrows
at Dover under cover of darkness.”138 Bomber Command’s Operation Order No.
133 of 1 May 1941 speculated that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau might try to reach
a German port by using the English Channel route. The move could take place
at any time, without prior warning. If passage were attempted by day, the ships
would be attacked by British surface ships and aircraft. During the passage up
the Channel the enemy would be able to provide a very high degree of fighter
protection by day. Unless suitable cloud cover was available, a British attack on
the ships would not be ordered except in areas where Fighter Command could
provide protection. These areas were anywhere east of Cherbourg to a line
between Dungeness and Boulogne, and in the Dungeness–Boulogne–Dunkirk–
North Foreland area. The planners considered it unlikely that the “enemy will
try to pass the Strait of Dover by daylight”; but if the Germans did so, “it will be
necessary to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the fighter screen in
the area of attack [to attack] with the largest possible striking force.” The “intention” (objective) was to attack Scharnhorst and Gneisenau using the maximum
possible striking force if they attempted to make the passage between Cherbourg
and Dunkirk by daylight.139
To provide fighter escorts to the heavy bombers, arrangements would be
made between No. 3 and No. 11 Groups when the execution order was issued.
If possible, attacks by heavy bombers would be coordinated with attacks by
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torpedo bombers of the Coastal Command. If heavy bombers were used in the
Strait of Dover area, the fighter screen would be provided for no longer than
forty-five minutes. During that period air groups would attack with as many
bombers as possible. These attacks would be conducted by single aircraft and
at the discretion of group commanders; no coordination of attacks would be
possible. Only Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would be attacked. No. 5 Group
would hold two squadrons of Hampden medium bombers in readiness. Aerial
mining would be conducted at dusk or during the night, depending on the
situation. Fighter escorts could not be provided for these mining operations,
but a fighter patrol would be maintained in the area if mining was conducted
at dusk.140
Coastal Command’s Operational Instruction No. 104 of 8 September 1941
stated that “there is possibility that major German naval units in Brest might
attempt to reach a German port using English Channel probably through the
Strait of Dover during darkness. Prior warning of such a move may not be received, but it is thought that it might be preceded by a reinforcement of enemy
fighter strength in the neighbourhood of Cherbourg to cover the warships.”
After transiting the Strait of Dover, the enemy ships would probably steer “to
pass through the Outer Ruytingen Channel. This may present a favourable opportunity for sea mining.”141
The intention of Coastal Command was to destroy major enemy naval units
during their passage from Brest to a German port. It would conduct dawn and
dusk reconnaissance off Brest and Cherbourg. The crossover ASV (air-tosurface) radar patrols off Brest would be established at the direction of Air Officer Commanding (AOC)–CINC Coastal Command. The Brest–Cherbourg area
would be reconnoitered in the morning, while afternoon reconnaissance of the
sea area off Cherbourg would be conducted to the longitude of Greenwich (0°).
Bombing would be conducted if and when the German ships reached the area
east of the Cherbourg peninsula. If practicable, attacks by torpedo bombers from
Thorney Island (near Portsmouth) would be synchronized with the high-altitude
bombing attacks to take advantage of the fighter cover provided for the bombers.
A fighter escort would be provided for the torpedo attack by three squadrons
of the Tangmere Wing. Torpedo bombers would rendezvous with fighters over
Tangmere (West Sussex, England). Fighter Command would provide a supporting wing to cover the withdrawal of the attacking force. If the enemy ships
survived the passage through the Channel and the Strait of Dover, they would be
attacked as soon as possible by Coastal Command’s torpedo bombers. Alternatively, the torpedo bombers might be required to support mining conducted by
two squadrons of Hampdens from Bomber Command. The executive order for
this operation was code-named EXECUTE MALTA. If the enemy ships attempted
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their transit through the strait during daylight, Fighter Command would provide
a protective force for a short time over the area, so that bombing and torpedo attacks could be conducted; if possible, the attacks would be “timed to take place
whilst fighter cover is available.”142
The Bomber Command operation order, issued on 1 May 1941, laid down
conditions for an attack on the enemy ships. The requirements included a suitable cloud cover in any area where Fighter Command could not be expected to
operate. The original Air Ministry letter warned about the possibility of a daylight passage through the Strait of Dover.143 According to Plan FULLER, the degree
of combat readiness the bomber force was to maintain was left at the discretion
of CINC, Bomber Command.144
In its order, Fighter Command stated that the intention was to protect aircraft
of the Bomber and Coastal Commands while they attacked major enemy naval
units on passage between Cherbourg and a point south of the island of Walcheren. For Operation FULLER / MINOR FULLER, the plan was to concentrate fighter
squadrons in the Tangmere area, including squadrons from No. 12 Group. No.
11 Group wings at Tangmere, Biggin Hill (near London), and Kenley (in Surrey;
also near London) would be the first to be employed. Headquarters Fighter Command directed No. 10 Group to have a wing of three squadrons available; this
group would be used to reinforce the other groups.145
Plan FULLER also envisaged the employment of forces commanded by Vice
Admiral Dover (Vice Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay) and CINC Nore (Admiral Sir
George D’Oyly Lyon). Admiral Ramsay’s plan was to launch torpedo attacks using
Swordfish torpedo bombers and MTBs, aiming at damaging the enemy ships while
they were within the effective range of the Dover coastal batteries. The MTBs would
be employed without air cover but with the support of MGBs. However, Admiral
Ramsay did not envisage employing the MTBs for daylight attacks.146 These attacks
would be followed by attacks by the Harwich destroyers off the Belgian coast.147
The First Sea Lord, Admiral Dudley Pound, was firmly against employing
British heavy ships in the southern part of the North Sea, where they would be
exposed to enemy air and torpedo-boat attacks. They also would risk damage
from minefields, whether British or German.148
GERMAN PREPARATIONS
The Germans carried out a series of diverse preparatory measures. Among the
most important was preparing the heavy ships for sea and combat after their
long sojourn in the shipyard. To enhance the ships’ AA defenses, they were fitted with additional 20 mm and 37 mm AA guns. To reduce the danger of fire
aboard, the Brest Group ships left ashore the aircraft they normally embarked,
given that they did not need them for reconnaissance or air defense. All three
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heavy ships were fitted with additional radio transmitters to ensure continuous
communication with fighter aircraft.149
Security Forces West conducted minesweeping of the intended route and
provided navigational support, consisting of radio beacons and beacon boats and
the preparation of emergency ports.150 Clearing enemy mines from the transit
route to the greatest extent possible required minesweeping night after night.151
However, Security Forces West did not have sufficient forces to neutralize enemy
mines completely; that task could be carried out only if minesweepers from the
Baltic were redeployed to the Naval Group Command West area.152 In addition,
an unfavorable ice situation in the Baltic resulted in the M- and R-flotillas arriving late to their assigned bases in the Naval Group Command West area.153 In the
Strait of Dover, the Germans could use only R-flotillas, which were not as capable
as M-flotillas. Because of the threat from the air, the Germans were able to sweep
mines only during the night. Neutralizing mines that were fitted with contact
counters and delaying mechanisms was especially challenging.154
Naval Group Command North was responsible for clearing mines from convoy routes to the latitude of Texel, Netherlands, and the northern extension of the
route beyond Texel. It also was responsible for clearing the southeastern end of
the German-mined area, dubbed Sperre II (Barrier II), and part of Sperre I. During mine-clearing operations conducted from 17 January to 12 February, only
thirty-two enemy ground mines were found in the area off Hoek van Holland and
on the convoy route in the German Bight.155 At about 2130 on 25 January, during
the deployment of the 5th Destroyer Flotilla from Vlissingen to Brest, destroyer
Bruno Heinemann (Z 8) ran into two mines and sank.156 The 4th R-flotilla swept
mines westward from the Strait of Dover; the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th R-flotillas within
the strait; and the 1st and 5th M-flotillas eastward from the strait. Mine clearing
was conducted even in bad weather, with wind strengths up to force 9 (out of
10) on the Beaufort scale. During the night of 11/12 February, the 1st M-flotilla
cleared a new minefield at the latitude of Berck-sur-Mer. It took only four boats
to clear a gap in the minefield.157
To conceal the true objective of the minesweeping from the enemy, German
agents spread the word that the activity constituted merely routine removal of
enemy mines. They also suggested that the Germans had laid a mine barrier that
needed checking. The deployment of the 5th Destroyer Flotilla to Brest to escort
the heavy ships also was linked to this minesweeping.158
The forces assigned to escort the Brest Group started to assemble at Brest during the last week of January. On 25 January, the 2nd T-flotilla, with five boats,
arrived; the next day, the 5th T-flotilla did so. On 28 January, the 5th Destroyer
Flotilla (Richard Beitzen [Z 4] and Paul Jacobi [Z 5]) also arrived. However, two
destroyers (Z-29 and Friedrich Ihn [Z 14]) required three to four days of exercises
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in the Western Area before they were ready for combat. In the evening on 8 February, one destroyer (Z-25) and two torpedo boats (Kondor and Jaguar) moved
from Vlissingen to Le Havre; the 2nd T-flotilla (five boats) from Brest to Le Havre;
the 3rd T-flotilla from Rotterdam to Dunkirk; two S-boats (S-51 and S-69) from
Ostend to Dunkirk; and two other S-boats (S-39 and S-103) from IJmuiden to Boulogne. On 9 February, two torpedo boats (T-15 and T-17) arrived in Dunkirk.159
The 3rd Air Fleet rehearsed its plan for providing air cover to the Brest Group
during the first days of February 1942. Luftwaffe aircraft flew 450 sorties under
simulated combat conditions; these flights apparently did not cause any suspicion
on the British side.160 At a 5 February meeting at the headquarters of Naval Group
Command West, the chief of staff of the 3rd Air Fleet stated that on A-day (12
February) fighters and heavy fighters would fly at low altitude to reduce the possibility of detection until the moment of contact with the enemy.161
Jamming of the enemy radars in the Strait of Dover area would be conducted
pursuant to the Naval Group Command West proposal. The 3rd Air Fleet would use
stations in the Cherbourg area to conduct jamming during the morning of A-day.
This would support the Luftwaffe’s IX Air Corps’s attacks on the English coast.162
From the beginning of February 1942, General Wolfgang Martini, the director of Luftwaffe communications, conducted experiments with a new method of
jamming British radars. He ordered the jamming of British coastal stations each
day at dawn. In the days leading up to the execution of Operation CERBERUS,
through 11 February, the duration of the jamming was increased gradually. The
British did not believe the interference was caused by systematic actions—German jamming—but instead that it resulted from atmospheric disturbances. This
cleverly executed plan was largely responsible for the delays in the British attacks.163 The Germans also jammed the radars of British aircraft.164
All the Luftwaffe actions in support of the fleet forces had to be approved by
Reichsmarschall Göring. The 3rd Air Fleet also insisted that it must have clear
orders about when and on whose orders the operation was to be terminated.165
BRITISH PREPARATIONS
The British preparations for preventing any attempt by the Germans to move
their heavy ships from Brest through the Channel included reevaluation of existing plans. On 8 February 1942, the Admiralty and Coastal Command conducted
a new appreciation of the situation. Other preparations included increasing the
combat readiness of various forces and extensive mining of enemy waters in the
Channel and the southern part of the North Sea.166
On 3 February, CINC Nore was directed to arrange for six destroyers with torpedoes to be in the Thames estuary on six hours’ notice, to operate under the orders of Vice Admiral Dover. Six MTBs also would be in readiness. Six Swordfishes
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were flown from Lee-on-Solent to Manston. One fast minelayer was placed under
Vice Admiral Dover and another under CINC Plymouth. The submarine HMS
Sealion was directed to join two other submarines already off Brest.167
Coastal Command organized three night patrols: (1) Stopper—off the Brest
entrance; (2) Line S.E.—between Ushant and Île de Bréhat; and (3) HABO—between Le Havre and Boulogne. All patrols were flown using ASV radar–fitted
Hudsons; theoretically they were capable of detecting a large ship at a range of
about thirty miles.168 Of three Coastal Command torpedo-bomber squadrons,
one was at Leuchars, in Scotland; it was tasked with conducting attacks on the
battleship Tirpitz. Another squadron was based at Saint Eval, in Cornwall; it covered the Bay of Biscay, and was put in readiness to conduct night attacks should
the Brest Group move up the Channel.169
On 4 February, the Admiralty sent a message to the Air Ministry to execute
Plan FULLER. Both services put their forces into a state of immediate readiness.170
Also on 4 February, Fighter Command directed No. 11 Group to coordinate
actions by its fighters and instructed No. 10 Group to operate according to its requests. On 8 February, Coastal Command directed the Beaufort torpedo-bomber
squadron at Leuchars to fly to Coltishall, Norfolk.171
From 4 to 9 February, all available bombers of Bomber Command were ordered to stand by each day as a striking force for the operation.172 However, on
6 February Air Vice-Marshal Jack Baldwin, the acting commander of Bomber
Command, asked the Air Ministry to be released from obligations under Plan
FULLER; he was told to ask the Admiralty, and on 7 February Baldwin sent his request there. Upon arrival, it reportedly caused “consternation” among naval planners.173 The Admiralty replied that the danger the German group represented increased as the tides became more favorable. After receiving the Admiralty’s reply,
Baldwin decided to assign two-thirds of his force to the bombing of Germany,
leaving only one hundred bombers for Plan FULLER. However, their state of readiness was increased to only four hours’ notice.174
On 5 February, an important convoy bound for the Middle East, dubbed
WS16, was formed up in the Clyde, to sail out on 16 February. British prime
minister Winston S. Churchill and Admiral Pound were concerned that the Brest
Group might attack that convoy as it passed down into the Bay of Biscay. Hence,
Pound sent the following message to CINC Home Fleet: “Possibility of Brest
ships coming out appreciated but sailing of W.S. 16 cannot be deferred. Request
you sail [battleship] Rodney to arrive to Clyde A./M. on February 15.” He also
sent a message to the commander of Force H: “As German battle cruisers may be
tempted to operate in Atlantic, Force H is to proceed to Clyde to arrive not later
than February 15. Object is to give protection to W.S. 16, which will sail under the
command of Admiral Sir James Somerville in [carrier] Formidable.”175
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Between 3 and 9 February, two 2,650-ton, thirty-nine-knot Abdiel-class minelayers (Manxman and Welshman), each capable of carrying some 160 mines,
laid about a thousand moored contact and magnetic mines in six fields between
Ushant and Boulogne, partly in deep water.176 One 820-ton coastal minelayer
(Plover), with a capacity of a hundred mines, laid moored magnetic mines in
deep water between Dover and Cap Gris-Nez and in the area where the British
believed the Germans would not conduct minesweeping.177 Bomber Command
laid sixteen fields of moored mines and 1,100 ground (magnetic influence) mines
off Terschelling.178 This area was selected because the enemy ships were bound
to pass by if they used the shortest route to home waters. The mines were laid in
deep water; the British believed the Germans might consider this area to remain
unmined, and hence would not waste time sweeping it.179
EXECUTION
The Germans started Operation CERBERUS as planned. On 11 February (X–1),
all the ships of the Brest Group still were camouflaged, but their aircraft were
on the pier so the French shipyard workers could see them. At 2030, Admiral
Ciliax issued an order to be ready for sailing out.180 On the same day, the Germans
recorded some sixty-seven enemy flights in the area of western France, with the
Schwerpunkt on Brest. Some thirty British bombers attacked Brest from 2035 to
2127. At 2040, Ciliax issued an air raid alert. This raid caused a planned delay in
the Brest Group sailing out until 2200.181
Finally, at 2245 on 11 February, the Brest Group, accompanied by six destroyers and three torpedo boats, sailed out from Brest (see map 1). The two-hour
delay in departure caused by the enemy air attack required the minesweeping
groups along the route to adjust their timetables.182 On the night of 11/12 February, full darkness lasted about twelve hours. This would have been sufficient to
transit only 360 nautical miles at a speed of thirty knots; nonetheless, the delay
in sailing out did not create a great problem, because the favorable tidal current
added to the ships’ speed over the ground.183
Admiral Ciliax intended to return to Brest if enemy aircraft or submarines observed his ships shortly after leaving port.184 Yet, for a variety of reasons—mostly
the malfunctioning of their radars—none of the enemy air patrols observed that
the Brest Group had left its harbor. In particular, Coastal Command’s reconnaissance aircraft on the western (Stopper) and central (Line S.E.) night patrols failed
to detect the Brest Group.185 Initially, the Brest Group sailed at seventeen knots
to Point 30a. At 0013 on 12 February (X-day), it increased speed to twenty-seven
knots. Ushant (Point Rosa 30) was passed at 0112.186
During the night of 11/12 February, winds were light and visibility was
very good, owing to a high-pressure area over the western part of the English
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Channel.187 The sea surface was smooth, with a light swell.188 The initial weather
forecast for 12 February was favorable for the Brest Group and the Luftwaffe’s
aircraft; nice weather, with a stiff breeze, would prevail in the English Channel in
the morning. However, after midday the wind would drop and the weather would
deteriorate gradually. This probably would result in low clouds and reduced visibility just as the Brest Group approached the Strait of Dover.189
By 0200, the Brest Group had passed the latitude of Ushant.190 At 0212, Admiral Ciliax informed the ships’ crews—for the first time—about the true purpose
of the operation. The Brest Group was screened by five destroyers and the 5th
T-flotilla, led by Commodore Bey.191 By the early morning of 12 February, winds
had increased out of the southwest, ahead of an approaching warm front (see
map 2).192 The weather was characterized by broken clouds, good visibility, and
a moderate sea state.193
At about 0530, the 1st M-flotilla discovered the newly sown enemy mines
some twenty nautical miles southwest of Boulogne; at the time, the Brest Group
was some five and a half hours away from that position.194 The area on both sides
of the swept channel had not been examined in recent months.195 One option was
for the Brest Group to avoid the newly discovered mined area; however, Commodore Ruge believed that an avoidance route would run the group over shallow
water, which was unsafe for the battleships. Hence, he directed the 1st M-flotilla
to return at 0700 to create a gap in the mine barrier.196 The Brest Group reached
the latitude of Cherbourg at 0615, and thereafter was joined by the 2nd and 3rd
T-flotillas and the 4th S-boat Flotilla.197 Up to that time, the Brest Group had
made good time, moving at thirty knots through the water, plus two more knots
over the ground resulting from the following tidal current.198
By the morning of X-day, the Brest Group was too far to the west for the RAF’s
eastern patrol (HABO) to sight it before the search was completed. The agreement between Commander, No. 11 Fighter Group, and Vice Admiral Dover
envisaged sending fighter aircraft from Hawkinge (near Folkestone) shortly after
dawn each morning to conduct early reconnaissance of the area between Ostend
and the Somme estuary (called the “Jim Crow” patrol). On the morning of 12
February, the British sent two Spitfires to patrol the area off the French coast
north of Le Havre; one of them patrolled the area off Boulogne. This aircraft
sighted enemy E-boats leaving the harbor, heading south; these E-boats were
joined off Berck-sur-Mer by another. Because of the radio silence ordered, this
aircraft returned to its base to report its observation. The second Spitfire fighter
reconnoitered the area between Cap Gris-Nez and Ostend. It reported the presence of eleven small vessels off Ostend and six similar vessels off Zeebrugge.199
During the morning and early forenoon hours of 12 February, the Germans
conducted extensive jamming of the enemy coastal radar chain. In addition, two
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Heinkel (He) 111 bombers fitted with jammers flew in the early morning parallel
to the southern English coast, including south of the Isle of Wight. Fighter Command sent a large number of fighters against what it presumed to be a squadron
of Luftwaffe aircraft. (A German jammer fitted on a single plane could simulate
the presence of twenty-five aircraft.) At the same time, one squadron of Junkers
(Ju) 88s carried out a relief attack against the port of Plymouth, flying undisturbed and suffering no losses.200
By 0800, the Brest Group already had been at sea some ten hours. Owing to the
strong following current, it had recovered most of the time lost initially. When
twenty-four boats joined the group at the latitude of Cap Gris-Nez, the size of
the screening force increased to almost sixty.201 Because of the need to maintain
radio silence, not until 0816 did Ciliax send a short signal about the position of
his group.202 At about 0842, the Messerschmidt (Me) 110 heavy (night) fighters
based at Abbeville started to provide air cover for the Brest Group. The German
torpedo boats and destroyers formed the outer protective screen for the group.203
After 0930, the air escort of the Brest Group shifted to Me-109 fighters, with
thirty the average number of aircraft at a time.204 By 1000, the Brest Group had
been joined by the 2nd and 3rd T-flotillas.205 By then it was only fifteen minutes
behind schedule.206
THE BREST GROUP IS DETECTED
At about 1030, a British air patrol off Le Touquet sighted some twenty to thirty
enemy ships sailing in a convoy—the Brest Group. This information was passed
immediately to Vice Admiral Dover and No. 11 Group. The patrol aircraft landed
at 1050. Another patrol aircraft identified Scharnhorst and Gneisenau at 1042.207
At 1105, the Brest Group was joined by the 4th S-boat Flotilla.208 Between 1126
and 1147, the Brest Group, sailing in a line column at a speed of only ten knots,
followed the 1st M-flotilla through the gap in the enemy mine barrier the flotilla
had cleared early that morning.209
BRITISH ATTACKS
After the Brest Group was detected, the British reacted quickly, executing Plan
FULLER. They mounted attacks with torpedo bombers of the FAA and Coastal
Command, MTBs, destroyers, the Dover coastal batteries, and heavy bombers of
Bomber Command (see map 3). None of these attacks scored any hit on the ships
of the Brest Group or its screening forces.
The major commanders on the British side were more concerned to “delay the
enemy in any way possible by immediate attack with any force available than to
risk losing the opportunity in the effort to arrange coordinated attacks.” Failure
to detect the Brest Group in a timely fashion was largely responsible for the lack
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of proper coordination among the attacks by various forces in the early stages of
the operation, whereas any reasonable prospect of success depended greatly on
having a coordinated plan for the employment of the aircraft available.210
Fleet Air Arm Attacks
The FAA had available only six old biplane Swordfish torpedo bombers (see
sidebar).211 Instructions for them to attack were received at 1130. The squadron
was to take off at 1220 and carry out its attack at about 1245.212 Coastal Command did try to coordinate the attacks by the Swordfishes with those by its more
capable Beaufort torpedo bombers; however, for some reason Admiral Ramsay
decided to use the Swordfishes independently.
The FAA appreciated fully the need for strong fighter protection. It had been
arranged that No. 11 Fighter Group would assign three squadrons (the Biggin
Hill Wing) to provide air cover and two squadrons (the Hornchurch Wing) to
escort the Swordfishes. The plan was to assemble the Swordfishes and fighters at
Manston (on the Isle of Thanet, in northeast Kent) at about 1225. However, because
of unforeseen events, that was not possible; only one fighter squadron arrived at
Manston on time, while the other two squadrons proceeded directly to the target
area. Nonetheless, the commander of the Swordfish squadron decided to take off
as planned at 1225, with his aircraft protected by only one squadron of Spitfires.
The Swordfishes proceeded in two flights of three. They located the enemy
ships some ten miles north of Calais. The Swordfishes flew at about eighty miles
per hour (mph), while the Spitfires were capable of 250 mph; hence it was difficult for the Spitfires to escort the Swordfishes. The Swordfishes fired their torpedoes at the enemy heavy ships but scored no hits. The enemy shot down all six
Swordfishes.213
Motor Torpedo Boat Attacks
The MTBs from Dover cleared the port at 1135 and sighted the enemy at 1223.
One MTB had engine trouble and fell astern, leaving four. They had no close escort from either fighters or MGBs (the latter cleared harbor some twenty minutes
after the MTBs). These four MTBs fired their torpedoes at the battle cruisers at
distances of four to five thousand yards.214 One MTB fired its torpedoes at Prinz
Eugen at a distance of about three thousand yards.215 All the torpedoes missed
their intended targets.
Three MTBs from Ramsgate cleared port at 1225.216 At 1215, the Brest Group
passed between Dover and Calais.217 At 1318, the MTBs sighted the enemy destroyers and S-boats. Their intent was to penetrate the enemy screen, then fire
their torpedoes. From 1320 to 1400, the German screening forces, primarily two
destroyers (Friedrich Ihn and Hermann Schoemann [Z 7]), engaged in combat
with the enemy MTBs.218 However, at about 1400 the commander of the British
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BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE FOR OPERATION FULLER
ROYAL NAVY
First Sea Lord, Admiralty; Chief of Naval Staff
(Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, London)

NORE COMMAND
(Admiral Sir George D’Oyly Lyon, Chatham)

Destroyers
16th Destroyer Flotilla
(Captain J. P. Wright, Harwich)
3 destroyers: Mackay, Whitshed, Walpole
21st Destroyer Flotilla
(Captain C. T. M. Pizey, Harwich)
3 destroyers: Campbell, Vivacious, Worcester

DOVER COMMAND
(Vice Admiral Bertram Ramsay, Dover)
8 MTBs
Dover MTB Flotilla
(Lt. Cdr. E. N. Pumphrey)
5 MTBs: Nos. 44, 45, 48, 219, 221
Ramsgate MTB Flotilla
(Lieutenant D. J. Long)
3 MTBs: Nos. 18, 32, 71
Dover
(Lieutenant P. F. S. Gould)
2 MGBs: Nos. 41, 43

FLEET AIR ARM
(Rear Admiral Clement Moody, Lee-on-Solent)
No. 825 Squadron: 6 Swordfishes

ROYAL AIR FORCE
Chief of the Air Staff
(Air Chief Marshal Charles Frederick Algernon Portal,
London)

BOMBER COMMAND
(Air Vice-Marshal Jack Baldwin, High Wycombe)
310 bombers operational, 240 bombers available
No. 3 Group (Exning, Suffolk)
No. 4 Group (Heslington Hall, York)
No. 5 Group (Morton Hall, Swinderby)

FIGHTER COMMAND
(General Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Stanmore)
550–600 fighters operational, in 34 squadrons (398
available)
No. 10 Group (Bentley Priory, Stanmore)
No. 11 Group (Hillingdon House, Uxbridge)
No. 12 Group (Watnall)

COASTAL COMMAND
(General Philip Joubert de la Ferté, Northwood)
40/31 Beauforts (number operational / number available)
No. 42 Leuchars (Scotland) (14/14)
No. 86 Saint Eval (Cornwall) (13/11)
No. 217 Saint Eval / Thorney Island (near Portsmouth)
(13/6)
607 Squadron (Manston): Hurricane fighter-bombers
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Sources: Admiralty and Air Ministry, Report of the Board of
Enquiry, pp. 9, 12, 15; “Naval Forces Engaged in Operations
against the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen, 12th
February, 1942,” app. A in “The Passage of the Scharnhorst,
Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen through the English Channel,
12th February, 1942,” Battle Summary No. 11, ADM 234/328,
UKNA, pp. 15, 20; Roskill, The Period of Balance, map 15.
Note: Particulars given in this sidebar are based on the sources
listed here. They may not align exactly with the particulars given
in the text, as that information is based on British and German
intelligence sources. The former reflects what we know now; the
latter reflects what the combatants thought they knew then.

attackers realized that the enemy screen actually was sailing astern of the heavyship squadron. Then the weather deteriorated and the MTBs returned to port
without launching their torpedoes.219
The German 3rd Air Fleet’s IX Air Corps operated west of the Isle of Wight.
Until 1315 its aircraft conducted reconnaissance and surveillance flights, partly
to protect the S-boats.220
Fires by Coastal Batteries
At 1318, the Margate batteries at Cliff, near Dover, opened fire on the Brest
Group.221 However, by 1333 the enemy ships were out of range, and at 1345 the
batteries ceased firing, having expended thirty-six nine-inch rounds.222 No hits
were scored.223
At 1330, the German batteries in the Calais area opened fire on the British
batteries.224 Battery Siegfried fired six 380 mm rounds, while Battery 1/725 fired
twelve 280 mm rounds.225
Destroyer Attacks
By coincidence, all six of the Harwich destroyers were exercising at sea when
the Brest Group first was detected. At 1156, a message sent to the commander of
the squadron directed it to proceed to attack, in two divisions. At 1300, Admiral
Ramsay informed the squadron commander that the enemy battle cruisers were
sailing at a higher speed than the twenty knots initially believed; therefore, the
only way to intercept the enemy off the Meuse River estuary was to cross the
mine barrier. At 1335, a lone Ju-88 sighted the three 16th Flotilla destroyers and
attacked them with bombs. At 1400, the destroyers passed beyond range of the
RDF station at Dover. Further reports on the enemy ships were received at the
Area Combined Headquarters at Chatham. With the Admiralty’s concurrence,
control of the destroyers was transferred to CINC Nore. At 1517, just when the
21st Destroyer Flotilla of three destroyers, also from Harwich, was directed to
turn to the southwest if the enemy ships had not been detected, visibility diminished from seven to four miles.
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At 1543, the 16th Destroyer Flotilla sighted the enemy ships at a distance of
four miles. The flotilla came under heavy fire from the enemy battleships and
escorting destroyers. One British destroyer fired a torpedo at the German ships
at a range of four thousand yards; another fired from three thousand. Four
minutes later, two British destroyers fired torpedoes at a range of 2,400 yards.226
The attack the British destroyers made was a very risky one. British bombers
were supposed to support the ships but never located them.227 It was lucky that
only one destroyer was damaged, albeit severely, and that it was able to return
safely to Harwich.228
Coastal Command Attacks
On the morning of 12 February, Coastal Command had in service thirty-six
Beaufort torpedo bombers; the seven on Thorney Island were the nearest to the
Brest Group, and AOC-CINC of Coastal Command decided that they would
carry out early attacks. Four Beauforts were in an advanced stage of readiness and
were supposed to fly to Manston and join the fighters, but they arrived too late.
Two Beauforts of the original formation of four landed at Manston at 1445. They
received information on the targets, then flew off on the attack. The weather was
bad, however, with rain and low visibility.229
At 1540, the aircraft dropped torpedoes from a distance of about one thousand yards at what pilots believed to be the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen. A second
formation of four Beauforts was ordered to proceed to Manston and then to the
target. They circled above Manston at 1500 and then set off for the target. Because
of the bad visibility they decided to carry out their attacks singly. Enemy fighters
attacked them and they encountered heavy AA fires from the ships. One Beaufort
was shot down; two other machines dropped their torpedoes but were unable to
observe the results.230
Between 0900 and 0915 on 12 February, fourteen serviceable Beauforts took
off from Leuchars. Because three aircraft did not have torpedoes, the entire
squadron was directed to fly to the station at North Coates (south of Hull)
to get torpedoes. However, that airfield was rendered unserviceable by heavy
snowfall.231 The same situation prevailed at Bircham Newton, where the squadron next was directed to land. Finally, the squadron was diverted to the fighter
base at Coltishall (in East Anglia), where it landed at about 1145 on 12 February. However, the torpedoes would have had to be brought from North Coates
to Coltishall, and that was not done.232 Because of engine problems with two
other aircraft, only nine out of fourteen Beauforts took off from Coltishall. The
squadron was directed to proceed to Manston to accompany five Hudson heavy
bombers. It landed at 1453 at Manston, then at 1534 took off with the Hudsons
and flew toward the target area.233
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Despite poor visibility, the Beauforts sighted enemy ships at 1604. Six Beauforts attacked and dropped seven torpedoes; the results were not observed, because of heavy enemy AA fire.234 Another twelve Beauforts sighted small craft but
failed to locate the main targets. Thirteen or fourteen torpedoes were dropped,
but the results were not observed.235
In the meantime, at 1220, all twelve Beauforts based at Saint Eval were directed
to fly to Thorney Island, and landed there at 1430. Fifteen minutes later, the detachment was ordered to take off and to join with the fighter escort at Coltishall
by 1700. As planned, all twelve aircraft arrived over Coltishall, but they found no
friendly fighters. The leader then decided to fly toward the enemy ships. By 1741,
the detachment was over the estimated position of the enemy ships, but visibility
was only a few hundred yards, it was raining, and darkness was near. Any chance
of carrying out a successful attack had vanished. The detachment returned to its
home base, but two machines were lost.236
Bomber Command Attacks
At 1127, Bomber Command received a report of detection of the Brest Group.
Only five minutes later, the Air Ministry informed all three subordinate major
commands that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been observed some sixteen
miles west of Le Touquet at 1105. Unusual enemy air activity also was reported.
A decision was made to use maximum force as early as possible to destroy the
enemy ships and aircraft—this “unique opportunity [was] to be exploited to the
utmost.”237 There were 310 bombers on the comprehensive list, but only some 240
were operationally available.238 These included one hundred bombers kept at four
hours’ readiness under Plan FULLER.239
At 1420, the first wave of seventy-three bombers drawn from all over the
country was sent to attack the enemy ships. No attempt was made to combine
this force into a single formation; instead, pilots headed out to sea toward the
enemy singly or in pairs, and all bombers attacked their targets individually.
First, general cover by fighters over the area was established. The first bombers
arrived over the target at about 1445, and attacks lasted until 1558. Scharnhorst
was sailing some thirty miles astern of the main formation. The weather in the
area was cloudy, with a ceiling at no more than two thousand feet but sometimes as low as seven hundred feet. The visibility was no more than one mile.
Overall, the weather conditions were very unfavorable for bombing.240
A second wave of some 134 bombers arrived at 1600 over the targets, in a
scattered formation owing to deterioration in the weather; the clouds had closed
and formed a solid overcast, it was raining, and visibility was less than 330 feet.
Even so, the weather over the French coast was sufficiently favorable to enable
German fighters to take off and land. The German fighters encountered the British bombers as the latter descended from the clouds to eyeball their targets, and
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shot down many of them. Together, the fighters and the AA defenses of the Brest
Group and its escorts prevented the enemy bombers from scoring any hits. These
encounters lasted until 1706.241
From about 1600 to 1900, the weather became more favorable for the attackers. Fighter protection of the Brest Group became even more difficult. Horizontal
visibility still was only 1.1–3.4 miles. Vertical visibility averaged 660 feet, facilitating British bomber attacks from the clouds at altitudes from 490 to 985 feet.242
At 1615, a third wave of thirty-five British bombers took off; at about 1750 they
reached their targets; at 1815 the last of them attacked, in darkness, rain, and
mist. No bomber of the third wave scored a hit either.243
In the meantime, at 1521 the Brest Group crossed the boundary between the
Naval Group Command West and Naval Group Command North areas (see
map 1). At 1531, Scharnhorst reported that it had run onto a ground mine.244
The ship took on a thousand tons of water and its port engine broke down.245
Admiral Ciliax shifted his flag to the destroyer Z-29.246 The Brest Group formation was broken up.247
At about 1745, an engine breakdown on Z-29 forced Admiral Ciliax to shift his
flag again, this time to the destroyer Hermann Schoemann. By then Scharnhorst
reported that it was making twenty-seven knots, despite its damage. At 2055,
the ships of the Brest Group suffered another mishap when Gneisenau ran into
a mine. The device ripped the ship’s bottom and damaged the propeller shaft.248
However, Gneisenau still was able to proceed at fifteen knots.249
At 2234, Scharnhorst reported hitting a second ground mine, off the Frisian
Islands.250 The ship was forced to stop, but some thirty minutes later was under
way again.251 After a consultation with SKL, it was decided that Gneisenau would
proceed via the Elbe to Kiel and Scharnhorst to Wilhelmshaven.252 At 2400,
Scharnhorst was traveling at twelve knots. Scharnhorst, Hermann Schoemann, and
later Z-29, plus several torpedo boats, sailed toward Jade, while Gneisenau and
Prinz Eugen headed to the Elbe River estuary and then to Brunsbüttel. The light
forces sailed to Heligoland.253
From 0157 to 0346 on 13 February, six British bombers flew into the German
Bight and over the waters off Jade, the Elbe estuary, and Heligoland. Their apparent intent was to prevent the German ships from entering the Elbe. However,
all their efforts to inflict significant damages on the Brest Group failed. After
Scharnhorst arrived at Wilhelmshaven at about 1250, Admiral Ciliax reported the
completion of Operation CERBERUS.254
RESULTS
The 3rd Air Fleet reported that a total of 406 aircraft (27 Me-110s, 125 Focke-Wulf
Fw-190s, and 254 Me-109s) were employed in support of the Brest Group on 12
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February.255 This was a much larger number of aircraft than the 250 machines
that were envisaged initially. Initial reports showed some seventy fighters missing; however, many of these landed at airfields in the Netherlands instead of their
home bases owing to the weather. Many fighters suffered greater damage while
landing than in combat.256 The German fighter losses in combat were given as only
seven fighters (four Bf-109s and three Me-109s).257 In addition, two bombers (one
Dornier 217 and one Ju-88) crashed on return to Germany. The Germans claimed
with certainty that their fighters had shot down twenty-six enemy aircraft (five
Spitfires, four Whirlwinds, six Swordfishes, four Hampdens, three Blenheims, two
Wellingtons, one Whitley, and one Hurricane), and probably had shot down thirteen others; in addition, AA defenses had shot down twenty-three enemy aircraft.258
Over some three-plus hours, 242 RAF bombers took off and attacked the
Brest Group, but the German fighters kept most of them away from their targets;
only thirty-eight British bombers sighted the enemy ships. Some bombers found
the ships initially but in trying to gain altitude lost them again. However, twelve
bombers were able to lay mines off the Elbe River estuary. Some fifteen bombers
were lost, and another crashed while landing at its base.259
On paper, Fighter Command had thirty-four fighter squadrons with 550–600
machines, but only 398 were available for combat and were employed, of which
102 carried out attacks on various naval vessels.260 Some twenty-one Spitfire
squadrons took part in the action, plus some Hurricanes.261
The British claimed that their fighters had shot down sixteen enemy fighters,
probably destroyed three more, and damaged seventeen. Two enemy torpedo
boats (Jaguar and T-3) were damaged by bombs. The British aircraft also sank
one six-hundred-ton vessel and one E-boat, while eight enemy escort vessels were
damaged. The British lost all six Swordfish torpedo bombers, one destroyer was
damaged heavily, and one MTB was cut to shreds. In these efforts, some thirteen
FAA officers and men were killed, and forty-three others suffered injuries.262
EPILOGUE
In the aftermath of Operation CERBERUS, the German plan was for both battleships and the heavy cruiser to deploy to Norway to be used to attack enemy
convoys to Soviet Russia. However, their deployments were delayed repeatedly
because of a series of accidents.
Scharnhorst was deployed initially to the Baltic to bring the ship up to a state
of combat readiness. However, in an exercise in early August 1942 the ship collided with a U-boat and suffered damages, which were repaired in September.
Then engine troubles kept Scharnhorst in home waters until early January 1943.
The ship’s planned deployment to Norway, in company with Prinz Eugen and five
destroyers, was aborted on 7 January because of the threat of British bombers.
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On 8 March, when poor weather grounded the enemy bombers, another attempt
was made, and Scharnhorst reached Bogen, near Narvik, on 14 March. But during its stay in Norway Scharnhorst suffered damage from an internal explosion
that required major repairs. Then lack of fuel prevented Scharnhorst from being
used in combat. Its first renewed action took place on 8 September 1943, when
it accompanied Tirpitz and ten destroyers in bombarding enemy (Norwegian)
coastal batteries, fuel tanks, and harbor facilities on Spitsbergen (Operation
ZITRONELLA). In its last action, Scharnhorst, accompanied by five destroyers, was
sunk in the battle of the North Cape on 26 December 1943; only thirty-six out of
the crew of nearly two thousand survived.263
Gneisenau never reached Norway. The repairs of the damages caused by the
mine on 12 February were completed on 26 February. However, during the night
of 26/27 February the ship was damaged heavily by bombs in a British air raid
on Kiel. Gneisenau was towed to Gotenhafen (Gdynia, Poland, today) on 2 April
1942, but the necessary repairs would have been so extensive that they never
were completed. Gneisenau was decommissioned on 1 July 1942 and scuttled at
Gotenhafen’s entrance on 23 March 1945.264
The heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen also had an unhappy subsequent history.
In the aftermath of Operation CERBERUS, on 21 February 1942, together with
the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer and five destroyers, Prinz Eugen sailed for
Trondheim, Norway. Only two days later it was torpedoed by a British submarine. The ship was able to limp back to Kiel on 16 May, where it remained in
dry dock until October 1942. Thereafter to the end of war it operated in home
waters. It served as a training/experimental ship until June 1944, then was returned to combat service, used to support German troops on the Baltic coast.
On 15 October 1944, it collided with the light cruiser Leipzig. Repairs were
completed within a month. On 20–21 November 1944, Prinz Eugen bombarded
Soviet positions on the Sworbe Peninsula (Sõrve Peninsula, Estonia, today).
In mid-January 1945, it bombarded Soviet troops on the Samland Peninsula,
Königsberg (Kaliningrad, Russia, today). In March, Prinz Eugen again was in
action, firing on Soviet positions at Gotenhafen, Hela (Hel, Poland, today),
and Danzig (Gdańsk, Poland, today). Prinz Eugen sailed from Swinemünde
(Świnoujście, Poland, today) to Copenhagen, Denmark, in April 1945. After
the end of the war, it was awarded as a prize to the United States; the U.S. Navy
commissioned it as Prinz Eugen (IX 300). In January 1946, it sailed to Boston
and then to the Pacific. It served as a target ship in the atomic bomb tests at
Bikini Atoll in July 1946 (Operation CROSSROADS). It survived two such tests;
although heavily damaged, unlike other target ships it remained afloat. It finally
sank in December 1946.265
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CONCLUSION AND OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
The redeployment of the two German battleships and one heavy cruiser from
Brest to home waters was planned meticulously and executed almost flawlessly.
Despite damages inflicted by mines, both battleships reached their ports in the
German Bight. The British did not detect the sorties of the Brest Group in a
timely fashion nor the group’s subsequent movement through the Channel until
too late. In contrast, British planning was highly fragmented, as were British attacks on the Brest Group. Hence, it hardly was a surprise that the British naval
and air forces failed to destroy, or even to inflict heavy damage on, the Brest
Group.
The German Kriegsmarine was highly centralized but not necessarily soundly
organized. Although the fleet commander nominally was in charge of all surface
forces, the establishment of the naval group commands weakened his position
greatly; in effect, his responsibility as an operational commander was transferred
to the naval group commanders. The fleet commander’s ability to control his
forces effectively also was affected adversely because he and his staff were located
on board a battleship instead of ashore.
The German naval command organization at the operational level for Operation CERBERUS generally was sound. Admiral Saalwächter was a supported
operational commander, while Admiral Carls was a supporting commander.
Admiral Ciliax was an operational-tactical commander; in the operational chain
of command, he temporarily was subordinate to Admirals Saalwächter and Carls.
Field Marshal Sperrle, as the 3rd Air Fleet commander, was subordinate to the
CINC of the Luftwaffe, Reichsmarschall Göring, who had a strong tendency to
interfere with the responsibilities and authority of subordinate operational and
even tactical commanders. With the exception of the middle level of commanders,
the Luftwaffe generally was unwilling to cooperate closely with the Kriegsmarine;
however, with Operation CERBERUS the situation was different, because Hitler
demanded that the Luftwaffe provide full support to the navy. In contrast to common practice, the Luftwaffe’s high command assigned a single commander, Colonel Galland, to be in charge of all fighters assigned to provide air cover to the Brest
Group. This ensured full unity of command in the employment of fighter aircraft
in support of the Brest Group during the execution of the operation.
The Royal Navy also was highly centralized. The Admiralty and its First Sea
Lord had full command and control over subordinate commands. The highest
operational level of seagoing command was the Home Fleet. With the exception of the Western Approaches Command, all shore commands were of the
operational-tactical level. A major problem in planning and executing Plan
FULLER was the lack of a single joint operational commander.
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Experience shows that planning and executing a major naval/joint operation
require the appointment of a single operational commander entrusted with full
responsibility and full authority over all subordinate forces. The most-effective planning and execution are ensured by applying the concept of supported and supporting
operational commanders. Supporting commanders then are obligated to provide
full support to the supported operational commander.
During the fall and winter of 1941, Admiral Raeder met several times with
Hitler at the latter’s headquarters at Rastenburg to discuss the future employment of heavy surface ships in the war against Allied maritime commerce. Unlike
Raeder, Hitler was increasingly skeptical about the survivability of heavy ships in
the face of the enemy threat from the air. By late 1941, he decided that the remaining battleships and heavy cruisers had to be redeployed to Norway to counter
a possible enemy landing and to attack the enemy’s convoys to Soviet Russia.
Raeder agreed with Hitler about the need to shift the Kriegsmarine’s Schwerpunkt
to the northern area, yet he continued to insist that there was a future for the
employment of heavy ships in the Atlantic.
Raeder also had detailed exchanges of views with Admirals Saalwächter, Carls,
and Ciliax on the future of the Brest Group. (Apparently Admiral Schniewind,
the fleet commander, was not involved in these discussions.) In what was a
standard practice in the Kriegsmarine, Raeder and his three subordinate admirals each expressed their views on the situation in a memo. They all agreed
that a breakout of the group into the Atlantic followed by a transit through the
Iceland–Scotland passages was unfeasible; in contrast, a breakout through the
Channel had a greater chance of success, although it still was highly risky. All
four admirals were against Hitler’s idea that if the Brest Group could not transit
through the Channel the battleships should be disarmed and their guns used for
coastal defense; they presented these views to Hitler.
However, Hitler was determined that the Brest Group must be redeployed to
home waters and eventually moved to Norway. In his view, the risk of transit could
be reduced greatly by achieving surprise and by passing the Strait of Dover during
daylight hours. Despite Raeder’s strong opposition, Hitler on 10 January 1942 made
the final decision for a west-to-east transit by the Brest Group. Hitler also involved
himself deeply in the purely tactical aspects of the pending operation; normally, the
highest political-military leader should not be involved in such discussions.
The British possessed detailed and fairly accurate knowledge of the enemy’s
naval and air dispositions in the English Channel and its western and eastern
approaches. Their great advantage was a highly effective Admiralty OIC and
the ability to decode and read most of the enemy’s Enigma messages. Coastal
Command relied on photographic reconnaissance of Brest and its approaches to
observe the daily activities or movements of the ships of the Brest Group. The
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British also were able to have agents in the occupied part of France confirm the
results of their decoding and air reconnaissance.
Appreciations of the situation by the Admiralty and Coastal Command in
early February 1942 accurately foresaw that an enemy breakout from Brest was
imminent. Yet despite their extensive knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions, the
British did not have knowledge of the German plans for Operations CERBERUS
and DONNERKEIL. The question remained whether the Brest Group would try to
reach home waters through the Channel or via the Greenland–Iceland–Scotland
passages; they also considered that the German ships might sail through the
Strait of Gibraltar to reach Genoa, Italy.
German naval intelligence had few if any agents in England during the war;
B-Dienst was the main source of German intelligence both prior to and during
Operation CERBERUS. However, it was highly effective, and the Germans had
detailed and timely knowledge of the enemy’s naval and air order of battle in England and Scotland. In contrast, the Germans did not have sufficiently accurate
information on the coastal defenses in the area of Dover, and they greatly exaggerated the number of enemy torpedo boats in the Dover and Ramsgate areas.
Moreover, they did not know any details of the enemy plans.
Operational intelligence results from the proper fusion of tactical and strategic
intelligence. It is aimed at providing support to the planning and execution of a
major operation or campaign. Operational intelligence should be highly centralized
to ensure the most effective gathering, processing, and integration of all available
information. The best results are achieved by using diverse sources of information.
Overreliance on technical intelligence should be avoided; the decoding of enemy
messages can put one’s forces in great danger, because if the enemy learns or suspects
that the codes have been broken he can feed in false information.
The German plans for Operations CERBERUS and DONNERKEIL were based on
a relatively large number of both military and nonmilitary considerations. The
Germans were highly successful in their analysis of the impact of the weather
and selected hydrographic/oceanographic aspects of the situation on their plans
for the operation. Perhaps the most critical were selecting the month, day, and
time of sailing out from Brest; selecting the optimal time of the day for transiting through the most dangerous section of the route—the Strait of Dover; and
ensuring secrecy and surprise. The length of the night hours, the phase of the
moon, and the state of the tides and currents, plus the weather, were major factors in selecting the time frame for executing the operation. The time of sailing
out depended largely on the time selected for the transit of the Strait of Dover.
The German decision to transit the narrowest part of the English Channel during
daylight rather than at night was probably the single most important factor in
achieving surprise. Only in daylight was it possible for the Brest Group to enjoy
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effective air cover and the most-effective use of heavy guns and AA defenses
against attacks by enemy light forces and aircraft. The selected route had to run
over deep water and also beyond the effective range of enemy coastal radars. The
Germans conceived and coordinated many diverse measures and actions aimed
at deceiving the enemy prior to the start of operations. Jamming of the enemy
coastal radar stations was planned and executed.
A sound plan for a major naval/joint operation should be based on realistic and
detailed evaluation of the key aspects of the weather and hydrography/oceanography in the pending operating area. This is especially critical to the success of an operation in littoral waters. The effects of the duration of the night, the depths of water,
the strength and direction of the surface currents, and the tides / tidal currents on
the employment of one’s own forces and those of the enemy should be integrated fully
into the plan of the pending operation. The staff of the naval/maritime operational
commander should have a section composed of highly knowledgeable and experienced meteorologists and hydrographers/oceanographers to provide input to the
planning of a major naval/joint operation.
German planning was conducted using standard procedures for operations
such as CERBERUS. Admiral Saalwächter issued the operational instruction and
operation order. Thereafter, Admiral Ciliax issued more-detailed operation
orders for his group. Commodore Ruge was responsible for planning the employment of his security forces in support of the Brest Group. The 3rd Air Fleet
issued only an operation order. Naval and air plans were coordinated closely.
Admiral Ciliax did not have any large freedom of action in selecting the route
for the movement of his group, as normally would have been the case with
an operation on the open ocean; the reasons were geography and the need to
synchronize closely the actions of the Brest Group with the support provided
by light forces and the Luftwaffe. It was especially difficult to sequence and
synchronize the employment of the Luftwaffe fighter squadrons assigned to
provide air cover for the Brest Group, but continuous and effective air cover in
the Strait of Dover area and off the coast of Belgium and the Netherlands was
critical for preventing the enemy from inflicting serious damage on the Brest
Group.
British planning for an effort to prevent the Brest Group from reaching home waters through the Channel started shortly after Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau arrived in Brest in March 1941. Plan F ULLER was based on the
correct assumption that the safest option for the enemy was to redeploy the
Brest Group to home waters through the Channel. However, both the RAF
and the Admiralty allowed themselves to become too certain that the German
ships would transit the Strait of Dover at night, and that belief was reflected in
their plans. The possibility that the Germans might transit the strait in broad
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daylight was given short shrift; hence, no alternate plans to deal with such an
eventuality were developed.
Admiral Pound was justified in his concern about employing the heavy forces
of the Home Fleet in the confined and heavily mined waters of the southern
North Sea. However, the Admiralty should have made efforts to deceive the enemy, so he at least would wonder about that possibility.
Although various major commands made relatively sound arrangements to coordinate their actions during the execution of FULLER, they were not binding. The
British also did not have the concept of supported and supporting commanders.
Prior to planning a major naval/joint operation, it is highly useful to hold a
detailed discussion of the key elements of the pending operation—what in today’s
terms is called the operational design. The soundness of the plans depends on a
realistic assessment of all essential elements of the operational situation. The naval/maritime operational commander should make a quick and sound decision
instead of waiting to get more information and make the best decision. Regardless
of advances in technologies, the commander when doing so rarely will have full
knowledge of the operational or strategic situation. Planning should be detailed so
that the commander can improvise quickly to meet unforeseen situations encountered in combat. Proper understanding of the German-style Auftragstaktik (mission command) requires that the naval/maritime operational commanders issue
only broad operational instructions, while subordinate tactical commanders issue
more-detailed operation orders. Each major naval/joint operation in the littorals is
unique because of the particular characteristics of the operating area and the need
for the closest cooperation between naval forces and those of other services.
The Germans had about four weeks in which to complete all preparations for
Operations CERBERUS and DONNERKEIL. Naval Group Command West carried
out extensive mine clearance on the pending route of the Brest Group. Modern
minesweepers were redeployed from the Baltic to the French Channel ports.
This minesweeping was accompanied by efforts to disguise it as routine activity.
Supporting security forces and destroyers were deployed to their assigned ports.
At the same time, the 3rd Air Fleet’s fighters conducted rehearsals for providing
air cover over the Brest Group. The Germans were lucky that the enemy did not
become suspicious of all their activities prior to the start of Operation CERBERUS.
Perhaps one of the most critical, and also most successful, preparatory measures
was the Luftwaffe’s jamming of the enemy coastal radar stations. The Germans
were highly successful in acclimating the enemy radar operators to the everincreasing intensity of the jamming.
The British intensified their air reconnaissance of Brest and other major ports
on the French coast over the last ten days prior to the sortie of the Brest Group.
They redeployed various air units to the airfields envisaged under Plan FULLER.
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And they increased the combat readiness of their torpedo bombers, heavy bombers, and fighters.
No plan can be executed successfully without detailed and timely preparations.
The operational commander and subordinate tactical commanders should make
sure that their plans are updated and fully nested. All forces assigned to the operation should be deployed in timely fashion, but without arousing the enemy’s suspicions. Optimally, plans should be rehearsed, and by the forces assigned to carry out
the pending operation; whenever possible, this rehearsal should be in the form of
conducting a planning game / war game. Comprehensive measures of operations
security should be conducted to prevent the enemy from receiving warning of one’s
impending actions. Experience shows that one of the best methods of preserving
secrecy is to disguise preparations as routine activities.
Despite lack of unity of command at the operational level, the Germans
executed their naval and air plans for the breakout of the Brest Group almost
flawlessly. The ships of the Brest Group executed their mission even though their
crews lacked adequate sea training because of the ships’ prolonged stay at Brest.
The performance of the ships’ leaders and crews was remarkable. Although the
actual sailing out was delayed by more than two hours, the Brest Group used high
speed, the high tide, and the following current to recover almost all the time lost
by 1000 on 12 February. The Brest Group remained undetected until it nearly
had reached the Strait of Dover. The reasons were a series of technical mishaps
with Britain’s ASV radar and the Germans’ highly successful jamming of their
opponents’ coastal radars.
The British were caught completely by surprise and were unable to employ
their naval forces and aircraft systematically. But once the enemy ships were detected the British commanders acted energetically in executing Plan FULLER. The
initial British attacks were conducted by MTBs and the FAA’s obsolete torpedo
bombers. These were followed by attacks by the destroyers. Despite the great
courage displayed by all the commanders and crews, all these attacks failed. The
British light forces clearly were inadequate to the task of successfully engaging
much larger and more-powerful enemy heavy ships, along with their screening
vessels and very strong and continuous air cover. Only the heavy ships of the
Home Fleet might have stopped the Brest Group.
Despite their employment of very large numbers of heavy bombers and torpedo bombers, the British attacks caused no damage to the enemy ships. Several
factors explain this profound lack of success. Bad weather and low visibility in
the target area compounded the problem of finding the enemy ships at all. Most
of the separate attacks were carried out by a small number of, or even individual,
bombers. Last but not least, the German fighters and the AA defense provided
by the Brest Group itself were highly effective in preventing enemy aircraft from
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scoring hits. Fighter Command provided air cover to naval forces and bombers
during their attacks on the Brest Group.
Upon detection of enemy forces, operational commanders and their subordinates
should act quickly and aggressively, boldly and creatively, or success may not follow. No
plan possibly can foresee all the enemy’s actions and reactions. In executing the plan
for a major naval/joint operation, mission command generally should be applied. The
exception is a case in which the actions of a subordinate commander could endanger
the success of the mission as a whole or the missions of adjacent commanders. Sporadic
and individual attacks generally should be avoided. The actions of supporting forces
should be synchronized fully with the actions of the main forces. However, this should
not be carried so far as to affect adversely the success of individual force elements.
Operation CERBERUS was highly successful because of sound planning and
energetic and skillful execution. Being conducted in confined and navigationally
difficult waters, it required the closest cooperation between the Brest Group and
supporting forces, particularly the Luftwaffe.
Although Operation CERBERUS took place some eighty years ago, it continues
to provide many valuable lessons for today and into the future. Especially significant are the lessons related to the human factor. Among other things, Operation
CERBERUS demonstrates the timeless importance of such factors in naval warfare
as sound command organization and the application of true mission command;
a willingness to take high but prudent risks and act with boldness, aggressiveness,
and creativity; and high-quality training and combat readiness.
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REVIEW ESSAY

BACK TO THE FUTURE? HISTORY, ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
FATE OF NATIONS

Anand Toprani

The New Map: Energy, Climate, and the Clash of Nations, by
Daniel Yergin. New York: Penguin, 2020. 512 pages. $38.

Daniel Yergin’s Pulitzer Prize–winning The Prize was the rare work that appealed
to both specialists and general readers.1 It made the arcane history of one of the
world’s most vital industries accessible, even thrilling, by blending astute analysis
of oil policy and geopolitics with fascinating stories of the key personalities in the
history of the industry, from Texas wildcatters to Middle Eastern monarchs. The
Prize proved beyond a doubt that secure access to oil was a prerequisite to greatpower status in the twentieth century—but the world Yergin described therein
has changed.2 Today, the nations of the world are confronted with the challenge
of transitioning to a “green economy” that produces fewer greenhouse gases (in
total, not per capita) while still ensuring economic growth and prosperity. The
balance of power also has changed; the Euro-American hegemony, which hydrocarbons (both coal and oil) facilitated, is coming to an end, and the world is
reverting to a stage in which the bulk of economic activity is concentrated in East
and South Asia, as was the case before 1750.
The first part of Yergin’s book The New Map, on the United States, recounts
the familiar story of how a few pioneers, most notably George Mitchell, laid the
groundwork for a technological revolution that has transformed the U.S. energy
outlook from one of perceived long-term scarcity
Anand Toprani, PhD, is an associate professor in the to one of abundance. Yergin might have noted
Strategy and Policy Department of the Naval War that the “problems of abundance” are not new;
College.
indeed, The Prize recounted the frantic efforts of
previous generations of oil magnates and national
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policy makers to bring order to an unruly oil industry that alternated between
periods of boom and bust.3 Yet he argues that excess oil and gas may allow the
United States to play a stabilizing role in the global energy industry by reducing
excessive dependence on a fractured Middle East. Maybe so, if we assume that
the global consumption of oil and gas continues to rise or remains high enough
to sustain the necessary investment to extract existing sources. Unfortunately,
Yergin misses a tremendous opportunity to explain one of the foundations of the
American “shale revolution”—which also may be its Achilles’ heel.
Yergin implies that the credit for the shale revolution goes to plucky entrepreneurs, but this neglects the role of both government policy (particularly tax credits) and cheap financing from Wall Street. The latter was possible only because
of the low interest rates that prevailed following the 2008 financial crisis, which
gave shale firms the financial cushion necessary to thrive. Unfortunately, shale
has proved a poor investment. The output of shale wells still tends to collapse after the first few years of production, which means that firms must drill new wells
constantly just to maintain production. This means they cannot take advantage
of declining marginal costs of production, so they continue to burn through cash
raised on Wall Street. Over the last few years these financiers have become less
forthcoming, which means that larger firms are gobbling up profligate smaller
companies. Accordingly, U.S. oil production may have plateaued, because of a
dearth not of oil but rather of financing, as well as the interest larger firms have
in price stability.
The second part of the book focuses on Russia and its quest to retain global
influence and regional dominance through its extensive oil and gas reserves.
Yergin repeats a familiar argument that Russian hydrocarbon exports to Europe
may afford it a certain degree of geopolitical leverage, but he fails to explain
exactly why energy dependence also must entail political subservience. Clearly,
there are other factors at work. When Germans today weigh the choice of expanding their imports of Russian gas, they understand that Russia’s political interests contradict their own. Likewise, they are equally aware that American fury
at ventures such as the Nord Stream 2 pipeline have as much to do with the U.S.
desire to find reliable export markets for its new gas surplus as with American
animosity toward the Kremlin.
The third part of the book, on China, is perhaps the strongest. Here,
Yergin’s marvelous storytelling and captivating prose explain the historical
roots and contemporary significance of the ongoing dispute over sovereignty
in the South China Sea. It is clear that China’s claims, much like those of Iran
in the Persian Gulf, long predate today’s geopolitical feuds and are evidence of
historical continuities in Chinese policy making that predate the Communist
revolution. The clash between competing visions of world order—specifically, an
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Anglo-American transnational liberal empire that posits the free transit of goods
through international waterways, against China’s insistence on the supremacy of
national sovereignty—comes into sharp relief in disputes over the South China
Sea. At this stage, it is unclear whether or how the world’s two superpowers can
reconcile their disparate visions.
The fourth part of the book, unfortunately, loses narrative focus. It is broadly
about the Middle East, but it is unclear whose map we are studying. Yergin begins
with a rehash of the drafting of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, which divided
what are now Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine into British and French spheres
of influence, but the chapters that follow are not merely explorations of the consequences of that “old map.” Instead, they are a brief summary of twentieth-century
Middle Eastern history and contemporary security problems that range from
Saddam Hussein’s expansionism and the foundation of the Islamic Republic of
Iran to the depredations of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and the discovery
of major natural gas reserves in Israeli waters.
The fifth part of the book details the transformation of the automobile industry through the resurgence of electric vehicles, but what it really does is set
the stage for the final section, on anthropogenic climate change. Yergin accepts
the prevailing consensus of the scientific community that climate change poses
severe long-term risks to mankind. This means that even achieving a net-zero
carbon-emissions world (in which all the greenhouse gases produced can be
absorbed naturally or captured artificially) requires finding some alternative to
hydrocarbons, especially for power generation and transportation. He argues,
considering historical precedent, that any such transition to a green economy
must take time. Unfortunately, his consideration of prior “energy transitions” is
inadequate because he assumes that the only relevant factors are economic and
technological, along with consumer preferences. Current research on the transitions from wood to coal and coal to oil suggests, however, that government policy
and market power mattered far more than Yergin credits.4
Yergin also is skeptical of calls for swift divestment away from fossil fuels (for
either consumption or investment) because he justifiably is concerned about
current demand for energy. There are no alternatives, he notes, to jet fuel, and
far too many pension funds depend on returns from investments in oil and gas
firms. This seems to be a better argument for government-funded pensions than
for remaining dependent on high prices for oil company shares. Curiously, he
leaves out the fact that it was an oil company, BP, that created the notion of an
individual “carbon footprint”—a concept that has served to draw attention away
from national-level policy to control emissions.5
While Yergin is sensitive to the problem regarding alternatives, he may be using the wrong frame of analysis to evaluate them. It is difficult to justify costly
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actions today to deal with climate change, because our prevailing model of capitalism simply does not take into account the well-being of future generations.6
This is where governments can and should take the lead. While Yergin is dismissive of the “Green New Deal,” he admits that the Chinese government’s energetic
support created a world-beating solar panel industry in less than a decade. Individuals cannot by themselves make a meaningful contribution to fighting climate
change; only states have the necessary wherewithal. And if a state can, as in the
case of Chinese solar panels, rapidly drive down costs (85 percent over the past
decade), why cannot another state or states do the same for batteries, or “breakthrough technologies” such as carbon capture, or a new generation of nuclear
reactors, or hydrogen fuel cells?
It is essential that national-security officials not compartmentalize their
analysis of economic or security affairs. As one historian noted of the Great Depression, “markets can function only within a framework of rules, restraints, and
institutions capable of ensuring social and political as well as economic stability.”7
The creation of that framework is inherently a political act, one in which the use
or threat of force likely will be present. The geopolitics of the twenty-first century
will look very different from that of the twentieth century, but does that mean
that the lessons of the latter do not apply to the former? Will competition for oil
be eclipsed by that for rare earth metals or lithium, such that the form but not
the substance will change?8 Or does the possibility of achieving self-sufficiency
in energy consumption through renewables offer an alternative to interstate resource competition or interdependence?9 Most importantly, does the challenge of
climate change compel Americans to rethink their rivalry with China? Reading
The New Map will stimulate thinking along these lines, but doing so is only the
first step.

NOTES
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IN THE ARENA
From Hitler’s Germany to Saddam’s Iraq: The Enduring False Promise of Preventive War, by Scott A.
Silverstone. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019. 323 pages. $30.

Professor Scott Silverstone is a PhD
political scientist and retired American
naval officer currently teaching international relations at the U.S. Military
Academy. The title of his latest book,
From Hitler’s Germany to Saddam’s
Iraq, is perhaps a misnomer, yet the
book remains an excellent read. It
concentrates, first, on the folly of France
in invading the Ruhr Valley in 1923 to
enforce its claim to 80 percent of the
coal mined there to pay the indemnity
owed to France pursuant to the Treaty
of Versailles, and, second, on Britain’s
wisdom in refusing to join France then
or in a proposed invasion to eject German troops from the Rhineland in 1936.
According to Silverstone, a preventive
war is a war that a more powerful state
launches against a hostile state that
is becoming more powerful, to keep
the latter from becoming powerful
enough to threaten the former. His
thesis is that a preventive war usually
does not improve the security of the
state that initiates it; in fact, such a
war often makes that state less secure.
To succeed, the aggressor would need
the power to annihilate the victim.
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The book explains this by considering
Thucydides’s security paradox—that
is, that one state increasing its military
strength to protect itself from a potential
enemy can impel the supposed enemy
to increase its own military strength,
thereby preventing the first state from
improving its security, costing each
state more resources, and possibly
leading to war through fear of the
enemy. However, Professor Silverstone’s
theory is more elaborate than this. He
sees the false promise of preventive war
arising when the less powerful state
has a severe grievance against the more
powerful one, but the more powerful
state will not cooperate in resolving this
grievance and instead launches a war to
prevent the weaker state from becoming powerful enough to initiate the
military action. However, operational
victory on the battlefield does not mean,
ipso facto, achievement of strategic
political success; in fact, victory can
strengthen the loser’s determination.
In the 1920s and ’30s, Germany
had considerable grievances against
the Allies, especially France, which
bore the blame for the Treaty of
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Versailles’s imposition of war guilt, a
loss of territory, heavy indemnities,
and disarmament. When France and
Belgium invaded the Ruhr Valley in
1923, they turned enmity into rage. They
caused such disorder and suffering that
they opened the way for radical movements and ensured that the German
public would support enthusiastically
Hitler’s reoccupation of the Rhineland
in 1936. In other words, the French
invasion intensified German grievances
and helped to produce World War II.
Meanwhile, Britain in 1923 refused to
join what Silverstone calls the Ruhr
War, and the United States withdrew its
token occupation force. In 1936, Britain
resisted French pleas to join a proposed
invasion, because this, at best, merely
would have delayed German rearmament. Instead, the United Kingdom
doubled its defense budget in three
years. The real failure was in alliances,
specifically (1) the alienation of Italy
over its invasion of Ethiopia, (2) Belgian
neutrality and the country’s failure to
build its sector of the Maginot Line, and
(3) the Soviet Union’s breaking of its
defense pact with France by concluding
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Moreover,
Silverstone argues persuasively that an
invasion was unlikely to have overthrown, weakened, or deterred Hitler.
Finally, From Hitler’s Germany to Saddam’s Iraq is useful for its clarifications
of this period for an American audience.
One such clarification concerns the
severe consequences of the Ruhr War.
The Germans tried passive resistance
but escalated to sabotage as the French
occupation became more draconian.
Strikes, unemployment, riots, starvation,
and hyperinflation spread throughout
Germany. Another clarification is
that British politicians who became
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celebrities in the United States for
their opposition to appeasement (e.g.,
Winston Churchill) were not, in fact,
such proponents of forceful action as
they portrayed themselves to be in their
memoirs. Silverstone demonstrates this
through newspaper accounts, public
speeches, and formerly confidential
governmental memorandums. From
Hitler’s Germany to Saddam’s Iraq is
a useful warning against succumbing to the lure of preventive war.
KEVIN MCMULLEN

Last Mission to Tokyo: The Extraordinary Story
of the Doolittle Raiders and Their Final Fight for
Justice, by Michel Paradis. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2020. 480 pages. $28.

The April 1942 air raid on Tokyo—led
by then–Lieutenant Colonel James H.
Doolittle, U.S. Army Air Corps—marked
a turning point in World War II. The
“Doolittle Raiders” successfully attacked
the Japanese homeland for the first
time, and thereby shifted strategic
calculations in both the United States
and Japan. Although their daring
mission pushed the technological limits
of the day, most of the eighty Doolittle
Raiders survived the raid, eventually
returning home as heroes; however,
eight airmen were captured by the
Japanese. Last Mission to Tokyo picks up
the story with their capture and shows
how their legacy remains relevant—even
with regard to modern-day military
commissions at Guantánamo.
Using a nonfiction but narrative style
of writing, Paradis provides a wellresearched and easy-to-read account
of the captured Doolittle Raiders’ grim
fate, culminating in the U.S. Army’s
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effort to seek “justice” for them after
the Japanese surrendered. In doing
so, Paradis sheds new light on these
men, the military “commissions”
to which they were subject, and the
origins of common article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949—a
bedrock principle in international law
that ensures that captured enemies
receive “all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples” (p. 342).
As a professor at Columbia Law
School specializing in war crimes
law, Paradis grounds the book within
his professional expertise. He first
recounts Japan’s prosecution of the
captured Doolittle Raiders in 1942,
which resulted in convictions for all
eight and death sentences for three. He
then details the investigation, charging,
and prosecution of United States v.
Sawada, et al.—the U.S. Army’s postwar
case against the Japanese convening
authority, judges, and prison warden
involved in the 1942 commission.
The Sawada prosecutors’ driving concern
was the illegitimacy of the Japanese
trial of the captured Raiders. Paradis
provides a harrowing and meticulously
documented account of how the Japanese
tortured the men into “confessing” and
then used those “confessions” in an illegal “show trial” to obtain convictions and
death sentences. As Paradis writes, the
prosecution viewed these actions as a war
crime akin to “murder,” but the “murder
weapon was paperwork” (p. 217).
While recounting the details of Sawada,
Paradis also comments on the World
War II legal landscape. Using two
notable military commissions of the
era as reference points—Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), and In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)—Paradis
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fits Sawada into a historical context
familiar to national-security-law
practitioners. While this comes at
the expense of some discussion of
the larger political issues in postwar
Japan, Paradis nevertheless presents an
authoritative account of the Sawada
trial in a way that makes it relevant to
the national-security community today.
Although Paradis does not connect
Sawada expressly to modern-day
military commissions at Guantánamo,
the parallels are obvious. U.S. prosecutors alleged that Japanese officials
illegally denied the Doolittle Raiders
prisoner-of-war status. They further
alleged that the Japanese extracted
“confessions” using torture. Notably, the
Japanese used “the water cure”—known
today as waterboarding—stress
positions, isolation, and starvation,
among other torture techniques (pp.
19–20, 22–23, 56, 122, 243–44). The
Japanese passed a law after the 1942
attack on Tokyo that declared the
air raid to be a “violation of wartime
international law” (pp. 113, 282); U.S.
prosecutors viewed this as an illegal ex
post facto law, “written after the fact
for the purpose of trumping up charges
against the Doolittle Raiders” (p. 113).
American prosecutors even charged the
Japanese military judges with denying
the Doolittle Raiders a fair trial.
Today, many of the same issues haunt
the military commissions at Guantánamo. For example, U.S. officials have
denied Guantánamo detainees formal
prisoner-of-war status. U.S. officials
tortured detainees using waterboarding, stress positions, isolation, and
dietary manipulation, among other
techniques—facts that Dr. James E.
Mitchell made clear in a military commission report in January 2020. Defense
attorneys, with Paradis at the forefront,
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continue to challenge the statute the
United States is using to prosecute
Guantánamo detainees, arguing that it
is an illegal ex post facto law. And just
last year, Paradis obtained legal relief for
a Guantánamo detainee after arguing
that the military judge was biased.
To be sure, the legal landscape for
military justice has changed since
Sawada. On the heels of World War II,
the international community expanded
the judicial protections in the Geneva
Conventions and Congress passed the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. These
changes tethered military tribunals
to widely accepted legal standards,
which steadily enhanced their judicial
character over the next several decades.
Do the military commissions at
Guantánamo honor that tradition or
resurrect the same types of injustices
the Doolittle Raiders faced at the hands
of their Japanese captors? Last Mission
to Tokyo is a must-read book within the
national-security community, especially
for people trying to place the current
military commissions at Guantánamo
in historical and legal context.

professional. It is a literary rarity, boasting exceptional scholarship, clear
arguments, and a writing style so
sure and compelling that the reader
is both disappointed and surprised
to finish the last of its 670 pages.
Nolan examines what might be termed
the cult of the decisive battle that
leads to sharp, quick victory, as well
as the near-mythical reverence that
military scholars afford to commanders
who emerge victorious from such
conflicts. While acknowledging that
decisive battles can happen, Nolan then
convincingly demonstrates that such
battles are rare, and many (if not most)
battles thought to have been decisive
were not. He argues that wars very
rarely are won in such fashion; rather,
they are grinding contests of strength,
attrition, and force that, as warfare
has evolved, increasingly exhaust
the victors and destroy the losers.

The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have
Been Won and Lost, by Cathal J. Nolan. Oxford,
U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2017. 670 pages. $25.

The fact that some wars have been won
quickly—by great leaders who either created or benefited from the rare decisive
battle or quick campaign—has had a
pernicious effect on the evolution of military thought and culture. The so-called
cult of the offensive may have reached its
high-water mark in 1914, but it had been
building for centuries and still survives
to the present day. In contrast, as Nolan
points out, the benefits of defensive
strategies, of the careful husbanding of
troops and resources, rarely are extolled.

From first page to last, The Allure of
Battle is a remarkable, exceptional work.
Already gathering awards—notably,
the Gilder Lehrman Prize, recognizing
“the best book on military history in the
English-speaking world”—Nolan’s book
should be read by every serious student
of military history, as well as every
military officer and national-security

Nolan’s position puts him in direct
contradiction with canonical theorists
of war, including Carl von Clausewitz
and Alfred Thayer Mahan. Both argued
for the need to create the conditions
for victory through a decisive major
engagement. Criticizing these masters
guarantees that intellectual battle lines
will be drawn. The Allure of Battle then
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goes further when it depicts Napoléon
as the man who doomed France by
relying on ever-diminishing tactical and
operational success instead of creating
a long-term strategy to preserve and
strengthen his state. Napoléon had a
remarkable ten-year run, and at one
point truly was the master of Europe, but
his lack of strategic vision and planning
cost him his armies and his crown,
and devastated France in the process.
Weaker states have been drawn to the
chimera of the fast win, because their
leaders know it is their only chance,
however long the odds, of winning at
all. In other cases, initial success may
obscure a stark reality for a time, as
when the Japanese fleet roared across
the Pacific and German armored
divisions sliced through Europe in the
early 1940s. Nevertheless, Nolan argues
that German and Japanese leaders
knew, well before 1943, that their wars
were lost; the Allies’ industrial might
and resolve to stay in the fight signaled
an eventual, inevitable Axis defeat.
Although the book is a gem, there are
areas for small improvements. Despite
its look at the wars of Japan, the work is
self-admittedly Eurocentric. Coverage
of the U.S. Civil War is all but absent,
and there is not one mention of the
wars of South America—in particular,
the War of the Pacific, the War of the
Triple Alliance, and the Chaco War.
The omission is felt more keenly as the
history of these wars supports Nolan’s
thesis. Also missing is a serious look
at the centuries of colonial wars in
which there were many decisive battles,
and their potential impact on the
ideal of the quick win. It is deceptively
easy—but wrong—to dismiss these wars
as sideshows. Expanding the scope of
the book beyond the shores of Europe
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obviously would entail additional
chapters, but readers willing to invest in
nearly seven hundred pages of material
would not balk at a few hundred more.
Nolan also could have spent more time
examining when a strategy based on
decisive battle and a quick campaign
actually resulted in victory. He does
look at some cases, such as the German
victory in the Franco-Prussian War and
Frederick the Great’s conquest of Silesia,
but only to show that those conflicts
were not the avatars of decisive victory
that the victors and history made them
out to be. Conversely, although he
extols the virtues of more-defensive
strategies, more material on when and
where they worked would be welcome.
It would be grossly unfair to end this review on a negative note, however slight.
The Allure of Battle is a great book. Destined to be a classic, it is a welcome and
necessary addition to our understanding
of military history. It is also a great
read—exciting, engaging, and evocative.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Nimitz at Ease, by Michael A. Lilly. Apache Junction, AZ: Stairway, 2019. 367 pages. $29.95.

One of Chester Nimitz’s staff members,
interviewed in 1969, suggested that
“[i]t’s so easy to write about a man who
swings wildly when he’s on the quarterdeck of a ship, but Nimitz had to pull
together the pieces of a terribly riven
situation . . . , and these aren’t the things
that make exciting reading.” (See James
Bassett, oral history, Nimitz Library
Special Collections, U.S. Naval Academy,
Annapolis, MD, p. 9). As a result, this
staff officer concluded, a biography of
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Chester Nimitz would be difficult to
write. In spite of that, there is a quite
valuable biography of Nimitz written
nearly fifty years ago by Naval Academy
professor E. B. “Ned” Potter (Nimitz,
first published in 1976 and still in print).
Yet, as Nimitz’s former staff officer
noted, a combination of the character of
Nimitz’s job and the enigmatic nature
of the man himself kept much of
his personal life in the shadows.

Potter’s book as a life history, but it does
illuminate an aspect of Admiral Chester
Nimitz that heretofore has been hidden.

That is why this new book, Nimitz at
Ease, from retired Navy captain Michael
Lilly, is so useful. Lilly is a descendant of
H. Alexander Walker (known as Sandy)
and his wife, Una, who owned two
houses on Oahu during the years Nimitz
was Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet,
and who were great friends of Nimitz.
Moreover, Una kept a daily diary in
which she chronicled the social events
of the Walker family and their friend.
Captain Lilly came into possession of
the diary, as well as scores of private
letters and family photographs, and he
has assembled them into an account of
Nimitz’s private life during the admiral’s
time as Pacific Fleet commander.

Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster,
USA (Ret.), whose Dereliction of
Duty is a foundational case study
of American civil-military relations
during the Vietnam War, has produced
another superb exposition of civilmilitary relations. This time, McMaster
himself emerges as the case study, even
if unintentionally, in Battlegrounds:
The Fight to Defend the Free World.
Ostensibly a memoir of McMaster’s
time as national security advisor from
2017 to 2018, Battlegrounds offers so
much more. McMaster’s achievement
is all the more commendable (yet easily
overlooked) as he presents a timely
model of military professionalism and
civic virtue in the context of a sobering
analysis of the grave threats currently
facing the so-called free world.

What emerges is a portrait of Nimitz
as a man who was entirely comfortable
in his own skin. He enjoyed not only
playing horseshoes and practicing pistol
shooting (well chronicled elsewhere) but
also playing lawn tennis, roughhousing
with the Walker grandchildren, swimming long distances in the ocean, and
playing poker in shorts and an aloha
shirt after dinner on the Walkers’ lanai.
Una’s diary proves just how much time
Nimitz spent at their beach home, called
Muliwai, where he could escape from the
frenzy of his Pacific Fleet headquarters
in the “Cement Pot” on Makalapa Hill.
This is not a full biography by any
means, and it does not supplant
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Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World,
by H. R. McMaster. New York: HarperCollins,
2020. 560 pages. $35.

Combining easy prose and an approachable style with the experience and
intellect of a decorated general with a
PhD in history, McMaster has written
a book as accessible to the lay reader
as it is valuable to the national-security
professional. McMaster even exposes the
secret to his success; when asked why
he “was spending more time packing
books than clothes” for his work as
national security advisor, McMaster
responded that he “intended to draw
on history to help frame contemporary
challenges to national security” (p. 426).
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Taking Battlegrounds as a case in point,
McMaster weaves history together with
political and international-relations
theory, ethnography, psychology, and
even a healthy dose of classical wisdom
for good measure. The result is a
comprehensive survey of U.S. foreign
policy and national-security strategy.
McMaster foregrounds the discussion
with his observation that “strategic
narcissism” has plagued America’s
approach to global affairs since the
end of the Cold War. American policy
makers paradoxically have demonstrated
either too much optimism or too much
pessimism about America’s role in the
world; in either case, they have acted
as if America is the axis on which the
world rotates. In this, McMaster presents
his own paradox; he contends that the
United States has exhibited strategic narcissism in its behavior, but throughout
the book he portrays the United States as
uniquely responsible for the fate of the
free world. Still, if strategic narcissism is
the problem, then McMaster’s solution
is “strategic empathy,” which requires
studying and understanding other states,
societies, and individuals, including
their motivations, goals, and worldviews.
To underscore his thesis, McMaster
structures Battlegrounds around
the concept of strategic empathy by
dividing the book into six parts, each
of which examines a state or region
(e.g., Russia, China, the Middle East).
Each part contains two chapters, the
first of which sets the strategic context
for the challenges springing from each
state or region owing to factors such as
history, culture, and ideology, while the
second presents McMaster’s summary
of the dangers flowing therefrom, along
with his discerning recommendations
for tackling them. McMaster devotes
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a seventh substantive part to what
he identifies as “arenas” that the
United States urgently must address,
including cyber, space, climate, and
education. The stakes are high indeed.
Owing to their own specific perceptions,
interests, and intentions, states such as
China, Russia, and Iran are pursuing
aggressive policies that threaten the free
world. For instance, Xi Jinping and the
Chinese Communist Party defend their
actions as part of a “great rejuvenation”
that will see China enjoy the power and
prestige it once did, during its imperial
period. Vladimir Putin’s Russia, in the
aftermath of the Cold War and facing
troubling domestic trends, has settled on
a policy oriented more toward weakening rivals than to restoring its own
standing. Iran will continue to destabilize the Middle East—whether there
is a nuclear deal or not—owing to its
entrenched revolutionary theocracy. The
commonality among these states is that
the ideologies of their ruling regimes are
all implacably hostile to principles and
institutions cherished in the free world,
such as open society, representative
government, and individual liberty.
America’s adversaries also are exploiting
the transformations of the information
age—which optimists had hoped would
help spread freedom and democracy—to
strengthen their repressive regimes at
home and undermine constitutional
governments abroad. For example,
Russia has “turned the social network
ecosystem invented in the United States
against the American people, their
democratic system, and their common
identity” (p. 46). So, aside from the
need for strategic empathy as it pertains
to understanding others, McMaster
intimates that the United States could
benefit equally from self-reflection.
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After all, McMaster’s battlegrounds
are not only overseas but also here,
in the United States in a civil society
currently too partisan and polarized
to rally effectively against the forces
massed against the free world.
The Roman author Tacitus wrote that
one of the foremost functions of history
is to ensure that no worthy deed or
person goes unmentioned—or unstudied. He also believed that we honor those
deeds and individuals best through
emulation. Perhaps Battlegrounds
is most instructive in the example
McMaster sets as a soldier, scholar, and
citizen in a republic. Even when he
vigorously disagreed with the policies of
administrations of both political parties,
McMaster nevertheless discharged his
duties to the best of his abilities. He has
devoted his life to study and service
for the good of his country. If more
citizens and servicemembers follow his
example, we yet may turn the tide.
JEFFREY P. ROGG

Sons of the Waves: The Common Seaman in the
Heroic Age of Sail, by Stephen Taylor. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2020. 416 pages. $30.

Are sea stories true? Landsmen never
really know. Without direct experience
of life at sea it is impossible to separate
fact from fiction. Sailors have their
own vocabulary and they forge strong
bonds with each other. Sailors tell sea
stories to bridge the gap between their
world and the terrestrial world, but
when they do so they are unbound by
the constraints of commonly shared
experiences that limit imaginations
when two landsmen speak. At sea there
be dragons, sailors say, and landsmen
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have no way of disproving their claims;
sailors exploit that uncertainty.
For all these reasons, naval historians
always have treated sailors’ memoirs
with a great deal of caution. All
memoirs require careful handling
because the events being described
often took place decades earlier, and
the pressures of publishing provide
incentives for exaggeration and
sensationalism—and sailors hardly
need encouragement on that front.
Yet Stephen Taylor bases his new book
almost entirely on sailors’ memoirs,
and argues that they provide a better
window into the world of British sailors
in the age of sail than historians have
admitted previously. For Taylor, sea
stories are mostly true, and he has done
enough double-checking of the facts
available to show that we should take
seriously what they say about life at sea.
The central character in Taylor’s book is
Jack Tar. Most naval historians treat Jack
Tar as a caricature, but Taylor argues that
the popular perception of the common
British seaman is not far off base. Taylor
develops his character by narrating
the experiences of dozens of sailors
from 1740 through 1840. Jack circumnavigates the globe with Anson and
endures deadly slaving voyages; he fights
in major fleet battles and small-boat
actions; and he returns home to earn
his reputation for profligacy in port.
Throughout, Taylor maintains a healthy
skepticism of his sources, but that does
not stop him from repeating some of
the more implausible stories, such as
that of William Swallow. Taylor relishes
such capers, but he also examined the
available archival records to verify what
could be verified in Swallow’s story.
Sons of the Waves is a compendium of
sea stories, woven together in Taylor’s
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breezy, informal writing style. The result
is easy to read and engagingly illustrated.
In addition to the usual reasons to treat
sea stories skeptically, historians have
tended to be wary of them as sources
because of an argument put forward
most prominently by N. A. M. Rodger:
that many of the memoirs published
in the nineteenth century were thinly
disguised political polemics aimed at
ending the practice of impressment
and improving conditions on the lower
deck. In Rodger’s view, historians should
not fall into the trap of perpetuating
the myths of ships as floating jails and
press-gangs running rampant, because
so much of the source material is unreliable. Taylor addresses this view directly
and argues, on the contrary, that most
of the memoirs he uses were published
well after the debates about impressment
and corporal punishment had passed.
By taking sea stories seriously, then,
Taylor has brought together a range of
valuable sources for the social history of
the lower deck. All of Taylor’s memoirs
were readily available to naval historians
before, but his great accomplishment is
to have synthesized their perspectives
in one volume and demonstrated the
value in analyzing them. There is some
irony here, in that Taylor provides
plenty of evidence to support Rodger’s
depiction of the lower deck, despite
using sources that Rodger avoids. But
there is plenty of fuel for alternative
interpretations as well; Taylor repeatedly
shows the social and emotional cost of
impressment, the range of shipboard
disciplinary regimes, and the uncertainties of naval pay and pensions. Taylor
has not settled the debate, but he has
made a useful intervention in it.
A number of points emerge from
Taylor’s retelling of sailors’ experiences.
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The most important is that they were
not victims but rather rational assessors
of the maritime labor market who
sought competent captains and comfortable cruises. That is not to say that they
did not suffer in the age of impressment,
but rather that they did not accept their
fate passively. They voted with their feet,
deserting unhappy ships and volunteering for happy ones. That brought them
into conflict with the Admiralty’s need
to maintain ever-larger naval forces on
ever-more-distant stations, so what held
them together in difficult conditions
was teamwork. Sailors who were pressed
together stayed together—or, in the
words of Robert Hay, one of Taylor’s key
witnesses, “they bec[a]me endeared to
each other by a similarity of sufferings”
(p. 383). Sailors also had a voice, and
Taylor has helped us hear it more clearly.
As Taylor puts it, “One characteristic
stands out above all others in [Jack’s]
storytelling, and it is self-respect” (p. xv).
There was not one singular experience of
life on the lower deck, but the more we
can learn about that experience from the
men themselves, the closer we can get
to understanding their shared experiences. Whether or not all of Taylor’s
sea stories are true, they provide a vivid
account of life at sea in the age of sail.
EVAN WILSON

Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia
and Then Took On the West, by Catherine Belton. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2020. 640
pages. $35.

Catherine Belton’s Putin’s People has
received positive acclaim from most
reviewers, and with good reason. It
is a brave and impressive work of
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investigative journalism, packed with
details about the Russian officials who
assisted Vladimir Putin’s meteoric rise
to power and fascinating insights into
the mechanisms of power in modern
Russia. Belton has made an important
contribution to a broader understanding
of the topic. Nevertheless, scholars
should be judicious with Belton’s claims.
Putin’s People is simultaneously a tour
de force of investigative journalism and
exhibit A in the discussion over the
differences between first-rate journalism
and rigorous historical scholarship.
Belton, an investigative correspondent
for Reuters, has extensive experience in
Russia. She has reported for the Moscow
Times and Business Week, and from 2007
to 2013 was the Moscow correspondent
for the Financial Times; her credentials
in this regard are impeccable. Her book
begins by tracing how KGB officials,
seeing the writing on the wall at the end
of the Cold War, looted Soviet coffers of
funds intended for influence and intelligence operations around the world.
Belton then follows the money and
influence through the Yeltsin period,
exploring how the people around Putin—then a competent but nondescript
bureaucrat—enabled his rise. Once in
power, Putin and his people made use
of their extralegal power structures to
enrich themselves at the expense of the
state and to conduct ostensibly deniable
Kremlin influence operations in Europe
and the United States. Her narrative of
these events is bracing throughout.
Belton’s research is thorough
and meticulous, but her tone is
conspiratorial—a problem that hinders
much writing on Russia—and her
handling of sources is unlikely to pass
muster with professional historians. For
example, intelligence operations clearly
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fascinate her, but she falls for common
cloak-and-dagger tropes. Her opening
chapter on KGB operations in eastern
Europe, where people “disappear off the
grid” and Putin’s activities are “shrouded
in mystery,” is written breathlessly. But
it barely connects the future president
directly to that work, and only once does
she allow for the fact that intelligence
work is characterized largely by mundanity, not drama—a fact that any reader
of John Le Carré or member of an intelligence agency would know all too well.
Belton’s sources sometimes work in
service of her narrative rather than
the opposite, and can fail to meet the
higher standards that professional
historians expect. For example, after
recounting the loss by Putin’s mentor
Anatoly Sobchak of the 1996 Saint
Petersburg mayoral election, Belton
writes that “many believed” the loss
was the result of dirty tricks by people
around Sobchak’s rival Boris Yeltsin.
While such a campaign by Yeltsin was
possible, even likely, Belton’s sources
for this assertion are an interview with
Sobchak’s widow and a documentary
film produced by his daughter—hardly
objective stuff. This occasional combination of ambitious conclusions and weak
sourcing sometimes weighs down the
book’s otherwise interesting arguments
about the nature of power in Russia.
To be fair, Belton is a journalist, an
excellent one, but not a historian.
If the minor dustup over this book
on Twitter between historian Sergey
Radchenko and the Atlantic Council’s
Dylan Primakoff is any indication, this
is a distinction that sometimes is lost
on both professions. As an investigative
journalist, she is writing the proverbial
“first draft of history.” Viewed in these
terms, the book provides an excellent
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set of guideposts for future historians
to explore the power dynamics of
modern Russia, and should be read
alongside scholarly contributions such
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as Brian Taylor’s The Code of Putinism
and Karen Dawisha’s Putin’s Kleptocracy.
MICHAEL B. PETERSEN

OUR REVIEWERS

Kevin McMullen is an attorney who holds advanced degrees in law, diplomacy, and comparative
government. He retired from the U.S. Army Reserve as a lieutenant colonel of infantry.
Jacob Meusch is a lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy, Judge Advocate General’s Corps. An
active-duty lawyer, he currently is assigned to the Military Commissions Defense Organization.
Richard J. Norton is a professor of national-security affairs at the College.
Michael B. Petersen is the director of the Russia Maritime Studies Institute and an associate professor at the College. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Maryland, College Park.
Jeffrey P. Rogg is a postdoctoral fellow in the National Security Affairs Department at the College.
He received his PhD from the Ohio State University.
Craig L. Symonds is the Ernest J. King Distinguished Professor of Maritime History at the College
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REFLEC TIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program
Manager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading

O

Program.

n 23 February 2021, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Michael
M. Gilday, USN, released his update to the CNO Professional Reading
Program (CNO-PRP). He identified fifty-three books of particular benefit to
the professional development of all sailors, E-1 to O-10. The titles and authors of
these books were identified in the previous issue of the Naval War College Review
(Spring 2021).
The master chief petty officer of the Navy (MCPON) also identified a list of
books he believes to be of special value to the enlisted force. However, to be clear:
any sailor, of any rank, can read any book on the two lists. The differentiation is
intended simply to serve as a guide if readers want to focus their limited time on
the books most appropriate to their level of experience.
The twenty-one books on the MCPON’s suggested reading list are listed below
by title and author or editor.
Blink		
Brave New World
A Call to Conscience

Malcolm Gladwell
Aldous Huxley
Clayborne Carson and Kris Shepard, eds.

Cannonball!		

Brock Yates

The Captain Class

Sam Walker

Class 11		
Descent into Darkness
Duty		

T. J. Waters
Edward C. Raymer
Robert M. Gates

The Good Shepherd

C. S. Forester

The Happiness Advantage

Shawn Achor
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Jonathan Livingston Seagull

Richard Bach

The Old Man’s Trail

Tom Campbell

The Only Woman in the Room

Marie Benedict

Overcome		

Jason Redman

Perform under Pressure

Ceri Evans

Run Silent, Run Deep

Edward L. Beach

Shoot the Women First

Eileen MacDonald

Starship Troopers

Robert A. Heinlein

Team of Teams

Stanley McChrystal

Tragedy at Honda

Charles A. Lockwood and Hans Christian Adamson

We Die Alone		

David Howarth

All seventy-four books are highlighted and summarized on the CNOPRP website, which can be found at navy.mil/CNO-Professional-Reading
-Program/. On this site, sailors also can download the “U.S. Navy Reading
Checklist,” a one-page listing of all titles arrayed in their various topical categories and according to suggested experience levels. It can serve as a motivational
tool for dedicated readers to use to record their progress through the world of
professional reading—you can check out the books, then check them off the list
as you read them!
A few of the books featured in the recently revised CNO-PRP have been considered controversial by some critics. CNO Gilday has responded to this criticism
by noting, “While I do not endorse every viewpoint of the books on this reading
list, I believe exposure to varied ideas improves the critical thinking skills of our
Sailors. My commitment to them is to continue to listen, make sure their voice
is heard, and make the Navy a shining example of an organization centered on
respect, inclusive of all.”
Author Thomas Brown addresses the value of reading opposing views when
he notes that
we should be approaching new writing with the purpose of understanding not disproving. Our aim should be to learn, not to defeat. In doing this we will likely come
to better engage with our own ideas as well as the ones being presented on the page in
front of you.
This is important as while you may whole-heartedly disagree with what a piece of
literature is saying, there is always something that can be gained from reading it. You
might encounter a new perspective on a topic you have never considered; you might
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learn of a new topic you never knew existed; you might entirely change your opinion
on something. None of this is guaranteed, but you won’t know for sure unless you
read with an understanding approach.*

As the CNO and MCPON say, we should all “Read Well to Lead Well”!

JOHN E. JACKSON

* Thomas Brown, “How to Read Something You Don’t Agree With and Why We Should Do It More
Often,” Medium, 1 March 2019, tbrown12321.medium.com/.
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